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Earnings Top-up (ETU) was an in-work benefit available to low paid workers
without children.  ETU was piloted from October 1996 to October 1999 in
eight areas across Britain.  This volume is part of a set of seven final reports
from the evaluation of the ETU pilot.  (Baseline statistics were published in
1999, in DSS Research Report No. 95, and interim evaluation findings
were published in March 2000, DSS Research Reports Nos. 112 and 113).
The evaluation was conducted by researchers at the Policy Studies Institute
(PSI), the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at Loughborough
University and the Institute for Employment Research (IER) at the University
of Warwick.  Outline details of the evaluation are provided in this report.
Further information on the evaluation can be found in the six other final
reports from the ETU evaluation:
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: The Synthesis Report (Marsh, A., 2001,
Department of Social Security Research Report No. 135).  This report
draws together the main results of the evaluation in one volume.  The aim
of this report is to provide a relatively short and non-technical overview of
the evaluation’s conclusions drawn from all strands of the evaluation.  It is
intended that this will help readers identify the sources to which they can
turn for fuller information on the evaluation.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Employers’ reactions (Lissenburgh, S.,
Hasluck, C and Green A., 2001, Department of Social Security Research
Report No. 132). This report is in two parts.  The first presents findings
from the surveys with employers carried out by PSI during the ETU pilot.
It explores employer’s experiences of ETU focusing on wage effects and
hours worked.  The second part is econometric analysis, undertaken by
IER, which considers the effects of ETU on employers’ behaviour and the
recruitment process.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Effects on Low Paid Workers (Marsh,
A., Stephenson, A., Dorsett, R and Elias, P., 2001, Department of Social
Security Research Report No. 134).  This report is in two parts.  The first
section, by PSI, presents findings of the surveys conducted with low paid
workers and ETU recipients throughout the pilot.  It explores the
characteristics of these workers and the effect that ETU had on their lives
and examines the reasons for non take-up of ETU among eligible workers.
The second part, by IER, analyses the same data to explore the wider labour
market and potential long-term effects of ETU.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Qualitative Evidence (Heaver, C.
Roberts, S. Stafford, B. and Vincent, J. 2001, Department of Social Security
Research Report No. 133).  This report presents the findings of qualitative
research conducted by CRSP as part of the evaluation of ETU.  The report
has three parts focusing on ex-recipients of ETU, self-employed recipients
and unsuccessful ETU applicants.
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Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Staff Views (Vincent J., Heaver, C.,
Roberts, S. and Stafford, B., 2001, Department of Social Security In-house
Research Report No. 74).  This report presents the findings of the staff
panels drawn from the eight pilot areas, and from central administrative/
processing staff from the Benefits Agency and Employment Service staff
over the three years of the pilot.  The report focuses on staff’s views of ETU
and the way in which it operated within the pilot areas.  It also considers
changes over time from the beginning of the pilot to its end in 1999.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Labour Market Conditions (Green, A.
2001, Department of Social Security In-house Research Report No. 75)
This report, by IER, draws out the contrasts and similarities in labour market
conditions across local areas included in the ETU pilot.
Previously published research in the ETU series include:
Low Paid Work in Britain (Marsh, A., Callender, C., Finlayson, L.,
Ford, R., Green, A and White, M., 1999, Department of Social Security
Research Report No. 95).  This report presents the findings from the first
surveys conducted prior to the introduction of Earnings Top-up, with
employers low paid workers and medium term unemployed people.  Baseline
data on the characteristics of these groups are presented, including health
and education, wage expectations, earnings, wage setting behaviour and
recruitment.  Preliminary information on the labour market profiles of the
evaluation areas is also included.
The First Effects of Earnings Top-up (Finlayson, L., Ford, R., Marsh,
A., Smith, A., and White, M., 1999, Department of Social Security Research
Report No. 112).  This report presents the findings from surveys conducted
in 1997, almost one year after the introduction of ETU with employers,
low paid workers, medium term unemployed people and ETU recipients.
The report presents interim analysis of the first effects of ETU over this
period.
Piloting Change (Vincent, J., Abbott, D., Heaver, C., Maguire, S., Miles,
A., Stafford, D., 1999, Department of Social Security Research Report No.
113).  This report presents the interim findings from three components of
the ETU qualitative research: two group discussions with Employment
Service and Benefits Agency staff; face-to-face interviews with ETU
recipients; and telephone interviews with employers.
This report consists of two parts, both of which provide crucial evidence
that informs the conclusions of the evaluation of ETU:
Part One, by Alan Marsh, Augusta Stephenson and Richard Dorsett
contains the findings of the surveys conducted with low paid workers and
ETU recipients throughout the ETU pilot.  It explores the characteristics of
these workers and the effect that ETU had on their lives and examines the
reasons for non take-up of ETU among eligible workers.
Part Two, by Peter Elias presents the econometric analysis.  This outlines
the same data as in the first part of the report to explore the wider labour
market and potential long-term effects of ETU.
1SUMMARY
Earnings Top-up - Earnings Top-up (ETU) was an in-work benefit for
people without dependent children, introduced in October 1996 in eight
areas for a three-year pilot period.  Its main objectives were to improve
the incentive for unemployed people to take low-paid work, and to help
low-paid workers remain in work by raising their incomes relative to
out-of-work support.  ETU was paid at a fixed rate for 26 weeks to
people working 16 or more hours per week, with a premium for 30
hours or more.  The maximum payment was reduced by 70p for each
pound of income above the earnings thresholds.  It was payable at two
different rates, Scheme A and Scheme B, each in four areas, and rates also
differed between couples, single people aged 18-24, and single people
aged 25 or over (Table 1.1).  (Section 1.2)
The ETU evaluation - The eight test areas were matched with four
corresponding control areas.  All the areas were chosen for their high
level of unemployment, high number of job vacancies and high proportion
of low-paid vacancies.  They represented four types of labour markets:
large towns, major urban, seaside, and rural areas (Table 1.2).  As part of
the programme of evaluation research, several surveys of low-paid workers
and ETU recipients were carried out (Figure 1.1) (Section 1.3)
The progress of ETU - The projected caseload was reached after 14
months, and the caseload stabilised in mid-1998 at around 24,000.  In
March 1999, 46 per cent of recipients were single over 25s, 40 per cent
single under 25s, and 14 per cent couples.  From April 1999, when the
National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced, the caseload declined,
mostly at the expense of young single recipients, consistent with NMW
increasing their wages above their limited ETU entitlement (Figure 1.2).
Women were a slight majority and the proportion of self-employed
recipients rose from seven per cent to 12 per cent during the evaluation
period.  (Section 1.4.1).  At August 1999, prior to claiming ETU, 18 per
cent of recipients had been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance or Income
Support, a fall of seven per cent since April 1998 (Section 1.4.4)
Despite measures intended to balance the caseloads in the two schemes,
Scheme B attracted more customers than Scheme A (Figure 1.3), largely
because of the very high caseload in Sunderland (major urban area B) -
Scheme A recipients only outnumbered those in Scheme B in the rural
areas.  In particular, Scheme B attracted far more young single people
than Scheme A (Figure 1.5).  Furthermore, northern industrial regions
contained many more recipients than southern seaside areas (Figure 1.4).
(Section 1.4.2)
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2Hours and wages were relatively stable for most of the pilot period, but
following the introduction of NMW, the average gross weekly earnings
of employees claiming ETU increased slightly, while the average hours
worked declined (Table 1.5).  This indicates that some employees working
longer hours had become ineligible for ETU when their hourly rate
rose. (Section 1.4.3)
Key characteristics of ETU recipients - A small majority of the sample
were women, and ETU receipt was concentrated among young and
single people (Table 2.2) (Section 2.3.1).  Half had no formal housing
costs, 42 per cent were living in their parents’ home (Table 2.3).  ETU
counted as assessable income for Housing Benefit (HB) claims, but there
seemed little conflict.  Only one-third were tenants (Table 2.3) and among
those who remained eligible recipients of ETU at interview, only 43 per
cent would receive more HB if they ceased to receive ETU (Table 2.6).
(Section 2.3.2)
Just 17 per cent had a health problem (Table 2.7, Section 2.3.3), but
levels of education and training were low.  The highest academic
qualification of half the respondents was at GCSE level and almost all the
rest had no academic qualifications.  Almost one-third overall had no
qualifications of any kind (Table 2.8).  Eleven per cent of respondents
were unemployed at interview (Table 2.10), but 90 per cent of those
who remained in work of 16 or more hours had a permanent job, though
just five per cent were in a managerial, professional or technical occupation
(Table 2.11).  Forty-four per cent worked part-time (Table 2.12), but
only eight per cent had changed their hours as a result of claiming ETU.
(Section 2.3.5)
Some of the ETU recipients had financial problems - 29 per cent were in
‘severe hardship’ (Table 2.17).  Those in non-working households were
worse off than those who remained eligible, but those in working
households which had become ineligible were better off than the rest
(Table 2.18).  (Section 2.3.6)
Claiming ETU - One-third of respondents had become ineligible for
ETU by their interview, and 13 per cent of those who remained eligible
no longer received ETU.  Of those no longer eligible, half were no
longer in work of 16 or more hours (Table 2.20), but the other half
worked longer hours for higher pay than those who remained eligible
(Table 2.21) (Section 2.4.1).  Delays in claiming were fairly rare and
most delay was caused by uncertainty.  The most common reason for
applying for ETU was that the respondent had just found out about it –
getting a new job came third.  Word of mouth was a very important
source of information, though over one-third had been told about ETU
by an official (Table 2.23).  However, knowledge levels regarding the
rules were low.  (Section 2.4.2)
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3Did ETU make a difference? - Half of those taking their job since ETU’s
introduction had been aware that they might qualify (Section 2.5.1).  Of
these, 56 per cent would have accepted the job at the wages offered
without ETU.  Of the remainder, 43 per cent would have asked for
longer hours (Section 2.5.2).  Just 15 per cent of the few who discussed
it with their employer at the time felt ETU had made a difference to
their getting a job, and just six per cent of workers receiving ETU would
stop working if they ceased to get it.  Half said they would continue their
present job, though half of those would want more money or hours.
However, 72 per cent of respondents felt that without ETU they would
have had to cut back or could not have managed at all.  Those who
started their job before ETU’s introduction were just as likely to find it
indispensable as those who did not.  (Section 2.5.3)
Britain’s low-paid workers - Spells of unemployment were common
among the low-paid workers and only two-thirds remained in work of
16 or more hours per week at interview (Table 3.1).  A quarter were
ineligible for ETU because neither they (nor a partner if they had one)
were working 16 or more hours.  However, employment histories were
similar in the pilot and control areas (Table 3.2) (Section 3.3.1).  Median
pay rates had risen among the workers-in-work since 1996, but hours of
work had fallen sharply (Table 3.6).  One in six workers appeared to be
below the National Minimum Wage and net weekly wages were typically
between £100 and £140 a week.  (Section 3.3.5)
Respondents tended to be either young, single and living with their
parents or older couples who owned their home outright or still had a
small mortgage (Section 3.3.2).  Few were tenants, less than a fifth paid
rent and only a third of these received Housing Benefit (Table 3.4).
Overall, only three per cent of those working 16 or more hours per
week continued to get Housing Benefit in work.  (Section 3.3.3)
Women were a small majority (Table 3.3).  Rates of illness and disability
were high - 28 per cent had a long-term health problem (Table 3.3) -
and, in addition, these respondents were poorly educated.  More than
half had no qualifications (Table 3.3), rising to eight out of ten among
older workers, while the young rarely had more than basic or vocational
qualifications.  (Section 3.3.2)
The economic and social profile of workers did not differ significantly
between Scheme A, Scheme B and Control Areas, nor between the
1996 and 1999 samples, except that the later sample contained more
older workers (Table 3.3).  (Section 3.3.2)
Awareness, eligibility and claiming - Awareness of ETU was low and
falling – only 29 per cent had heard of a new benefit for working people
without dependent children (Table 3.8).  Even in places where ETU was
more popular, two-thirds were unaware of it and fewer could name
Chapter 3 - The impact of
Earnings Top-up on workers-
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4ETU.  (Section 3.4.1).  The effectiveness of networks as sources of
information had risen since 1997 to 44 per cent, but 29 per cent had
been told by the DSS, Employment Service or Benefits Agency.  (Section
3.4.2)
Overall, 47 per cent of current workers in the pilot areas qualified for
ETU, 39 per cent in A and 54 per cent in B (Table 3.12).  However, if
B rates were available in Scheme A, B and Control areas, about half the
sample would have qualified in each area, underscoring the all-important
similarity between them (Table 3.12).  (Section 3.5.2)
Eight out of ten low-paid workers still in work of 16 or more hours at
interview had never claimed ETU.  Current receipt was concentrated
among older single women, while receipt among couples and home-
owners was rare.  (Section 3.6.2).  The proportion of eligible workers
claiming ETU rose from the 18 per cent found in the 1997 follow-up
sample, but remained low at 23 per cent overall: 14 per cent in Scheme
A and 30 per cent in Scheme B (Table 3.14).  (Section 3.6.3)
Take-up among couples  - The small proportion of couples among the
ETU caseload was due to non-take-up among eligible working couples,
not to a lower rate of eligibility. Eligible couples were about as numerous
as the eligible single workers were, but only 10 per cent of them claimed
their ETU compared with 37 per cent of single people.  In Scheme B
single people had a take-up rate of 43 per cent, which was much more in
line with expectations, especially since the new benefit had had so little
public promotion.  (Section 4.2.1)
Modelling take-up rates - Multivariate analysis indicated that, other things
being equal:
• Eligible workers who took up their entitlement to ETU were young,
single workers, many of them living in Sunderland and Doncaster.
They worked shorter hours and so had lower earnings, higher
entitlements and felt hard up.  Often they had experience of claiming
other income-tested benefits such as Housing Benefit and Family Credit
or came from families who did.  (Section 4.3.3)
• Eligible workers who failed to take up their entitlement to ETU were
couples, especially dual-earner couples, and older people who either
owned their own homes or lived in some other arrangement rather
than as homebuyers or tenants.  Additionally one of them might be
receiving a disability benefit.  They lived in a Scheme A area or in
Bournemouth. They had no experience of claiming other income-
tested benefits, had slightly higher earnings and so were entitled to
slightly lower amounts of ETU and they were used to managing on a
low income.  (Section 4.3.3)
Chapter 4 - Eligibility and
claiming ETU: why did so
many low-paid workers fail to
take up their entitlement to
ETU?
5In addition, the lack of publicity was crucial.  In the first six months it
was limited to non-electronic media and then it vanished altogether,
leaving it to official and informal networks to inform workers of ETU.
Few eligible non-claimants were aware of the benefit.  Geographical and
social isolation were important factors in inhibiting claims among eligible
workers.  In geographical terms, eligibility under Scheme A was confined
to too small a band of the lowest incomes.  This meant that eligibility was
too sparsely scattered to support adequate networks of informal information
that would prompt others to claim.  In social terms, lowest-paid older
couples, dual earners, homeowners, people with disabled partners and so
on were all groups isolated from streams of information that would prompt
claiming a new in-work benefit, even in Scheme B areas.  (Section 4.3.3)
Skill transfer was also important. It is highly significant that claiming
ETU was both need-driven and associated independently with prior
experience of claiming income-tested benefits, especially in claiming
Housing Benefit and Family Credit.  Those picking up their entitlements,
as well as being young, single and connected to information sources,
were the lowest-paid of eligible workers and sensitised to news of a subsidy
by the experience of hardship. (Section 4.3.3)
Workers interviewed before the introduction of ETU were followed up
twice, first in 1997 and again in 1998.  Alongside them, ETU recipients
interviewed in 1997 were also followed up in 1998.  (Section 5.1)
There was no evidence that workers left their jobs at a slower rate in the
Scheme A or B areas compared with the Control areas.  Nor was there
direct evidence of people claiming ETU and so hanging on to their jobs
longer.  Furthermore, there was no indirect evidence of job retention
being better in the presence of ETU in the Scheme A or B areas compared
with the Control areas.  (Section 5.4.2)
Nor was there any retrospective evidence in the 1999 surveys that workers
in the Scheme A or B areas had had better or more secure work histories,
either directly as a result of receiving ETU or by working in a more
secure employment market that was now underwritten by wage subsidy.
Department of Social Security (DSS) records of awards of ETU and of
Family Credit were examined for two possible effects resulting from the
introduction of ETU (Section 6.1):
• A wage effect - The wage bargaining position of everyone at the bottom
end of the wage distribution might become weaker.  Employers might
respond to the increasing numbers willing to work for very low wages
by buying labour more cheaply, that is low wages might become lower
or remain steady.
• A substitution effect - ETU recipients might move into jobs currently
occupied by low-paid workers with children claiming FC if few new
jobs were created by the introduction of ETU.
Chapter 5 - Job retention
among ETU workers
Chapter 6 - Examining wage
and substitution effects using
administrative data
6In practice, there are reasons why we might not expect to find such
effects as a result of the ETU pilot scheme (Section 6.1):
• Around seven in 10 ETU recipients were already in work when they
applied for the benefit, giving employers less scope to reduce wages
than they would have if they were fixing the wage of a new job.
• Both the number of claims and the proportion of eligible workers
who claimed were relatively low.  It is unlikely that the wage bargaining
and employment position of low-paid workers would have been
weakened by the introduction of ETU at this take-up and take-up
rate.
• Though FC recipients also occupied the low-paid end of the labour
market, they worked for wages which were, on average, higher than
the wages of those claiming ETU and they were different populations
in many respects.  ETU would not necessarily have significant effects
on the slightly different labour market they occupied.
Administrative data on the wages of ETU recipients themselves offered
no conclusive evidence that employers responded to ETU by holding
down the wages of ETU recipients (Section 6.2.1).  However the failure
of ETU recipients’ wages to rise across the evaluation period to April
1999, particularly among couples, suggests that it should not be ruled out
as a possibility.
In the Family Credit wage data, similar trends occurred both before and
after the introduction of ETU and in pilot areas, control areas and areas
outside the evaluation alike.  That is, they showed no significant effect
on the wages earned by FC recipients in the same workforces as those
chosen for the ETU pilot, compared with the control areas and with the
rest of Britain (Section 6.2.2).  Wage data for employed lone mothers on
FC, who typically earned lower weekly wages than other employees on
FC and might therefore be the most vulnerable to an ETU wage effect,
gave no indication of a downward pressure on their wages caused by the
introduction of ETU.  This was true generally and also specifically within
Sunderland where ETU had penetrated a significantly larger proportion
of the low-paid workers without children than it had elsewhere.
There was no evidence from the data as a whole of a substitution effect
occurring among FC recipients in the pilot areas.  This was true for both
FC recipients as whole and specifically for employed lone mothers
receiving FC whose weekly wages were on average lower than those of
other employees receiving FC and therefore closer to those of ETU
recipients (Section 6.3).
7The administrative data - Overall, evidence taken solely from
administrative data would have concluded that ETU was on balance a
success.  In particular, data on the wages of ETU recipients offered no
conclusive evidence that employers had responded to ETU by lowering
or holding down the wages of workers in the low-paid end of the labour
market, although it could not be ruled out.  The Family Credit data
showed no significant effect of ETU on the wages earned by FC recipients
in the ETU pilot areas.  Nor was there any evidence of ETU eligible
workers replacing FC eligible workers in the pilot areas at lower wages.
(Section 7.1)
The surveys of ETU recipients and the workers-in-work - Earnings Top-
up reached the people it was intended to reach – the lowest-paid workers
with little education, small housing costs and a record of unemployment
- but it did not reach enough of them.  However, those it did reach were
glad to have it and there was evidence that it met need.  (Sections 7.2 and
7.3)
Explaining non-take-up and its implications for policy - A large proportion
of non-take-up among eligible workers was accounted for by:
• the absence of main-media publicity;
• the sparse distribution of eligibility under Scheme A; and
• the social and economic isolation of older couples and their lack of
claiming-skills.  (Section 7.4.2)
The much higher take-up rate among those already attuned to the benefit
system - younger low-paid single workers and tenants living in Scheme
B areas - indicated that a new version of the benefit could be more
successful, especially one that:
• allowed for the introduction of the National Minimum Wage with
adjusted thresholds;
• adopted a shallower taper like Working Families’ Tax Credit, that is
one which was withdrawn at a lower rate against income above the
earnings threshold;
• was backed by national television and radio advertising which would
penetrate the relative isolation of poorly paid older couples, especially
dual earner couples and those who have their own homes, or work in
residential settings.  (Section 7.5)
Such a benefit or tax credit would extend eligibility to large numbers of
lower-paid workers, especially so if the estimates of the take-up rate for
ETU from the workers-in-work surveys were accurate.  Evidence from
the surveys of ETU recipients suggests that they were accurate.  (Section
7.6)
Chapter 7 - Conclusions
8Job retention - No evidence was found to encourage the view that people
kept the jobs they had more easily because of support from ETU, though
qualitative research found that some people said they would find it hard
to cope without ETU (Heaver et al, 2001).  (Section 7.7)
Conclusion - There was little evidence from the evaluation surveys of
ETU recipients and workers to oppose the view that most of the
expenditure on ETU in the pilot areas went to people who:
• would anyway have done the jobs they did; or
• took the jobs they would have taken;
• worked the hours they would have worked; and
• worked for the wages they would have otherwise accepted.  (Section
7.8)
This part presents results from a study of the wider labour market and
possible long-term effects of the Earnings Top-up (ETU) pilot scheme.
Designed to assist single people and couples without children to move
into and retain low-paid employment, the scheme has the potential to
create higher levels of employment.  Substitution and displacement
mechanisms, through which the employment of recipients of ETU may
reduce employment opportunities for non-recipients, could counteract
this effect.  Using survey data, a statistical analysis of the duration of
employment and non-employment spells is conducted to examine for
substitution and displacement effects.  No statistically significant effects
can be detected within the data.
In terms of the potential longer-term impacts of the scheme, some
interesting findings emerge.  It appears that the earlier experience of
employment, in the five years preceding the scheme, is significantly lower
on average for scheme participants compared with a sample of low-paid
workers.  Most interestingly, as the scheme winds down there is no
immediate return to the pre-scheme low employment rates demonstrated
by ETU recipients.  While it remains too early to conclude that the
scheme raised the long-term average employment rate among those who
participated, it does appear to be the case that the scheme affects the
propensity of the ex-participants to remain in employment beyond the
lifetime of the scheme itself.
Part Two - Econometric
Analysis
Department of Social Security
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1 EARNINGS TOP-UP: THE BENEFIT AND THE EVALUATION
PROGRAMME
This report is part of a series of publications presenting the results of the
final stage of the Earnings Top-up (ETU) Evaluation project and it focuses
on the surveys of workers-in-work and ETU recipients.  Two other
reports in the series give the results from parallel surveys of unemployed
people (DSS Research Report No. 131) and of employers (DSS Research
Report No. 132). This first chapter provides a brief outline of the Earnings
Top-up (ETU) pilot evaluation and the part played by the surveys of
workers-in-work and ETU recipients, and goes on to describe the progress
of the new benefit during the three years of the pilot scheme.
ETU was introduced in October 1996 in eight areas of the country for a
three-year pilot period.  It was an in-work benefit for people without
dependent children.  The two main objectives of ETU were to improve
the incentive for unemployed people to take low-paid work of 16 or
more hours a week, and to help low-paid workers stay in work and
avoid unemployment by raising their incomes relative to out-of-work
support.  The aim was to make work pay for low-paid workers without
children in the way that Family Credit had made work pay for working
parents.  The last new claims were taken before 6th October 1999 but
those with a claim in payment at that date were allowed to make two
subsequent renewal claims.  The last claim ended in September 2000.
There were two different versions of ETU called Scheme A and Scheme
B and the rules differed for each of three groups of clients: couples, single
people aged 18 to 24, and single people aged 25 or over (Table 1.1).  It
was available to employed and self-employed people who worked 16 or
more hours per week in jobs lasting at least five weeks.  Like Family
Credit, it was paid at a fixed rate for a period of 26 weeks and an additional
amount was payable to those working 30 or more hours a week (£11.05
per week).  The maximum amount of benefit payable was reduced by 70
pence for each pound of income above the earnings thresholds.  It was
not available to full-time students or people with savings of more than
£8,000.  Eligibility for couples was based on the incomes of both,
excluding certain social security benefits, and only one member of a
couple could claim.
1.1  Introduction
1.2  Earnings Top-up
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Table 1.1  ETU payments and thresholds - 1999/2000
Single 18 - 24 Single 25+ Couples
Scheme A
Maximum ETU payment £24.40 £30.00 £49.85
Earnings threshold £51.70 £62.45 £80.65
Scheme B
Maximum ETU payment £24.40 £30.00 £60.15
Earnings threshold £80.65 £80.65 £80.65
Note: the maximum ETU payment is payable up to the earnings threshold and then reduced by 70 pence
for each pound of income above the earnings threshold.
The programme of evaluative research was designed to compare the eight
test areas (four were assigned Scheme A and four Scheme B) with four
more areas chosen as control areas of corresponding type.  Research in
these 12 areas was carried out at different points from 1996, prior to the
introduction of ETU, to 1999 when it ended (Table 1.2).  The areas
were selected because they had high levels of unemployment, high
numbers of job vacancies and high proportions of low-paid vacancies.
These were areas where ETU was expected to have the most impact.
Four types of labour markets were also selected: major urban areas, large
towns, seaside areas, and rural areas.
The two main target groups for ETU were the existing low-paid workers
and unemployed people.  For the first group, ETU may have encouraged
them to remain in work rather than returning to unemployment, perhaps
by encouraging them to accept a new job at lower wages when their
existing employment ceased, for example.  Unemployed people could
have been encouraged to consider a job that paid less than they would
normally have accepted.  If people were more able to accept low-paid
work then this could, in turn, have impacted on the decisions employers
made about recruitment and wages.  The evaluation of the effects of
ETU therefore included the corresponding field surveys of low-paid
workers in-work and unemployed people.  Alongside these were similar
field surveys of ETU recipients and telephone surveys of employers (Figure
1.1).  The evaluation programme also included studies of local labour
market conditions, carried out by the Institute for Employment Research
at the University of Warwick, in-depth interviews with key participants,
carried out by the Centre for Research in Social Policy at Loughborough
University, and analysis of official administrative statistics.
1.3  The ETU evaluation
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Table 1.2  ETU pilot area groups and types
Area Scheme A Scheme B Control Area
Major urban area Newcastle upon Tyne Sunderland Middlesbrough,
Hartlepool and Stockton
Large town Barnsley, Castleford, Pontefract, Doncaster Rotherham and Worksop
Wakefield and Dewsbury
Seaside area Southend Bournemouth Southampton and
the Isle of Wight
Rural area North Wales (Bangor and Perth and Crief, South Wales (Hay on Wye
Caernarfon, Conwy and Colwyn, Dumbarton, Stirling Brecon, Llanwrtyd Wells,
Denbigh, Dolgellau and Barmouth, Tredegar, Ebbw Vale,
Holyhead, Porthmadog and Pontypool, Monmouth,
Ffestiniog, Pwllheli, Shotton, Flint Abergavenny and
and Rhyl, Wrexham) Cricklehowell, Cwmbran,
Llanelli, Burry Port,
Llandeilo and Llandovery)
The 12 areas selected for the ETU pilot contained about one in nine of
the working population in Britain.  The surveys of workers-in-work
and, later, the ETU recipients carried out for the evaluation of the Earnings
Top-up pilot included the first large-scale surveys carried out in Britain
of the lowest-paid workers without children living in 12 of the lowest-
paid areas.  For this reason alone they are a valuable resource.  Their
purpose in the ETU evaluation project was:
• to provide direct observation of how the benefit was affecting those
who received it;
• to show who among the lowest-paid might benefit from ETU;
• to estimate the take-up rate among those eligible for the benefit;
• to investigate why some eligible workers failed to claim their benefit;
• to estimate whether ETU helped low-paid workers remain in jobs
longer than is typical of the lowest paid.
The first four aims were addressed by the new samples of workers and
recipients in 1999, the last by the 1998 follow-up surveys of the workers
and recipients interviewed in 1997.
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1996 1997 1998 1999
There were three main reasons for selecting new samples of workers and
recipients in 1999.  First, even if other things remained the same, the
effect of ETU may have varied over time as the benefit became more
established and people became more aware of it.  Second, the 1997 survey
of workers was a follow-up survey of the pre-introduction survey in
1996.  For this reason it could not provide valid estimates for the target
population of workers in 1997.  This was particularly important with
respect to the take-up rate among workers eligible for ETU and so the
1999 survey is the only properly valid estimate of the take-up rate that
will be available.  Third, substantial changes in the labour market and
benefit system over the previous two years may well have resulted in
compositional changes in the target groups for the new benefit.
As in 1996, the survey of workers-in-work was derived from the National
Insurance Contribution Records.  Further selection by a doorstep sift
carried out by interviewers framed the sample as one ‘in-range’ of ETU.
That is, their earnings were at or a little above the point at which their
eligibility for ETU ended.  The surveys of ETU recipients were taken
from Administrative Records of the current caseload but boosted the
proportion among them who had entered ETU from claimant
unemployment from about one in six to one half. Chapter 2 deals with
this new survey of ETU recipients.  The remainder of the report deals
with the surveys of workers-in-work.  Meanwhile, this chapter goes on
to provide a summary of the administrative data collected by the
Department of Social Security (DSS) Statistical Enquiry.  It describes the
progress of Earnings Top-up from its inception in October 1996, but
with a focus on September 1999.  September 1999 was chosen because it
was the last full month in which new claims were accepted and showed
the situation as it was at the end of the pilot evaluation proper (see Section
1.2).
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Figure 1.2 illustrates the progress of the ETU caseload to January 2000.
Following the introduction of ETU in October 1996, the number of
awards rose rapidly until April 1997 and then increased at a slower rate
until mid-1998 when it levelled out at around 24,000, a figure considerably
higher than the projected 20,000 for the end of the three year pilot
scheme, this projected caseload having been reached after about 14 months.
The highest caseload was reached in March 1999, immediately prior to
the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, at which point there
were 24,503 claims for ETU in payment.  Of these just 3,499 were
couples (14 per cent), 9,792 were single people aged under 25 (40 per
cent) and 11,212 were single people aged 25 or over (46 per cent).
Following the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, the number
of claims in payment began to fall and by September 1999, when the last
new claims were accepted under the pilot scheme, the caseload had fallen
back to 21,557, which was closer to the initial estimates.  This decline
was predominantly among young single recipients - the proportion of
recipients from this group had fallen from 40 to 35 per cent.  The
proportion of older single recipients had consequently reached half, with
the proportion of couples remaining steady at 15 per cent.  This would
be consistent with the new legislation increasing wages, pushing young
single people out of eligibility, while the entitlement of the other groups,
with their higher wages, thresholds and maximum payments, was less
affected.
When new claims ceased being accepted, the caseload went into sharp
decline among all three groups and in January 2000 the number of cases
in payment was just 15,088.
The caseload grew and declined at a much more gentle rate among couples
than among single people and never exceeded 3,500 (Figure 1.2).  Indeed,
at the end of the three year pilot (September 1999) there were nearly six
times as many single recipients as couples.  Almost as many men as women
received ETU throughout the pilot period despite the much higher
proportion of women in low-paid jobs as many such women have working
partners and their joint incomes disqualify them from ETU.  Twelve per
cent of recipients were self-employed at September 1999, when the last
new claims were accepted.  However, this proportion had increased
steadily across the period from the start of the pilot (seven per cent in
November 1996) to March 1999 (10 per cent) after which it began to
increase at a faster rate.  This was most likely a reflection of employees’
earnings rising relative to those of the self-employed with the introduction
of the National Minimum Wage.
1.4  The progress of ETU
1.4.1  The caseload and types of
recipient
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Figure 1.2  The progress of the ETU caseload by January 2000
by recipient type
Scheme B had a higher earnings threshold for single people than Scheme
A, that is they could earn more before passing out of eligibility, and so it
was expected that Scheme B areas would contain a higher proportion of
eligible people and thus produce a greater number of recipients per head
among the working population.  The design of the pilot scheme aimed
to balance this by more or less halving the population in scope
geographically in Scheme B areas when defining the qualifying postcode
areas.  However, Scheme B still attracted more customers than Scheme
A: 57 per cent (12,392) compared with 43 per cent (9,165) of the total
caseload at the end of three years (Figure 1.3).  This gap opened up
during the first year of the pilot and remained fairly static until March
1999 after which the caseload in Scheme B decreased slightly more quickly
than the caseload in Scheme A.
Across the pilot period, much of the difference between Scheme A and
Scheme B was accounted for by the numbers receiving ETU in Sunderland
(the Scheme B major urban area), nearly twice as many as in the
corresponding Scheme A area of nearby Newcastle.  Only in the two
rural areas did the Scheme A recipients (North Wales) outnumber the
Scheme B recipients (Perthshire, Scotland).  The numbers claiming either
version also differed by type of region.  Compared to the industrial regions
of the North, the ‘seaside’ areas of the South - Southend and Bournemouth
- had very few ETU customers.  Figure 1.4 represents the situation at the
end of the three year pilot.
In September 1999, 62 per cent of awards were renewals and only 27 per
cent were new (Table 1.3), a proportion which had been falling across
1.4.2  Geographical differences in
caseload
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the pilot period.  For most of the period, Sunderland, as well as having
the highest number of awards, also had the highest percentage of renewals
(68 per cent in September 1999) and Scheme B had a larger proportion of
renewals than Scheme A.
Figure 1.3  The progress of the ETU caseload by January 2000
by scheme type
Figure 1.4  ETU awards in payment by pilot area in
September 1999
Despite the higher rate of benefit paid to couples in Scheme B, more
couples claimed in Scheme A throughout the evaluation (1,718 compared
with 1,460 in September 1999) and couples were a larger proportion of
recipients in Scheme A than in Scheme B (19 per cent compared with 12
per cent in September 1999) (Figure 1.5).  At the end of the evaluation,
more than half of recipients in Scheme A areas were single and aged 25 or
over (56 per cent), while 46 per cent of Scheme B recipients met this
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description.  Almost half of awards in Scheme B areas were to single
people under 25 (43 per cent) while the equivalent proportion in Scheme
A areas was just 26 per cent.  These differences had become very slightly
more pronounced since the introduction of the Minimum Wage,
presumably as it had a slightly greater effect on the single under 25s in
Scheme A areas due to the lower thresholds reducing ETU eligibility as
wages rose.
Table 1.3  Number and type of ETU awards by area in September 1999
Row percentages
Scheme type No. of awards New awards Renewals Subsequent
Major urban area
Newcastle upon Tyne A 3,299 32 59 9
Sunderland B 5,737 22 68 10
Large town
Barnsley, Castleford, Pontefract, Wakefield and Dewsbury A 2,151 28 62 10
Doncaster B 3,342 25 64 11
Seaside area
Southend A 751 30 62 7
Bournemouth B 1,430 34 55 11
Rural area
North Wales A 2,692 32 56 12
Perth and Crief, Dumbarton, Stirling B 1,544 27 61 12
All Scheme A 8,893 31 59 10
All Scheme B 12,053 25 64 11
Total ETU awards in September 1999 20,946 27 62 11
Note: new awards are made to people who have never received ETU before.  Renewal awards are those following on immediately from a previous award
without a break.  Subsequent awards are those where there has been a previous award but there has been a break between claims.
Source: DSS ETU Statistical Enquiry
Figure 1.5  Percentage of ETU awards by scheme and client
type in September 1999
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The average gross weekly earnings of ETU recipients at 30th September
1999, when the last new claims were accepted, were £83.13 and the
average hours worked were 28, amounting to an hourly wage of £3.00
(Table 1.4)1.  Recipients were on average earning slightly more money
than they had been in March 1999 but for a shorter working week - the
average weekly wage had increased by £2.12 and average weekly hours
had decreased by two - implying that for some low-paid workers in full-
time jobs the Minimum Wage had pushed their income beyond their
ETU threshold.
To see this effect more clearly one has to look at the wages and hours of
employees only, the self-employed being ineligible for the Minimum
Wage (Table 1.5).  The average gross weekly earnings of employees
were £88.72 for a 27 hour week, which works out at an average hourly
wage of £3.33, below the Minimum Wage of £3.60 for people aged 22
or over, but above the lower rate of £3.00 paid to those aged 18-21.
Employees receiving ETU were on average earning slightly more money
(£3.37), but for a shorter working week (by two hours) than prior to the
introduction of the Minimum Wage2, showing that employees working
longer hours had become ineligible for ETU when their hourly rate
rose.  However, it appears that not all single employees claiming ETU in
Scheme A areas were being paid at the Minimum Wage rate, especially
the under 25s, the very people whom one would expect to see move out
of eligibility in largest numbers due to their low earnings threshold and
maximum payment.  Had they been paid at the legal rate, the ETU
caseload would have dropped more steeply than it did among this group.
1.4.3  Hours, pay and awards
1 Hourly wage rates were not included in the administrative data and have been calculated
using average weekly wage and hours.
2 Hours and wages had been relatively stable for most of the pilot period prior to the
introduction of the National Minimum Wage (see Chapter 6).
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Table 1.4  Average earnings, hours worked and ETU received in September 1999
Average Average Average ETU Percentage Average
gross earnings hours worked award receiving max. gross earnings
£ per week per week £ per week ETU £ per hour
All 83.13 27.72 26.29 42 3.00
Couples 99.52 29.96 39.57 32 3.32
Single – under 25 82.12 29.34 21.80 39 2.80
Single – 25+ 79.03 25.91 25.58 48 3.05
Scheme A 70.66 26.33 27.12 41 2.68
Couples 95.05 29.97 37.86 36 3.17
Single – under 25 59.93 27.63 21.83 32 2.17
Single – 25+ 67.35 24.52 25.91 47 2.75
Scheme B 92.33 28.74 25.69 43 3.21
Couples 104.82 29.96 41.61 27 3.50
Single – under 25 91.84 30.08 21.78 43 3.05
Single – 25+ 89.59 27.16 25.28 48 3.30
Source: DSS ETU Statistical Enquiry.
Note: Hourly wage rate has been calculated using average weekly wage and hours
Table 1.5  Employees’ average earnings and hours worked in
September 1999
Average Average Average
gross earnings hours worked gross earnings
£ per week per week £ per hour
All 88.72 26.65 3.33
Couples 110.60 28.64 3.86
Single – under 25 84.21 29.07 2.90
Single – 25+ 86.10 24.12 3.57
Scheme A 77.13 24.38 3.16
Couples 107.22 28.25 3.80
Single – under 25 62.98 26.84 2.35
Single – 25+ 74.49 21.83 3.41
Scheme B 96.50 28.17 3.43
Couples 114.34 29.08 3.93
Single – under 25 92.93 29.99 3.10
Single – 25+ 95.82 26.03 3.68
Source: DSS ETU Statistical Enquiry.
Note: Hourly wage rate has been calculated using average weekly wage and hours
The average amount of benefit paid to cases current at the end of the
three-year pilot (September 1999) was £26.29 per week (Table 1.4),
down slightly since the introduction of NMW prior to which it had
been rising.  Average awards by status were £39.57 for couples, £21.80
for single people under 25 and £25.58 for single people aged 25 and
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over.  Average awards for Scheme A were slightly higher than for Scheme
B at £27.12 and £25.69 respectively3.  Overall, 42 per cent of claims
were for the maximum award.  Older single people were more likely to
receive the maximum amount (48 per cent), a fact consistent across the
evaluation period.  It would appear that this was due to them working
shorter hours on average (26 hours) than younger single people (29 hours)
and couples (30 hours).
Administrative data also show that at August 1999, prior to claiming
ETU, around seven in 10 ETU recipients had been working in the job
on which they based their claim (69 per cent).  Just 17 per cent moved
onto ETU directly from JSA and a further one per cent from Income
Support.  This figure of 18 per cent moving in from claimant
unemployment had fallen since April 1998 when it was one-quarter (23
per cent from JSA and two per cent from IS).  Since the main aim of
ETU was to assist more unemployed people into low-paid work, this
may be counted a disappointment.  It may also reflect only a drop in the
stock of unemployed people.  It is also possible that ETU assisted more
people to move from a job that ended to a new job without a spell of
claimant unemployment.
This chapter described the introduction of two versions of Earnings Top-
up (Scheme A and Scheme B), as a three-year pilot scheme to extend
wage supplementation to workers who have no dependent children.  A
programme of research was carried out over four years to evaluate the
effectiveness of the new benefit in improving the lowest-paid workers’
incentives to get and keep paid work.  The new benefit swiftly reached
its expected caseload, especially in its more generous form, attracting a
high proportion of young single workers.  Take-up was higher in the
industrial North East and low in the two ‘seaside’ towns in the South.
The introduction of the National Minimum Wage reduced take-up in
the final months of the pilot, raising weekly wages beyond entitlement.
But many younger workers receiving ETU appeared to continue to be
paid well below the minimum rate per hour.
1.4.4  Previously unemployed
recipients
3 This is despite the design of Scheme B being more generous than that of Scheme A.
Scheme B contains a much higher proportion of single people aged under 25 than





This chapter presents detailed data derived from two surveys carried out
in the summers of 1997 and 1999 for which respondents were sampled as
current ETU recipients.  The focus of the chapter is the more recent
survey of over 1000 recipients, but it refers to changes which have occurred
since the former (Finlayson et al, 2000).  Section 2.3 describes the
characteristics of these recipients, followed by their experiences of claiming
ETU (Section 2.4) and Section 2.5 looks its effects.
As the sample was drawn from administrative records, the opportunity
was taken to select proportionately more of a group of recipients of
particular interest: those who had moved from unemployment into a job
in which they claimed ETU.  In practice, this meant those who were
receiving JSA immediately before claiming ETU were over-sampled4.
According to administrative statistics, for every ETU recipient who was
unemployed immediately prior to claiming there were at least another
four who had been in work, compared with a ratio in the sample of
1:1.5, and the sample was therefore re-weighted to the proportions found
in the administrative data.  This re-weighting exercise also compensated
for differing sampling fractions in the ETU pilot areas5.  The survey,
then, provides a representative sample of two groups of people: all ETU
recipients at the time of sampling (the weighted whole sample) and ETU
recipients who were previously unemployed (by selecting the entrants
from unemployment and weighting only for the different area sampling
fractions).
The 1999 survey successfully interviewed 1,039 respondents: a response
rate of between 73 and 82 per cent, compared with between 81 and 88
per cent in 1997 (Table 2.1).  Since no information was collected from
non-respondents, analysis of any bias introduced by non-response is not
possible.  However, as in 1997, the interviewed sample of ETU recipients
differed from the picture obtained from administrative statistics quoted
in Chapter 1 in two crucial aspects: we interviewed more women and
more couples.  The interviewed sample had 58 per cent women and 42
per cent men, compared with the almost equal 52-48 per cent ratio
reported in administrative data.  Also 20 per cent in our sample had a








4 The sample included a very small number of people who had been claiming IS, rather
than JSA, before working and claiming ETU.  In this chapter all entrants to ETU
from unemployment will be called JSA entrants.
5 The sample was drawn equally from all eight ETU areas but the number of ETU
recipients was not the same in all areas.  Therefore, the weighting gives more weight
to respondents from Sunderland, for example, than to those from Southend.
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the weighting ensured that the selected sample was representative of all
ETU recipients and the differences were very similar in 1997 this suggests
that women and couples were more likely to be traced and to agree to an
interview.




Base Percentage Base Percentage
Issued sample 2688 100 1696 100
Not contacted
Moved/untraceable/dead/empty 235 9 274 16
Not available after 5 or more calls
(4 in 1997) 191 7 148 9
Contacted but not interviewed
Refused 158 6 144 8
Other reason for non-interview 114 4 91 5
Achieved interviews 1990 74 1039 61
Response rate (upper limit) 2262 88 1274 82
Response rate (lower limit) 2453 81 1422 73
Note: Upper limit response rate excludes all those not contacted and so calculates the proportion of
completed interviews as a proportion of the contacted eligible.  Lower limit response rate includes those
not available after 4/5 calls.
Table 2.2 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in
1997 and 1999.  The majority of respondents were women (58 per cent)
- men were only in the majority among 25-34 year olds (53 per cent)
and were just one-third (32 per cent) of 45-54 year olds.  However
entrants from unemployment tended to be male (56 per cent), particularly
in Scheme B areas (59 per cent, compared with 53 per cent in Scheme
A), and this reflects the larger proportion of men who claim benefit as
unemployed.
ETU receipt was concentrated among young workers.  Two-fifths of
respondents were under 25 years old, despite the maximum ETU payment
for single under 25s being set lower than for older single people.  Indeed,
one-quarter of respondents were aged between 18 and 20 (24 per cent).
However, nearly half of respondents in Scheme B areas were aged under
25 (48 per cent) compared with less than one-third (30 per cent) in
Scheme A, which is most likely to be a reflection of the considerably
higher earnings threshold in Scheme B for this age-group.  In 1997,
entrants from unemployment tended to have been slightly older but this
was not the case in 1999.
2.3  Key characteristics of
Earnings Top-up recipients
2.3.1  Gender, age and marital
status
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ETU had also predominantly attracted single people - four-fifths of
respondents did not have a partner.  Though Scheme B areas had had a
smaller proportion of couples in 1997, this gap had disappeared in 1999.
Over two-fifths of those without a partner (44 per cent) were aged under
25, while a similar proportion of those with a partner (42 per cent) were
aged 45 or more.  However, even among 45-54 year olds only one-third
had a partner (34 per cent).
Table 2.2  Socio-demographic characteristics of ETU recipients 1997 and 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
JSA entrants All ETU recipients
Scheme A Scheme B All Scheme A Scheme B All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Gender:
Male 58 53 57 59 57 56 43 43 41 40 42 42
Female 42 47 43 41 43 44 57 57 59 60 58 58
Age group:
Under 25 30 33 36 42 34 38 35 30 48 48 43 40
25-34 25 27 28 21 27 23 18 20 18 15 18 17
35-44 16 15 16 16 16 15 16 18 11 16 13 17
45-54 21 20 15 18 17 19 23 24 17 17 19 20
55+ 7 6 5 3 6 4 8 9 6 4 7 6
Marital status:
Partner 22 18 16 17 19 17 25 22 17 19 21 20
No partner 78 82 84 83 81 83 75 78 83 81 79 80
Unweighted base 488 204 464 197 952 401 1007 557 983 482 1990 1039
Base: all respondents
Household type
Table 2.3 shows respondents’ household composition in 1997 and 1999.
The relative youth of the respondents was reflected in their household
arrangements.  Nearly half (43 per cent) shared a home with their parents
but no partner, a quarter lived alone, and 14 per cent shared with just
their partner.  These proportions were very similar to those in 1997.
A smaller proportion of respondents in Scheme A shared a home with
their parents (without a partner) - 35 per cent compared with 49 per cent
in Scheme B - and a larger proportion lived alone (30 per cent compared
with 21 per cent).  Again, it is likely that this reflects the relative youth of
respondents in Scheme B areas - just six per cent of those aged 45 or
more shared a home with their parents but no partner, compared with
three-quarters of under 25s.
2.3.2  Household composition and
housing tenure
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Although ETU is a benefit for childless people, two per cent of respondents
had dependent children in their household at the time they were
interviewed.  It is likely that this reflects the six month claim period,
during which time circumstances can change without affecting receipt of
ETU, though no respondents had children living with them in 1997.
One-quarter (26 per cent) of respondents had children (including those
no longer of dependent age) living elsewhere and the majority of these
respondents were women (62 per cent).  This proportion was as high as
one-third in Scheme A areas (compared with one-fifth in Scheme B
areas), again probably due to the fact that Scheme A respondents had an
older profile – one per cent of under 25s had children living elsewhere,
compared with 63 per cent of those aged 45 or more.
Table 2.3  Household type and housing tenure of ETU
recipients 1997 and 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
All ETU recipients
Scheme A Scheme B All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Household type:
Lives alone 27 30 23 21 24 25
Lives with parents,
no partner 36 35 49 49 44 43
Lives with partner only 18 16 11 12 14 14
Other 19 18 17 19 18 18
Housing tenure:
Lives with parents,
no rent 10 9 9 9 9 9
Lives with parents,
pays rent 29 26 45 38 38 33
Rents (Local Authority/
Housing Association) 29 29 23 22 26 25
Rents privately 10 11 7 8 8 10
Mortgage 11 9 9 9 10 9
Owns outright 8 8 5 4 6 6
Other/missing 3 8 2 10 3 9
Unweighted base 1007 557 983 482 1990 1039
Base: all respondents
Housing costs
For the purposes of ETU evaluation, probably the most important aspect
of recipients’ circumstances was their housing tenure.  The baseline report
(Marsh et al, 1999) suggested that the majority of likely ETU customers
interviewed in 1996 had little in the way of housing costs and
corresponding entitlements to Housing Benefit (HB) that would reduce
the value of ETU as an incentive to work as it is taken into account
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when calculating HB entitlement.  Few of them, especially the
unemployed, had large mortgages whose interest support payments from
IS would be foregone in work.  Nor did the remainder pay the kinds of
rents that would disrupt the role intended for ETU by having the new
benefit simply replace people’s continuing entitlement to HB in work.
Large proportions of potential recipients in 1996 were young and lived
with their parents, or lived in circumstances where they made only small
contributions to their accommodation.
This was reflected in the samples of ETU recipients drawn in 1997 and
1999 (Table 2.3).  Of the 1999 respondents, half (48 per cent) had no
formal housing costs (down slightly from 53 per cent in 1997), that is
they lived in their parents’ home (42 per cent) or, more rarely, owned
their home outright (six per cent), although one-third of respondents
were paying board to their parents.  Just nine per cent of respondents had
a mortgage and 35 per cent rented their home.
The proportion without formal housing costs was higher in Scheme B
than Scheme A (51 per cent compared with 43 per cent), again likely to
be a reflection of age (Table 2.3).  A smaller proportion of JSA entrants
were home-owners - seven per cent compared with 15 per cent overall,
but they were no less likely to have formal housing costs.  In terms of
age, only among the over 35s did the majority have formal housing costs
(Table 2.4).  Those in couples were much more likely to have such costs
than single respondents - 76 per cent were tenants or had mortgages,
compared with 36 per cent of single people (Table 2.5).
Living with parents
Nearly half the respondents (42 per cent) lived in their parents’ home
(Table 2.3), down slightly from 47 per cent in 1997.  This was true of
three-quarters (74 per cent) of the under 25s (down from 83 per cent in
1997) and nearly half of those aged between 25 and 34 (44 per cent)
(Table 2.4).  Over half the young respondents who lived in their parents’
home were happy with this arrangement (57 per cent), but this had fallen
from two-thirds in 1997.  Over one-quarter (29 per cent) would have
preferred to live alone (among JSA entrants this was just 21 per cent), up
from one-fifth in 1997, and 13 per cent wished to live with other people.
However, half thought they would find it very difficult to manage an
independent household financially, one-third believing they would be in
deep trouble (34 per cent).  They were, however, more optimistic than
the 1997 recipients had been - one-quarter thought they could manage,
compared with under a fifth in 1997.
28
Table 2.4  Type of housing costs by age group of ETU recipients 1997 and 1999
Column percentages
16 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55+ All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Lives with parents, pays no board 16 15 9 10 3 2 2 2 1 0 9 9
Lives with parents, pays board 67 59 37 34 19 14 2 3 2 0 38 33
Tenant, pays rent 11 13 36 34 49 47 47 50 48 40 30 31
Tenant, pays no rent 1 2 3 3 6 3 3 4 1 8 4 3
Mortgage 1 3 12 5 13 15 22 20 18 15 10 9
Owns outright * * 1 1 5 8 18 15 24 15 6 6
Other/missing 3 8 2 12 5 9 5 5 6 20 3 9
Proportion with some formal
housing costs# 13 18 51 42 68 65 72 74 67 63 44 43
Unweighted base 1 726 376 416 192 293 177 399 220 156 72 1990 1037
Proportion of tenants receiving HB# 39 42 51 50 59 54 49 44 54 [52] 50 48
Unweighted base 2 125 62 184 76 163 92 218 117 68 36 758 383
# Cell percentages
* <0.5 per cent
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50.
Base 1: all respondents
Base 2: all tenants
Tenants and Housing Benefit
ETU is counted as income in the calculation of entitlement to Housing
Benefit (HB) so the entitlement to HB of tenants (who made up only 35
per cent of the overall sample and 49 per cent of JSA entrants) would in
most cases have fallen when they began to receive ETU.  In general,
those with the lowest HB awards or the highest ETU awards would have
lost the largest proportion of their HB because of ETU receipt.  Just half
(48 per cent) received HB when they were interviewed (Table 2.4) and
only nine per cent had all their rent paid in this way.  Sixteen per cent of
all tenants said that, when they first got ETU, they had expected to get
HB but could no longer get it.
A higher proportion of tenants in Scheme A than in Scheme B received
HB (56 per cent compared with 40 per cent), because their average
incomes were lower in order to meet the different eligibility rules of the
two Schemes.  Tenants who had come to ETU from unemployment
were also more likely to receive HB (54 per cent).  Single people were
more likely to receive HB (53 per cent of tenants) than were couples (38
per cent of tenants) (Table 2.5), probably because their awards of ETU
were lower on average.
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Table 2.5  Type of housing costs by partnership status of ETU
recipients 1997 and 1999
Column percentages
Single Partnered All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Lives with parents,
pays no board 11 11 2 1 9 9
Lives with parents,
pays board 47 40 4 3 38 33
Tenant, pays rent 27 27 43 51 30 31
Tenant, pays no rent 2 3 5 3 4 3
Mortgage 6 6 26 22 10 9
Owns outright 4 5 14 9 6 6
Other/missing 3 9 7 10 3 9
Proportion with some
formal housing costs# 35 36 74 76 44 43
Unweighted base 1 1570 836 420 203 1990 1039
Proportion of tenants
receiving HB# 55 53 40 38 50 48
Unweighted base 2 532 271 226 112 758 383
# Cell percentages
Base 1: all respondents
Base 2: all tenants
The respondents were not asked whether they had been entitled to
Housing Benefit prior to claiming ETU, or how much they had been
entitled to.  Nor is data available on how much their income and rent
were at the time when they put in their claim for ETU.  It is therefore
impossible to calculate whether and by how much their gain in ETU
was offset by losses in Housing Benefit.  However, it is possible to examine,
for some respondents, the interaction there would be between HB and
ETU if receipt of ETU ceased (Table 2.6).
As has been noted, just one-third of the respondents were tenants (35 per
cent).  Just over half of these (58 per cent) remained eligible recipients of
ETU at the time they were interviewed (one-fifth of all respondents).
Just two-fifths (38 per cent) of this group were eligible for HB when
they were interviewed, however, if ETU receipt ceased this would rise
to half (51 per cent), suggesting that a minority had lost all their HB
entitlement as a result of claiming ETU.  Less than half the group (43 per
cent) would see their HB entitlement increase if they stopped receiving
ETU.  One in 10 overall would gain less than £5 and just five per cent
would gain over £20 in Housing Benefit.  Among those whose
entitlement to Housing Benefit would increase if they stopped receiving
ETU, other things being equal, the average amount of that increase would
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be £13.  On average, then, a tenant who was still an eligible recipient of
ETU would lose a net amount of £23 if (s)he ceased to receive ETU, or
an average of 82 per cent of the current value of his/her ETU.
Table 2.6  Housing Benefit interactions with ETU withdrawal 1999
Cell percentages
Single Couple <45 yrs 45+ yrs Male Female All
Entitled to HB with ETU 27 63 44 30 41 36 38
Entitled to HB without ETU 32 92 55 42 62 44 51
Would gain HB if lost ETU 27 76 47 36 51 37 43
Net loss as percentage of ETU 86 70 78 86 79 83 82
Unweighted base 155 59 113 101 80 134 211
Base: tenants who were eligible recipients of ETU at time of interview
Single people seemed to have more to gain from ETU than couples
when HB was taken into account.  Only one-quarter (27 per cent) of
single people in this group were eligible for HB at interview, rising to
one-third (32 per cent) if ETU receipt ceased.  Only one-quarter (27 per
cent) would see a gain in HB if they lost ETU and their net loss on
average would be 86 per cent of their ETU.  In contrast, nearly two -
thirds (63 per cent) of couples in this group were eligible for HB at
interview, rising to 92 per cent if ETU receipt ceased.  Three-quarters
(76 per cent) would see a gain in HB if they lost ETU and their net loss
on average would be only 70 per cent of their ETU.  However, this
analysis is based on a small number of couples and the results should be
treated with caution.
Older people had slightly more to gain from ETU than younger ones.
Nearly half (44 per cent) of those aged under 45 were eligible for HB at
interview, rising to 55 per cent if ETU receipt ceased.  Half (47 per cent)
would see a gain in HB if they lost ETU and their net loss on average
would be only 78 per cent of their ETU.  In contrast, less than one-third
of those aged 45 or more (30 per cent) were eligible for ETU at interview,
rising to 42 per cent if they lost ETU.  Only one-third would see a gain
in HB if they lost ETU (36 per cent) and their net loss on average would
be 86 per cent of their ETU.
Women had slightly more to gain from ETU than men.  Two-fifths of
men were eligible for HB at interview, rising to 62 per cent if ETU
receipt ceased.  Half (51 per cent) would see a gain in HB if they lost
ETU and their net loss would be 79 per cent of their ETU.  However,
just over one-third of women (36 per cent) were eligible for HB at
interview, rising to 44 per cent if ETU receipt ceased.  Only just over
one-third (37 per cent) would gain HB if they stopped receiving ETU
and their net loss on average would be 83 per cent of their ETU.  Again,
it should be noted that the analysis is based on a small number of male
recipients.
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Housing arrears and difficulties moving into work
Problems with housing costs were common among tenants in this sample.
Nearly one-third of respondents paying rent (29 per cent) had rent arrears,
whether or not they received HB, although only two per cent of those
with a mortgage had fallen behind with payments (falling from one in 10
in 1997).  Over half (55 per cent) of tenants and mortgage holders, that
is one-quarter (24 per cent) of the whole sample, had experienced
difficulties with housing costs in the past when moving into work.  Forty-
two per cent had, specifically, past experience of rent or mortgage arrears
which they found difficult to pay when moving off benefit and into
work.  Such problems with unexpected rent arrears has traditionally been
an area of difficulty reported by parents moving between IS and FC.
This was specifically addressed by the introduction in 1995 of a four-
week run-on of HB in work before in-work entitlement was re-assessed.
Those in Scheme A were more likely to have current rent arrears - one-
third, compared with one-quarter (24 per cent) in Scheme B - as were
those coming to ETU from unemployment (35 per cent).
The majority of those paying rent (69 per cent) knew that Housing Benefit
could be available for working people - only one in 10 thought it was
definitely not available.  However, less than half the whole sample (43
per cent) knew this and Scheme B respondents were less likely to know
(35 per cent, compared with 54 per cent in Scheme A).  This could
reflect the fact that only one-quarter of respondents living with their
parents knew (27 per cent), which may have been another factor that
deterred them from living independently.
Table 2.7 refers to the health of the respondents in 1997 and 1999.  Health
problems are increasingly found among low-paid people in Britain though
only 17 per cent of these respondents said they had a long-term illness or
disability.  However, among those reporting such problems, 71 per cent
(12 per cent of all respondents) said this affected their work, that is their
health problems placed limits on the amount or kind of work they could
do or made it more difficult for them to get another job.  This had risen
from just over half (55 per cent) in 1997.  Despite this, just seven per
cent of those with a problem (one per cent of respondents) received
disability benefit.
Respondents in Scheme A were more likely to have a long-term health
problem (23 per cent, compared with 13 per cent in Scheme B), though
this was not so among JSA entrants.  It is likely that this reflects the
difference between the two Scheme populations in terms of age - just
eight per cent of under 25 year olds had a health problem, compared
with 28 per cent of those aged 45 or more (Table 2.7).
Five per cent of respondents looked after someone else who was ill or
disabled, and this was more common among those in couples, 10 per
2.3.3  Health
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cent of whom were carers, compared with four per cent of single people.
However, among JSA entrants caring responsibilities were evenly spread
between couples and single people.
Table 2.7  Health problems by age group of ETU recipients 1997 and 1999
Cell percentages
16 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55+ All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Has long-term illness or disability 11 8 16 17 25 22 26 29 23 27 18 17
Has health problem that affects work 5 5 10 14 14 14 15 21 15 22 10 12
Receives disability benefits * * 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 5 1 1
Unweighted base 726 375 416 191 293 177 399 219 156 72 1990 1034
Base: all respondents
School attendance
Nearly all the respondents (81 per cent) had left school at the minimum
school leaving age that applied at the time, a proportion ranging from
three-quarters of 45-54 year olds to 89 per cent of 35-44 year olds.  Over
one-third of those aged under 25 (37 per cent) had experience of truancy
in their final year at school.  This rose to nearly half of those coming to
ETU from unemployment (48 per cent).
All respondents were asked whether they had gone on to any other full-
time education after leaving school or sixth form college.  One-quarter
(23 per cent) had done so (including one-fifth (21 per cent) of those who
left school at the minimum age).  This was strongly associated with age -
35 per cent of under 25s and 29 per cent of those aged 25-34 had done
so, compared with less than 12 per cent of older groups.
Training courses
Since leaving school, one-third of respondents (35 per cent), including
44 per cent of men under 25, had been on a course designed to give
them skills they might use in a job rather than a qualification.  However,
only one-third of young men coming to ETU from JSA had been on
such a course.  Prominent among these courses were Youth Training
Schemes and office and business skills courses.  Nearly one in 10 (nine
per cent) had attended a government training scheme or Employment
Service programme during the previous year, including 19 and 14 per
cent respectively of men and women under 25.  Not surprisingly, those
coming to ETU from unemployment were more likely to have done so
(23 per cent).  One-quarter (23 per cent) of respondents (including 32
per cent of under 25s and specifically 35 per cent of men under 25) had
begun but not completed a course that was meant to lead to a qualification.
Four per cent of respondents had applied for a course but not been given
a place.
2.3.4  Education and training
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Qualifications
Half the respondents (48 per cent) had a highest academic qualification at
GCSE level (equivalent to O level and CSE level combined), but most
of the other half (45 per cent of respondents) had no academic qualifications
(Table 2.8).  This rose to 84 per cent of people aged 45 or over whereas
the vast majority of people aged under 25 (84 per cent) had some academic
qualifications (Table 2.9).
Half the respondents (46 per cent) had vocational qualifications, more
commonly younger respondents and those who also had academic
qualifications - only 14 per cent of respondents had only vocational
qualifications.  Overall, nearly one-third of respondents (31 per cent)
had no qualifications at all, a figure rising to around half or more among
those aged 35 or over (Table 2.9).
Table 2.8  Educational qualifications of ETU recipients 1997 and 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
JSA entrants All ETU recipients
Scheme A Scheme B All Scheme A Scheme B All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Highest academic qualifications:
Degree 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 3 1
A level 6 3 8 4 7 4 6 5 8 6 7 6
O level 23 23 24 20 24 21 22 20 29 23 26 22
CSE level 15 22 18 29 17 26 17 19 22 31 20 26
None 52 48 45 43 48 45 51 54 39 39 44 45
Vocational qualifications:
Yes 45 54 48 44 46 48 44 44 48 48 46 46
No 55 46 52 56 54 52 56 56 52 52 54 54
Neither academic nor
vocational qualifications# 36 29 29 34 32 32 38 38 27 25 32 31
Unweighted base 488 204 464 197 952 401 1007 557 983 482 1990 1039
#Cell percentages
Base: all respondents
Respondents in Scheme A were less likely to have qualifications - 38 per
cent had none, compared with one-quarter in Scheme B - and in
particular, academic qualifications - over half (54 per cent) had none,
compared with 39 per cent in Scheme B (Table 2.8).  In particular, the
proportion with no academic qualifications rose to 64 per cent in
Newcastle and 57 per cent in Southend, and was at its lowest in Sunderland
and Doncaster (39 and 33 per cent respectively).  This is likely to be
related to the high proportion of young people claiming ETU at the
Scheme B rate, who were more likely to hold some lower-level school
qualifications than older workers.  However, this was not true of JSA
entrants among whom Scheme B respondents were less likely to have
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qualifications (34 per cent had none, compared with 29 per cent in Scheme
A), particularly vocational ones (44 per cent, compared with 54 per cent)
(Table 2.8).
Table 2.9  Educational qualifications by age group of ETU recipients 1997 and 1999
Column percentages
16 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55+ All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Highest academic qualifications:
Degree 2 1 6 5 2 3 2 0 1 0 3 2
A level 10 9 7 4 4 4 4 1 3 5 7 6
O level 39 28 30 28 16 15 10 12 9 8 26 22
CSE level 33 46 27 29 8 11 2 3 0 0 20 26
None 16 16 30 35 70 67 82 83 87 87 44 45
Vocational qualifications:
Yes 60 58 49 51 34 35 28 30 25 34 46 46
No 40 42 51 49 66 65 72 70 75 66 54 54
Neither academic nor
vocational qualifications# 8 8 21 22 51 46 65 62 71 58 32 31




One in 10 respondents had problems with either literacy (seven per cent),
or numeracy (one per cent), or both (two per cent) and such problems
were not confined to a particular age-group.  As a consequence, half of
these respondents (49 per cent, or five per cent of all respondents) said
that they found it difficult to write to an employer for a job, while over
one-third (38 per cent) said it was difficult to get a promotion at work,
and one-fifth (19 per cent) felt that it was difficult for them to cope with
a job at all.
Respondents in Scheme B were less likely to have numeracy or literacy
problems (seven per cent, compared with 14 per cent in Scheme A).
Among JSA entrants, the proportions having literacy and numeracy related
problems in their work and home life were higher among those who said
they lacked these skills.
Driving licences
In almost every study of flows into work, having a driving licence is
related to increased chances of people getting and keeping paid work,
independently of other factors such as education and sex.  Only half
these respondents (48 per cent) had a driving licence and the same
proportion had access to a vehicle for their own personal use.
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Respondents in Scheme B were slightly more likely to have a driving
licence or access to a vehicle (50 per cent, compared with 45 per cent),
but only 38 per cent of those coming to ETU from unemployment had
a driving licence and only 37 per cent had access to a vehicle.  People
with a partner were more likely to have regular access to a vehicle (68
per cent) than single recipients (42 per cent).
Nearly all the respondents (84 per cent) were still in work when they
were interviewed (Table 2.10).  Two per cent were in work of less than
the 16 hours required for ETU eligibility.  One in nine (11 per cent) had
become unemployed since the sample was drawn and three per cent
described themselves as ill or disabled at the time of their interview.
Respondents aged 45 or over were more likely than younger people to
have remained in work of 16 or more hours - 90 per cent had done so.
One-fifth (19 per cent) of the (weighted) sample had come to ETU
directly from unemployment (Table 2.10) and unlike in 1997 there were
notable differences between these respondents and the others.  Over
one-quarter of those coming to ETU from unemployment were no longer
in work of 16 or more hours (27 per cent) and one-fifth (19 per cent)
were now unemployed.
Table 2.10  Work characteristics 1997 and 1999
Cell percentages
Unweighted Still in  work Entered ETU
base of 16+ hours directly from JSA
All 1997 1987 88 18
1999 1037 84 19
Single men:
<25 1997 320 88 16
1999 144 84 25
25-44 1997 287 85 32
1999 156 80 29
45+ 1997 90 78 26
1999 53 89 33
Single women:
<25 1997 348 88 11
1999 186 84 15
25-44 1997 279 90 20
1999 150 80 18
45+ 1997 253 94 13
1999 145 92 14
Couples:
18-44 1997 200 87 18
1999 109 76 18
45+ 1997 210 95 17





Virtually all of those working 16 or more hours (93 per cent) were
employees and the remaining seven per cent were self-employed – just
over half the self-employed proportion reported in the administrative
data for September 1999.  The self-employed are notoriously more difficult
to find at home for an interview.  Two-thirds of respondents (63 per
cent) were single and employed for 16 or more hours per week, however
only 54 per cent of those coming from unemployment fell into this
category due to the higher proportion of single non-workers.  Among
couples, single earners outnumbered dual earners by more than 2:1, though
in Scheme A this rose to more than 3:1.  Dual earner couples, then, were
32 per cent of younger couples, 21 per cent of older couples, but only six
per cent of recipients overall.  Nearly one-fifth of respondents in dual
earner couples were self-employed (18 per cent).
The vast majority of those still working 16 or more hours (90 per cent)
had a permanent job, seven per cent had a temporary job and four per
cent a fixed term job.  However, less than three-quarters (71 per cent) of
those coming from unemployment said they had a permanent job and
over one-fifth (22 per cent) said their job was temporary.  Men were less
likely than women to have a permanent job, though still 84 per cent of
them did so (up from three-quarters in 1997).
Most respondents (78 per cent - down from 85 per cent in 1997) worked
in commercial firms and most of the remainder worked for local
authorities.  Sixty-one per cent worked for enterprises with 25 or fewer
employees, 40 per cent for firms employing 10 or fewer, up from one-
third in 1997.  Only 14 per cent worked for large firms with more than
200 employees, but this compared with less than 10 per cent in 1997.
Trade union membership was low at only one in 10, however among
JSA entrants the figure was just four per cent.
Occupation
Employees’ occupations (most recent in the case of those who were no
longer working) were well-distributed across the range (Table 2.11).
However, just five per cent described their work as managerial, professional
or technical, while one-fifth provided protective or personal services (21
per cent).
Those living in Scheme B were roughly equally distributed among the
non-managerial occupations.  However, as many as one-quarter of those
living in Scheme A areas were in protective or personal services, while
just eight per cent worked in craft and related services.
Table 2.11 shows the wide variations in occupation by partnership status,
sex and age.  One-third of young single men were in craft jobs (34 per
cent), while around the same proportion of men aged 25-44 (32 per
37
cent) and 45 or more (37 per cent) were plant or machine operatives.  In
contrast, single women were concentrated in protective and personal
services (33, 23 and 31 per cent).  Over one-quarter of young single
women (28 per cent) were secretaries.  Respondents with partners differed
by age only on their propensity to work in sales – over one-fifth of those
aged under 45 (22 per cent) did so, compared with just six per cent of
those who were older.




<25 25-44 45+ <25 25-44 45+ <45 45+
Managerial/professional/technical 6 2 [10] 5 4 2 6 4 5
Clerical and secretarial 12 9 [3] 28 11 4 18 18 15
Craft and related 34 8 [3] 2 6 7 10 13 11
Protective and personal services 11 7 [17] 33 23 31 13 15 21
Sales 10 12 [3] 21 18 20 22 6 16
Plant and machine operatives 13 32 [37] 3 6 6 19 18 12
Other 14 29 [27] 7 31 29 12 25 20
Unweighted base 132 116 39 184 135 131 89 74 900
Base: all employed and formerly employed respondents
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
This reflects large differences between the sexes and lesser variations among
age-groups.  Around twice the proportion of women compared to men
were in clerical or secretarial jobs (18 and 10 per cent) and sales (21 and
nine per cent), and the proportion of women in protective and personal
services was almost three times that among men (28 and 10 per cent).
Conversely, the proportions of men in craft and plant operative jobs
were five times those among women (22 and four per cent had craft jobs,
and 25 and five per cent had plant operative jobs).  Under 25s were more
likely than other age-groups to be in clerical and secretarial jobs (22 per
cent) and craft jobs (14 per cent), and less likely to be plant or machine
operatives (eight per cent).
Those recruited to ETU jobs from unemployment were more likely to
be in managerial, professional or technical roles (14 per cent), considerably
more likely to be in craft roles (38 per cent) and less likely to be plant and
machine operatives (one per cent).  It is likely that this is a reflection of
the changing labour market.  The availability of technical jobs is increasing,
while the availability of plant and machine work is diminishing.
Hours of work
The average hours worked by those still in work of 16 or more hours
were 30 per week (mean).  This figure from the survey data was slightly
higher than the 28 hours shown in the administrative data for September
1999.
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Forty-four per cent worked part-time (16-29 hours per week) and 56
per cent worked full-time (30 or more hours per week) (Table 2.12).
Men were more likely to be working full-time than part-time (68 per
cent worked 30+ hours), especially young single men (83 per cent worked
30+ hours).  Women, overall, were just as likely to be working part-
time as full-time (52 and 48 per cent respectively), but only women aged
45 or more were more likely to be working part-time (66 per cent).
Two-thirds of younger respondents in couples worked full-time, while
only half (48 per cent) the older ones did so.  Overall, 59 per cent of
workers aged 45 or more worked part-time, while 70 per cent of the
under 25s worked full-time.
Table 2.12  Full-time and part-time work 1999
Row percentages
Unweighted base 16-29 hours 30+ hours
All working 16+ hours 844 44 56
Male 378 32 68
Female 466 52 48
Single men aged <25 117 17 83
Single men aged 25-44 121 51 49
Single men aged 45+ 42 [44] [56]
Single women aged <25 151 40 60
Single women aged 25-44 120 50 50
Single women aged 45+ 127 66 34
Couples aged <45 82 34 66
Couples aged 45+ 84 52 48
Has long-term illness or
disability 156 53 47
Does not have long-term
illness or disability 688 42 58
Has health problem which
affects work 108 58 42
Has health problem which
does not affect work 48 [43] [57]
Base: all respondents still working 16 or more hours
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
Half of workers (49 per cent) worked 30-40 hours, with just 13 per cent
working the minimum 16 hours (up from eight per cent in 1997) and
eight per cent working more than 40.  Only single men under 25 worked
around the national average with 35 hours a week and one in 10 of them
worked more than 40 hours (down from 15 per cent in 1997).  Single
women over 25 averaged only 26 hours a week and 16 per cent worked
only the minimum 16 hours required by ETU rules.  In general, the
older the respondent, the fewer hours they worked.
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Half of those in Scheme A were working part-time (49 per cent), while
nearly two thirds of those in Scheme B (63 per cent) were working full-
time.  Respondents in Scheme B worked longer average hours than
those in Scheme A - 31 compared with 28 (mean).  More than half (55
per cent) in Scheme B worked 30-40 hours, compared with just 40 per
cent in Scheme A, and a higher proportion in Scheme A worked the
minimum 16 hours (17 per cent), compared with 10 per cent in Scheme
B.
Those coming into ETU from unemployment were no more likely to
work part-time or full-time than the recipients’ sample overall, however
they were less likely to work 30-40 hours (41 per cent) and more likely
to work over 40 hours (14 per cent).
It would seem that shorter hours were also associated with poor health,
though not among JSA entrants.  Fifty-three per cent of respondents
with a long-term illness or disability were working part-time, compared
with 42 per cent of those in good health.  Among those with a health
problem, 58 per cent whose problem affected their work were part-
timers, compared with only 43 per cent of those whose problem did not
affect their work (however the unweighted base was small, Table 2.12).
There is little evidence of a tendency among respondents to move between
full-time and part-time work as a result of claiming ETU, or that they
were reducing their hours at all in response to wage supplementation.
The vast majority of both groups (89 per cent of part-timers and 95 per
cent of full-timers) said they had not changed their hours as a result of
claiming.  Only two per cent of those working full-time said they had
increased their hours, while four per cent of part-timers said they had
reduced their hours.  Eight per cent overall had changed their hours as a
result of claiming ETU.  Responses of this kind were most common in
Bournemouth and Southend where 13 per cent had increased their hours
and five and three per cent had reduced them.
Pay
Leaving aside the self-employed, the average weekly net pay of those
working 16 or more hours was £95.93 (mean), giving a net hourly rate
of £3.38 (Table 2.13).  These figures were higher than those in the
administrative data for September 1999 of £88.72 per week and £3.33
per hour.  However, the sample includes those who have passed out of
eligibility for ETU since the sample was drawn (32 per cent of respondents)
and whose wages tend to be higher (see Table 2.21 in Section 2.4.1).
Table 2.13 shows that hourly wages had risen since 1997, no doubt in
response to the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in April
1999, as well as to annual wage inflation.
Single men overall earned a similar amount to single women, typically
£96 a week compared with £92, but they worked longer hours and
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their net pay per hour was lower, ranging from £3.08 for the under 25s
to £3.38 for 25-44 year olds (Table 2.13).  These figures compared with
between £3.21 and £3.59 for the women.  (Note: some bases are small
when the data is subdivided by sex, marital status and age).  Recipients in
couples earned more, as the ETU rules allowed, averaging £106 a week.
This compared with £110.60 per week reported in the administrative
data for September 1999.  The official figures are gross earnings and our
figures are net, but at these wage levels deductions for tax and National
Insurance would be small.
The older the respondent, the smaller their average weekly pay, as a
result of the hours they worked - under 25s took home £100 per week,
compared with £90 among 45-54 year olds and £84 among those aged
55 or more.  However, those aged under 25 had a relatively low rate per
hour at £3.15.
Those employees coming to ETU from unemployment received very
similar mean net weekly and hourly wages - £93.56 and £3.30 - for
very slightly longer hours.  Those respondents who had their job prior to
the introduction of ETU earned on average £3 per week (or 13p per
hour) more than those who got their job afterwards, which does not
suggest that employers were pushing wages down in response to the new
benefit.
Table 2.13   Employees’ wages and working hours 1997 and 1999
Unweighted Mean hours/ Mean wage/ Mean wage/
base week week  (£)  hour (£)
All 1997 1547 31 85 2.86
1999 773 29 96 3.38
Single men:
<25 1997 254 36 86 2.49
1999 108 35 106 3.08
25-44 1997 209 34 86 2.73
1999 96 27 86 3.38
45+ 1997 52 32 90 2.91
1999 38 [28] [81] [3.14]
Single women:
<25 1997 280 33 80 2.56
1999 151 31 95 3.21
25-44 1997 224 27 80 3.08
1999 111 27 97 3.52
45+ 1997 216 25 78 3.16
1999 121 24 85 3.59
Couples:
18-44 1997 141 32 100 3.17
1999 75 33 111 3.51
45+ 1997 171 31 99 3.36
1999 73 29 101 3.68
Base: Current employees
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
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Those in Scheme B received higher mean net weekly wages than those
in Scheme A - £102, compared with £87 - and these differences
undoubtedly arose from the different benefit thresholds.  Thus, those
receiving ETU at Scheme B rates worked longer hours at similar average
wage rates (£3.40 compared with £3.36) to achieve higher final earnings.
Within Scheme B there was very little variation in mean reported earnings,
however in Scheme A Newcastle and Southend residents averaged £80
and £85 per week respectively, compared with £91 and £95 in Castleford
and North Wales (Table 2.14).
The tendency for young men to work longer hours at lower rates of pay
per hour, compared with older women who work short hours for better
rates, was part of a trade-off between hours and pay rates that the rules of
ETU allowed.  Those working the minimum 16 hours were paid £3.59
per hour net.  In contrast, those working more than 40 hours a week got
only £2.62 an hour, on average.  Those working the more usual 30-40
hours a week averaged £3.14 an hour net.
Table 2.14  Employees’ wages and working hours by ETU region 1997 and 1999
Unweighted Mean wage/ Mean wage/ Mean hours/
base week (£) hour (£)  week
Newcastle 1997 212 77 2.86 29
1999 95 80 3.45 25
Castleford 1997 219 82 2.78 31
1999 106 91 3.29 28
Southend 1997 158 84 3.03 30
1999 91 85 3.42 27
North Wales 1997 175 76 2.62 31
1999 109 95 3.26 31
Sunderland 1997 213 90 2.84 32
1999 90 102 3.39 31
Doncaster 1997 221 88 2.86 33
1999 102 103 3.41 32
Bournemouth 1997 153 95 3.05 33
1999 86 97 3.55 28
Perth 1997 196 88 3.16 30
1999 94 102 3.34 31
Base: Current employees
Work satisfaction
Virtually all of those working 16 or more hours (91 per cent) said they
liked their work and over two-thirds (69 per cent) said it was the kind of
work they wished to continue with in the future (74 per cent in Scheme
A, 67 per cent in Scheme B).  Though this meant nearly one-third wished
to change their occupation only one-fifth (21 per cent) were actively
looking for a new job.  This rose to 28 per cent among those coming
from unemployment.  Of this fifth, 60 per cent were looking for a
particular job (64 per cent in A, 57 per cent in B) (up from 46 per cent in
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1997).  Again, those coming from unemployment were less likely to be
looking for a particular job - 50 per cent.
Respondents aged 45 or older were more likely to be happy in their
current occupation (78 per cent) than the other respondents, and they
were less likely to be actively looking for a new job (13 per cent).
Target and acceptance wages
The average target wage of these ‘job-seekers’ was £164.44 for 38 hours
(£185 for a 39 hour week for men and £150 for a 37 hour week for
women).  These compared with £160 for a 40 hour week for men and
£125 for a 39 hour week for women in 1997.  However, 83 per cent
thought it would be difficult to get this and over half (57 per cent) thought
they would have to take a job paying less (though not by so much as in
1997).  On average they would accept £132.38 for a 34 hour week
(£141 for 37 hours for men and £127 per 33 hour week for women).
Again, this compares with £100 for a 39 hour week for men and £90
for a 35 hour week for women in 1997.
Scheme B respondents had a higher acceptance wage than those in Scheme
A - £135 for 35 hours compared with £128 for 34 hours.  In comparison,
those coming from unemployment were prepared to work longer hours
for less money.  Their target wage was £159.50 for 39 hours, but as
many as 90 per cent of them thought it would be difficult to get that
wage and two-thirds (65 per cent) thought they’d have to take a job
paying less.  Their acceptance wage was £126 for 35 hours, that is lower
wages for slightly longer hours.
Work history
Since 1993, respondents had on average spent just over two-thirds (69
per cent) of the period in work and 13 per cent claiming unemployment
benefit (Table 2.15).  However, the large majority (63 per cent) had not
been claimant unemployed at all during this time (and the median
percentage was zero).
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Table 2.15  Differences in ETU employment by area 1997 and
1999
Cell percentages
Mean proportion of period since 1991/93 in:
Unweighted Claimant
base Employment unemployment
Scheme A 1997 1007 65 15
1999 557 68 16
Newcastle 1997 281 61 15
1999 135 62 19
Castleford 1997 286 65 16
1999 154 74 14
Southend 1997 216 69 15
1999 111 73 18
North Wales 1997 224 66 12
1999 157 69 13
Scheme B 1997 983 69 11
1999 482 69 10
Sunderland 1997 269 66 10
1999 123 67 10
Doncaster 1997 283 71 12
1999 130 71 9
Bournemouth 1997 194 62 13
1999 113 73 15
Perth 1997 237 77 9
1999 116 71 11
All 1997 1990 67 13
1999 1039 69 13
Base: all respondents
There was little difference between the two Scheme areas, A and B, in
relation to time spent in work, although respondents in Newcastle had
spent a smaller proportion of this period working (62 per cent) compared
to other regions (Table 2.15).  However those in Scheme A had on
average spent longer in claimant unemployment (16 per cent, compared
with 10 per cent in Scheme B), perhaps due to those in Scheme B being
relatively young.  Respondents in Newcastle and Southend had spent a
particularly long time unemployed (19 and 18 per cent of this period)
(Table 2.15).
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Not surprisingly, JSA entrants had spent less time in work and more time
claiming unemployment benefit than respondents overall.  On average,
they had been in work for just half (51 per cent) of this period and
claimant unemployed for more than one-quarter (27 per cent).  There
was little difference between Scheme A and Scheme B in these respects,
however those in Castleford had spent longer on average in work (60 per
cent) and those in Southend had spent less time in work (40 per cent)
and considerably more in claimant unemployment.  In fact, on average,
they had spent more time claiming unemployment benefit (52 per cent)
than working.
Problem debt
One-quarter of respondents had problem debt (see Appendix A), 13 per
cent having one such debt and 12 per cent having more.  Eight per cent
were behind with payment for one bill6, and one in 10 were behind with
more than one bill.  Seven per cent were behind with repayments on
one loan, and two per cent were behind with repayments on more than
one.
Those in Scheme A areas were more likely to have problem debt - 31
per cent compared with 21 per cent in Scheme B (though the difference
had narrowed from 50 per cent in 1997) - and more likely to have more
than one problem debt (17 per cent compared with eight per cent). In
two Scheme A areas, Newcastle and Castleford, around one-fifth (20
and 19 per cent) reported two or more problem debts (twice the average),
and one-third (35 and 34 per cent) had at least one such debt.  This was
more than twice the proportion in Doncaster or Bournemouth.  Scheme
A respondents were more likely to be behind with bills (24 per cent,
compared with 12 per cent in Scheme B), most likely reflecting the
greater proportion of Scheme B respondents who lived in their parents’
home.  (Just 14 per cent of respondents aged under 25 had problem debt,
compared with one-third of those aged 45 or more.)
Financial anxiety and managing
One-third (34 per cent) had recently been worried about money almost
all the time (Table 2.16).  Over half (55 per cent) reported that they got
by alright but 15 per cent had some financial difficulties or were in deep
financial trouble.
The proportions reporting that they worried about money ‘almost all the
time’ were above a third in all areas except Scheme B areas Perth (29 per
cent) and Doncaster (27 per cent).  Scheme A respondents were also
slightly more likely to report that they had financial difficulties or were
6 Includes bills for electricity, gas, other fuel, Council Tax, insurance policies, telephone,
television/video rental/HP, other HP, and water charges.
2.3.6  Financial situation
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in deep financial trouble (19 per cent compared with 12 per cent) (Table
2.16) - in North Wales the proportion managing poorly was closer to a
third (32 per cent).  Again this is likely to be related to living arrangements
and hence age - nearly half of older respondents (43 per cent) worried
about money almost all the time, compared with just 29 per cent of
young respondents.
Table 2.16  Financial situation of ETU recipients by ETU area
1997 and 1999
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
How often have you been worried about money during the last few weeks?
Almost all the time 33 36 26 33 29 34
Quite often 24 22 22 21 23 22
Only sometimes 27 27 35 29 32 28
Never 16 15 16 17 16 16
Taking everything together, which of these phrases best describes how you are managing
financially these days?
I manage very well 5 3 3 3 4 3
I manage quite well 19 18 20 19 20 18
I get by alright 49 52 60 58 56 55
I don’t manage very well 11 9 6 9 8 9
I have some financial difficulties 12 15 9 8 10 11
I am in deep financial trouble 4 4 1 4 2 4
Unweighted base 1007 554 983 482 1990 1036
Base:  all respondents
Hardship
A counter-intuitive finding in Family Credit research was that eligible
non-recipients were better off than recipients, despite having less income
at the point of interview (Marsh and McKay, 1993).  They were
consistently about half as likely as recipients to experience ‘severe hardship’
(see Appendix A for an explanation of the Family Credit hardship measure
referred to here).  Given their more favourable social profile (for example
better-educated, home-owning couples earning more than the recipients
earned) this was not too surprising.  It followed that eligible non-recipients
had enjoyed higher trend income.  This had allowed them to accumulate
more of the stocks of consumer durables and other resources that supported
their living standards and to avoid debt during what often turned out to
be a temporary stay in the lowest income stratum.
A new hardship measure was constructed for the current study (see
Appendix A).  Half the respondents in this sample (49 per cent)
experienced little or no hardship, while 29 per cent were in severe hardship
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(Table 2.17).  Receiving ETU did not appear to make any difference to
the welfare of those households which were still eligible for ETU, although
the number of eligible non-recipients was very small and this should be
treated with caution (Table 2.18).  However, those households which
had passed out of eligibility and had no one in work at the time of
interview were considerably worse off on this measure - half (48 per
cent) were in severe hardship.  Conversely, those who had passed out of
eligibility but still had income from earnings were better off than the
other groups - 58 per cent experienced little or no hardship.




<25 25-44 45+ <25 25-44 45+ <45 45+
No hardship 33 30 28 36 18 17 12 15 25
Little hardship 28 18 30 25 28 21 24 20 24
Some hardship 20 19 18 21 22 26 23 26 22
Severe hardship 19 33 25 18 32 36 42 39 29
Unweighted base 144 156 53 186 150 145 109 94 1037
Base: all respondents
Hardship also varied by partnership status, sex and age (Table 2.17). Single
men and women aged under 25 were less likely to be in hardship than
others (61 per cent experienced little or no hardship), probably because
of the high proportion who were living in their parents’ home.  Older
single men were also less likely than single women over 25 and couples
to be in hardship, though the base for this group was very small.  Couples
were particularly badly off.  Just 36 and 35 per cent experienced little or
no hardship, and as many as 42 and 39 per cent were in severe hardship.
Overall, only two-fifths of older respondents avoided hardship, compared
with 57 per cent of young people.
Table 2.18  Hardship by household eligibility for ETU and
work status 1999
Column percentages
Eligible Eligible No longer No longer
recipient non-recipient eligible: eligible:
in-work out-of-work All
No hardship 22 23 32 19 24
Little hardship 24 29 26 23 25
Some hardship 26 23 17 10 22
Severe hardship 27 26 25 48 30
Unweighted base 548 85 173 166 972
Base: all households
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These differences may explain why one-third of Scheme A respondents
were in severe hardship (34 per cent), compared with one-quarter in
Scheme B as Scheme A had fewer young respondents (Table 2.19).  There
was little variation within Scheme A areas, although North Wales
respondents had been less successful at avoiding hardship than the other
regions.  However Bournemouth and Doncaster had smaller proportions
in hardship than the other two Scheme B areas, and the proportion in
Doncaster in severe hardship was half that in Sunderland and Perth.
Differences between JSA entrants and the rest were minimal with regard
to their financial situation, however they were slightly more likely to be
in severe hardship (34 per cent) than the overall proportion of 29 per
cent.
Table 2.19  Hardship by partnership status and ETU area 1999
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B
Single Couple All Single Couple All
No hardship 26 11 23 29 16 26
Little hardship 22 26 23 27 19 25
Some hardship 19 24 20 23 24 23
Severe hardship 33 40 34 22 41 25
Unweighted base 440 115 555 394 88 482
Base: all respondents
Calculated eligibility
ETU awards were made for six-month periods and therefore a change in
respondents’ circumstances did not immediately affect the amount of
ETU they received (Figure 2.1).  Respondents continued to receive
ETU until the end of the six-month claim even if they were no longer
working and just three-quarters of those who were still receiving ETU
remained eligible (77 per cent).
2.4  Claiming ETU
2.4.1  Continued eligibility for
ETU
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Figure 2.1  ETU entitlement (among those eligible at
interview) and receipt (among those in receipt at interview)
1999
One-third (32 per cent) of the respondents were calculated to have become
ineligible for ETU by the time they were interviewed (up from 22 per
cent in 1997), however four per cent of respondents were ineligible
Scheme A residents who would still have been eligible under Scheme B
rules.  (A greater proportion of respondents in Scheme A had become
ineligible (nine per cent), however they would all have been eligible
under Scheme B rules.)  Three-quarters of respondents aged 45 or more
remained eligible at interview, compared with only 58 per cent of those
aged under 25, and a much higher proportion (43 per cent) of JSA entrants
were calculated to have become ineligible than respondents overall (up
from 36 per cent in 1997).
Over half (56 per cent) of those who were ineligible had already stopped
receiving ETU (up from 42 per cent in 1997), and this rose to 64 per
cent of JSA entrants.
Receipt of ETU at interview
Around one-quarter (27 per cent) of respondents said they and their
partner were no longer receiving ETU when they were interviewed (up
from 16 per cent in 1997), but this rose to 36 per cent among JSA entrants.
The sample was drawn in April so this represents a rapid rate of departure.
However, almost one-third of those who had ceased to receive ETU
were still eligible to do so (31 per cent) (down from 37 per cent in 1997).
This figure was only 22 per cent among JSA entrants.  Thirteen per cent
of those who remained eligible were no longer receiving ETU (up from
seven per cent in 1997).
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The eligible non-recipients were not asked why they had ceased to receive
ETU and the small size of the group (unweighted n=85) makes further
analysis to uncover the reasons unwise.  A discussion of the reasons for
non-take-up is given in Chapter 4, based on eligible non-recipients in
the low-paid workers samples.  However, the group focused on in the
current chapter are set apart from the majority of eligible non-recipients
by dint of being ex-recipients, and it cannot be assumed that the
explanations for lapsed receipt are the same as those for entitlement which
has not so far been taken up.
Non-eligible respondents
Table 2.20 shows the economic status of respondents who were calculated
as being no longer eligible for ETU at the time of their interview, by
ETU area and gender.  Half of those no longer eligible for ETU were no
longer in work of 16 or more hours per week (48 per cent).  One-
quarter were unemployed and claiming benefit (up from six per cent in
1997), while eight per cent were ill or disabled and five per cent were
working less than 16 hours.  Compared with 29 per cent in 1997, just
one person said he was on a Government training scheme in 1999 as
such schemes had by then ceased to run.
Men were slightly more likely than women to be unemployed and
claiming benefit (28 compared with 23 per cent).  A slightly larger
proportion in Scheme B had ceased work of 16 or more hours (51 per
cent, compared with 45 per cent) and they had, for the most part, become
claimant unemployed.  However, this gap was smaller than in 1997.
The lower earnings thresholds in Scheme A would have taken workers
out of ETU eligibility at lower wages than in Scheme B.  As many as
two-thirds (64 per cent) of ineligible JSA entrants had ceased work of 16
or more hours and over one-third were unemployed and claiming benefit
(35 per cent), while one in 10 was ill or disabled.
Those who were ineligible but remained in work of 16 or more hours
per week had most likely moved out of eligibility due to a rise in their
weekly income.  In some cases this rise would have resulted from becoming
a dual earner household.  Seventeen per cent of those who had become
ineligible but were still working 16 or more hours had a partner who also
worked these hours, compared with an overall figure of only seven per
cent among all those working 16 or more hours.
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Table 2.20  Economic status at interview of respondents calculated as no longer eligible for
ETU by gender and ETU area 1997 and 1999
Column percentages
Men Women Scheme A Scheme B All
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Working 16+ hours / week 47 52 51 52 54 55 43 49 49 52
Working <16 hours / week 2 7 10 3 6 7 7 3 6 5
Unemployed and claiming benefit 6 28 6 23 5 23 7 28 6 25
Ill-health or disability 1 8 2 8 2 6 2 9 2 8
Full-time education 3 0 10 2 5 0 7 3 6 1
Government training scheme 41 1 18 0 26 1 31 0 29 *
Other * 6 3 11 2 8 3 9 2 8
Unweighted base 198 177 230 177 222 212 210 142 432 354
Note: * <0.5 per cent
Base: all respondents no longer eligible for ETU at interview
Most continuing workers who moved out of eligibility would have done
so as a result of a rise in weekly wages.  Table 2.21 shows that ineligible
16+ workers were paid considerably more per week, on average, than
those who remained eligible.
It is likely that some of them experienced this rise in wages due to the
introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999.  It
was noted in Chapter 1 that there was a decline in the ETU caseload
after its introduction and that this decline was predominantly among
young single people, suggesting that NMW increased wages among this
group and pushed many out of eligibility for ETU (Section 1.3.1).
Consistent with this, among the group in the sample who were no longer
eligible but who were still employed 16 or more hours per week, single
men under 25 were disproportionately represented.  They were 20 per
cent of ineligible 16+ hours employees, but only 15 per cent of 16+
hours employees overall.
However, it is probable that many people increased their weekly wages
independently of NMW.  Table 2.20 shows that half (49 per cent) of the
respondents who had become ineligible by interview in the 1997 study,
two years prior to the introduction of NMW, were still working 16 or
more hours and were thus likely to have become ineligible by virtue of a
pay increase.  The equivalent 1999 proportion was very similar (52 per
cent).  Furthermore, when ineligible respondents still employed for 16
or more hours were asked whether NMW had affected their rate of pay
per hour, only 29 per cent said that it had.
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Table 2.21  Average weekly wages and hours worked by calculated eligibility for ETU of
working respondents 1997 and 1999
Men Women
Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Mean weekly wage (£) 83 85 124 140 78 86 115 123
Mean hours worked per week 37 31 39 38 30 27 35 34
Unweighted base 566 272 86 89 875 364 117 88
Base: all respondents still working 16+ hours
Unsuccessful claims
Just under one in 10 (nine per cent) respondents no longer receiving
ETU had applied for ETU and been turned down (down from about a
fifth in 1997), the vast majority of them only once.  Most were informed
that they had too much income.
Reasons for claiming and delaying a claim
Three-quarters of respondents had claimed as soon as they first thought
they might be able to get ETU, but half of those who delayed had delayed
by two months or more.  As has been found with FC, this indicates that
much non-take-up of benefits among eligible respondents in cross-section
surveys is attributable to delays in claiming, with those who delay either
claiming eventually or moving quickly out of eligibility.
Recipients in Newcastle were less likely to let time pass before claiming
while those in the Scheme B areas were more likely to do so (Table
2.22).  Respondents aged under 25 were slightly more likely to have
delayed than other age-groups (30 per cent).  As many as 85 per cent of
JSA entrants had applied immediately and only 14 per cent had waited
two months or more.
The reasons given by those delaying their claim were mainly uncertainty
- 38 per cent were not really sure they would be entitled to ETU - but
22 per cent said that they had been unaware of ETU at time they delayed
(down from 30 per cent in 1997).  JSA entrants were more likely to say
they had delayed for no particular reason (19 per cent) and less likely to
have done so because they were unsure of their entitlement (24 per
cent).
Nearly half the respondents said their main reason for applying for ETU
had been that they had just found out about it (46 per cent), while one-
quarter (23 per cent) cited a fall in wages and one-fifth (19 per cent) that
they had just got a new job.
Those in Scheme A were slightly less likely to say it was because they
were earning less money (19 per cent compared with 27 per cent in
2.4.2  The experience of claiming
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Scheme B).  JSA entrants were most likely to say that getting a new job
had prompted their claim (40 per cent), while 32 per cent cited finding
out about ETU and 23 per cent a fall in wages.  JSA entrants in Scheme
A were more likely to say they had just found out about it (36 per cent
compared with 28 per cent in Scheme B) and less likely to cite a new job
(34 per cent compared with 45 per cent).
Table 2.22  Delays in claiming ETU by ETU area 1997 and
1999
Row percentages
When put in claim for ETU
Unweighted base As soon as aware Let time pass
Scheme A areas
Newcastle 1997 281 67 33
1999 135 85 15
Castleford 1997 286 81 19
1999 154 74 26
Southend 1997 216 76 24
1999 111 80 20
North Wales 1997 224 80 20
1999 157 72 28
Scheme B areas
Sunderland 1997 269 74 26
1999 123 70 30
Doncaster 1997 283 75 25
1999 130 77 23
Bournemouth 1997 194 73 27
1999 113 79 21
Perth 1997 237 77 23
1999 116 72 28
Base: all respondents
Sources of information about ETU
Sources of information prompting ETU claims divided broadly into three
categories: media, professional, and informal sources, however unlike in
1997 the media hardly figured in respondents’ answers.  This was not
surprising, given that the official advertising had been withdrawn in the
spring of 1997.  Thirty-six per cent of respondents had been told about
ETU in a DSS office or Jobcentre, 22 per cent by friends or neighbours,
15 per cent by workmates, and 10 per cent by relatives (Table 2.23).
However, 60 per cent of JSA entrants had heard from the first of these
sources, 13 per cent from friends or neighbours and 10 per cent from
workmates, whereas in 1997 very few had had any information from
informal sources.
Newspaper and magazine advertisements were more often cited by those
in the oldest age-group (eight per cent, compared with less than one per
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cent in other age groups).  However, older respondents were less likely
to give workmates as a source (10 per cent, compared with 15 and 18 per
cent in other age groups).  Word of mouth was most important among
the under 25s – nearly one-third said they had heard from friends and
neighbours (30 per cent), 16 per cent had heard from relatives, and only
one-quarter (26 per cent) had been told in a DSS office or Jobcentre.
Informal word of mouth was particularly important in Sunderland, which
had the highest take-up of ETU across the pilot period (Section 1.3.2).
It showed relatively high proportions hearing about ETU through friends
(29 per cent), workmates (23 per cent) and relatives (13 per cent).  Only
one-fifth of respondents in Sunderland (21 per cent) said they had been
told about ETU in the Jobcentre or DSS office.  This was less than half
the proportion in most other regions, for example 44 per cent in nearby
Newcastle which had a similar proportion coming to ETU from JSA as
Sunderland.  Respondents in Scheme B areas overall more often cited
informal sources than those in Scheme A (though the proportions coming
to ETU from JSA were similar).  This word of mouth information would
have been facilitated by Scheme B’s higher density of eligible workers in
the smaller geographical areas, compared with Scheme A.
Very few people had had trouble filling in the forms (eight per cent).
However, as with FC recipients, there was a low level of knowledge of
the rules of the benefit.  Only two per cent could identify the withdrawal
rate of 70p in the pound from a prompt card and just 59 per cent could
give 16 hours as the minimum required to qualify.  Those aged under 25
were slightly less likely than the other age-groups to be able to give the
16 hours minimum (52 per cent).
Only half of employees and former employees who entered work post-
ETU recalled that when they took the job they had been aware that they
might qualify for ETU (up from 43 per cent in 1997) - 29 per cent of all
respondents (Figure 2.2).  Of these only two-fifths (40 per cent) had an
idea of how much ETU they might be entitled to - just 17 per cent of all
employees recruited post-ETU.  Just over half of the amounts they gave
in reply were accurate (56 per cent) (down from 67 per cent in 1997).
The youngest respondents were considerably less likely to have been
aware of ETU when they took their job (40 per cent) than other age-
groups.  However, among JSA entrants over two-thirds (68 per cent)
had been aware that they might qualify for ETU, those living in Scheme
B areas being better informed in this respect than those in Scheme A (72
per cent compared with 61 per cent).
Among the already small proportion who had been aware of ETU when
they accepted their job, just over half (56 per cent - up from 43 per cent
in 1997) said they would still have been able to accept the wages offered
without the prospect of ETU.  This figure was higher in Scheme B (60
2.5.2  Wage offers
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per cent) than Scheme A (50 per cent).  Nearly three-quarters of
respondents under the age of 25 would still have taken the job (71 per
cent), presumably because they tended not to need so much income as
older people as most lived in their parents’ home.
Of the remainder, 57 per cent felt they would have turned down the job
altogether (down from two-thirds in 1997), while 43 per cent would
have had to ask for longer hours (up from one-third in 1997).  Those in
Scheme A were more likely to have turned the job down (64 per cent
compared with 50 per cent in Scheme B), probably because they were
on average working for lower wages.
Table 2.23  Source of information about ETU by region 1999
Column percentages (multiple response)
Scheme A areas Scheme B areas All
Newcastle Castleford Southend N. Wales Sunderland Doncaster Bournemouth Perth
Told in DSS office/Jobcentre 44 44 48 39 21 42 53 24 36
Friends, neighbours 14 20 8 17 29 25 18 33 22
Workmates 8 10 3 6 23 25 3 12 15
Relatives 9 8 8 9 13 8 5 14 10
Employer 3 2 3 6 4 6 3 1 4
Publicity display in Jobcentre 5 5 2 3 3 0 10 2 4
Newspaper, magazine advert 1 4 9 5 2 0 0 7 3
Advert not TV, radio,
newspaper/magazine 2 1 4 2 2 1 1 3 2
Leaflet through door 3 0 2 2 * 0 1 3 1
Letter from DSS addressed
to you 0 2 4 3 0 0 1 2 1
Welfare rights worker 1 0 4 0 0 * 0 3 1
TV adverts 0 * 0 1 0 2 0 2 1
Article in newspaper/magazine 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 *
Citizen’s Advice Bureau 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 *
Item on radio 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 *
Item on TV 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 *
Radio adverts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Other 11 10 8 13 7 2 6 1 8
Unweighted base 133 153 105 146 122 113 111 79 962
Base: all respondents
The people who felt that they could not have accepted their wage offer
without the prospect of ETU were asked to guess how much they would
have had to have been offered before they could have accepted their job
on the basis of wages alone.  On average, in 1999, ETU was worth £25
a week to employee recipients and earnings were around £88 per week
in ETU jobs.  If members of this sub-set of recipients were similar in
most respects to the others, their answers to the question ought to average
about £113 a week.  In fact, the average estimate was £118 a week but
the range was large.  The gap between the wage thought necessary in the
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absence of ETU and the wage earned when interviewed averaged £39.
However, if these estimates were given as gross wage figures, with
approximate reductions for income tax and National Insurance
contributions, the individual average wage-gap is reduced to £30 a week,
close to the £25 a week actually made up by ETU.  This implies that,
among the minority who actually thought about it, and who also made a
pragmatic choice between accepting a job with ETU and perhaps not
working at all at that time, a fairly accurate financial estimate was made.
The trouble with such a conclusion is that while the averages look fairly
persuasive, the range was very wide.
In addition, less than one-third of those recruited since the start of ETU
and who had been aware of it had discussed it with the employer at the
time (31 per cent).  Among this minority, four-fifths had brought the
subject up themselves (78 per cent).  So if employers had been bidding
down their wage offers in response to their recruits’ new opportunity to
claim ETU, only a small handful of them felt it an advantage to discuss
such a bargain directly with their job applicants, at least as ETU recipients
recalled the event.  Among JSA entrants, slightly more (38 per cent) had
discussed it with their employer.  They were just as likely to have raised
the subject themselves, however the unweighted base for this sub-group
was just 69 and this point should be treated with caution.
Post-ETU recruits who had been aware of ETU and had discussed it
with the employer during the recruitment process (nine per cent of all
respondents) were asked: ‘Do you think you got the job because you could also
get ETU or did this make no difference?’.  This wording allowed for the
possibility that the respondent might have been indifferent to ETU but
thought the new employer might have been prompted to offer work at
low wages knowing that ETU was available to new recruits.  Fifteen per
cent (down from one-fifth in 1997) felt that ETU had made a difference
– two per cent of all those recruited post-ETU introduction and one per
cent of all respondents (Figure 2.2).  However, among JSA entrants (who
had been aware of ETU and discussed it with their employer) this rose to
21 per cent of those asked.  (The unweighted base for these JSA entrants
was just 71 and this point should be treated with caution).
Respondents who were still working 16 or more hours and still in receipt
of ETU were asked what they would do if they could no longer get
ETU.  Half (50 per cent, compared with 55 per cent in 1997) said they
would continue in their current job, 41 per cent said they would try to
get a different job, and six per cent said they would cease working
altogether.  Of those who would continue in their present job, half would
ask their employer for more money or longer hours (48 per cent).
Less than one-third of those aged 45 or more said they would try to get
another job, compared with 43 per cent of under 25s.  Conversely, one
in 10 of the older group said they would stop work for a while, compared
2.5.3  The impact of ETU
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with just two per cent of the youngest respondents.  Those in Scheme A
were also slightly more likely to say they would stop work (nine per
cent) than those in Scheme B (four per cent), which is not surprising,
since those in A areas were typically collecting lower earnings, which
would be less viable in the absence of a supplement.
Figure 2.2  Awareness and impact of ETU at recruitment
Thought ETU had made
a difference at recruitment
1 per cent





employer at time of
recruitment
9 per cent
Did not discuss it with
employer at time of
recruitment
20 per cent
Aware of ETU at
recruitment
29 per cent















Finally, all the current recipients were asked how they felt they would
manage financially without ETU and those no longer receiving it were
asked how they would have managed without it.  Nearly three-quarters
(72 per cent) said they would only manage if they cut back a lot or they
couldn’t manage at all.   Just five per cent said they could manage without
cutting back.
Scheme B respondents were slightly more confident of managing without
ETU than those in Scheme A.  Nearly one-third (30 per cent) of them
felt they could manage without cutting back at all or just a little, compared
with 25 per cent in Scheme A.  Again, this is not surprising since Scheme
B respondents had higher average weekly earnings.  However, it is also
likely to have been influenced by the higher proportion of young single
people in Scheme B (43 per cent compared with 26 per cent).  The
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proportion who could not have managed was strikingly lower among
single people under the age of 25, most of whom would fall back on the
support of their parents’ home.  People who came in from JSA were just
as likely to say they could not manage as others, as were those who had
started their job before the introduction of ETU.
It is probable that, like most people, many ETU recipients adjusted their
expenditure to increases in their income fairly rapidly, and then came to
depend on the new level.  Others may have been using the extra income
from ETU to repay debts they had accumulated before ETU was available.
But the extent to which they financially needed the benefit is in contrast
with the lack of evidence for any real influence exerted by ETU in easing
people into jobs.  If all those entering jobs after the introduction of ETU
said they could not do without it, and all those entering jobs before it
said that they could manage, then this would be clear evidence that ETU
was capturing a new group of workers for whom the supplement had
made a real difference.  But the gap is too small: pre- or post-ETU
worker, the majority seem to find ETU indispensable.
A small majority of the sample were women and ETU receipt was
concentrated among young and single people.  Half had no formal housing
costs as many lived in their parents’ home.  ETU counted as assessable
income for Housing Benefit (HB) claims, but there seemed little conflict
- a minority were tenants and few eligible recipients would gain in HB if
they ceased to receive ETU.
Health problems were fairly rare, but levels of education and training
were low.  Half had only basic academic qualifications, but almost one-
third had no qualifications of any kind.  Eleven per cent were unemployed
at interview, but almost all those still working had a permanent job,
though very few were managerial, professional or technical.  Just under
half worked part-time, but very few had changed their hours as a result
of claiming ETU.
ETU had not eliminated financial problems.  Those working 16 or more
hours managed better than those out-of-work, but those in working
households which had raised their income above ETU thresholds were
better off than the rest.
One-third had moved out of eligibility by their interview, and 13 per
cent of eligible respondents were non-recipients.  Of those no longer
eligible, half were no longer in work, but the remainder worked longer
hours for higher pay than those who remained eligible.  Delays in claiming
were fairly rare and most delay was caused by uncertainty.  The most
common reason for applying for ETU was finding out about it.  Word of
mouth was a very important source of information about ETU, though
over one-third had been told by an official.  However, knowledge levels
regarding the rules were low.
2.6  Summary
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Half of those taking their job since ETU’s introduction had been aware
that they might qualify.  Of these, just over half would have accepted the
job at the wages offered without ETU.  Of the remainder, 43 per cent
would have asked for longer hours.  A small minority of the few who
discussed it with their employer at the time felt ETU had made a difference
to their getting a job, and very few working recipients would stop work
if they ceased to get ETU while half would continue their present job,
though half of those would want more money or hours.  However,
nearly three-quarters of respondents felt that without ETU they would
have had to cut back or could not have managed at all, and those who
started their job before its introduction were just as likely to find it
indispensable.
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The surveys carried out for the evaluation of the Earnings Top-up pilot
included the first large-scale surveys carried out in Britain of the lowest-
paid workers living in 12 of the lowest-paid areas. For this reason alone
they are a valuable resource.  Their purpose in the ETU evaluation project
was:
• to show who among the lowest-paid might benefit from ETU;
• to estimate the take-up rate among those eligible for the benefit;
• to investigate why some eligible workers failed to claim their benefit;
• to estimate whether ETU helped low-paid workers remain in jobs
longer than is typical of the lowest paid.
This chapter will deal with the first two questions - the customer base for
ETU among workers and the take-up rate.  The next chapter will deal
with non-take-up among workers eligible for ETU and the following
Chapter 5 will deal with the question of job retention.
Four surveys of workers-in-work were carried out in each of the 12 pilot
and comparison areas.  The first interviewed a large sample of workers
(2363 of them) in 1996 in the months prior to the introduction of ETU.
The second and third surveys re-contacted the 1996 respondents in 1997,
when they were interviewed again, and in 1998 when they were asked
to complete a postal questionnaire or in some cases were contacted by
telephone.  The fourth survey interviewed a new cross-section sample of
workers (n=1582), similar to the 1996 survey.
The method of sampling for the workers-in-work survey involved use
of the National Insurance records to select from each area a sample of
people of working age whose reported earned incomes were between
£30 and £180 a week.  Comparison with other records allowed the
removal of those claiming Incapacity Benefit and Child Benefit, either of
which would have disqualified recipients from ETU.  The remaining
sample was then screened on their doorsteps by interviewers for households
still without children, earning in their present or last job less than £140
a week in 1996 and £160 a week in 1999 for single people and £200 a
week for couples in 1996, £205 in 1999.  The above-inflation increase
in the single peoples’ inclusion ceiling was to cope with the possible
effects of the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in April
1999.
In this way, a sample of workers was identified who were ‘within-range’
of ETU and which ought, by 1999 to have contained a fair proportion
actually claiming the benefit.  It was a far more cost-effective method
THE IMPACT OF EARNINGS TOP-UP ON WORKERS-IN-WORK3
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than screening households in a doorstep sift without any prior
identification. Earlier experimental attempts to pre-screen addresses using
a postal questionnaire failed to provide acceptable response rates, even
with the promise of a reward.  But the use of the NIRS file had three
weaknesses that should be noted:
• No wage estimates were possible for people who were employed but
never earned more than the (£62 a week) lower limit for paying
National Insurance Contributions.  Someone paid what became the
Minimum Wage of £3.60 an hour for an ETU-qualifying 16 or 17
hours a week would still be under the 1997-98 NIRS contribution
floor.  Very few men but about a fifth of women working less than 16
hours per week earned below the NIRS floor and these would have
been a small but important part of the ETU customer base.
• The time lag between the collection of National Insurance records
and our interviewers arriving on someone’s doorstep could be up to
two years.  This meant that the final sample in 1999 had very few
people under 20. This too omits a small but important section of the
ETU customer-base - the 18 and 19 years olds and this question is
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
• As well as growing older during the time lag between sampling and
interviewing, others would have improved their earnings, or started a
family, for example.  On the other hand, those who remained in scope
were those who might reasonably be thought of as persistently low-
paid people living continuously in low-paid areas.  These were exactly
the people we hoped to encounter since they were likely to form the
core of a customer base for ETU.
The first survey in 1996 and the 1997 follow-up were reported in Marsh
et al (1999) and Finlayson et al (2000).  This chapter will concentrate on
results from the new cross-section survey, comparing new findings with
the earlier work.  In this way we hope to see the full story of how ETU
may have assisted low-paid workers on its introduction and how these
effects may have changed over the three-year period of the pilot.  The
results from the second postal and telephone follow-up survey will be
examined separately in Chapter 5 because it involved both the 1996-97
workers sample and the 1997 sample of ETU recipients together.
Current activity
A case could have been made for screening out from the 1999 workers
sample anyone not in a job for 16 hours a week or more, since they
would not have qualified for ETU.  But a sample selected on their earlier
earnings performance and then re-selected as persistently low-paid
workers, should have a lot to tell us about the stability of their labour
market participation too.  So the doorstep screener selected people for
interview on the basis of their wages from their current or last job.  Since
they were known to be earning in the previous year, there was little risk
3.3  Britain’s low-paid workers
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of picking up longer-term unemployed people of the kind deliberately
sampled for the parallel surveys of unemployed people.
There was little change over the three years in the profile of economic
activity in the 12 pilot areas taken together (Table 3.1).  As in 1996, only
about two-thirds (65 per cent) of the 1999 sample were in jobs whose
hours met the Earnings Top-up threshold of 16 or more a week - 68 per
cent among women and 61 per cent among men.  Some of those who
had become unemployed turned out to have partners who were in work
and so 75 per cent of the sampled households might have potentially
qualified for ETU.
Among the working households a third of the men but only four per
cent of the women were self-employed.  Compared with 1996, this
represented an increase in self-employment among working men from a
fifth to almost a third.  This alone might have depressed take-up rates for
ETU among eligible workers because in 1997 self-employment was
associated with non-take-up of ETU.  A further five per cent of men and
nine per cent of women were working less than 16 hours per week.
Table 3.1  Employment status by sex
Column percentages
Current economic status Men Women All
1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
Employed 16+ hours each week 48 46 70 65 60 57
Employed <16 hours each week 3 3 7 8 5 6
Self employed 16+ hours
each week 10 15 3 3 6 8
Self-employed <16 hours
each week 4 2 1 * 2 1
Government training 1 2 0 0 0 1
Claimant unemployed 21 16 8 5 14 10
Unemployed, not claiming 6 5 3 4 4 4
Full-time education 1 2 1 1 1 2
Temporary sickness
(less than 6 months) 2 2 1 1 2 2
Permanently sick/disabled 1 4 2 3 2 4
Looking after the home - 0 1 2 1 1
Retired 2 2 3 7 3 5
Other 0 1 0 1 0 1
Base 1052 685 1311 895 2363 1580
Claimant unemployment was common.  Twenty-one per cent of men
were unemployed and seeking work and most of these (16 per cent of
men) were claimant unemployed and receiving JSA.  The corresponding
rates among women were smaller: nine per cent seeking work and five
per cent receiving JSA.  These rates were a little lower than among the
1996 sample when 27 per cent of men and 11 per cent of women were
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unemployed.  The follow-up interview survey in 1997 found more than
a third of the under 25 year olds and more than two-thirds of the over
25s who were unemployed in 1996 still without work.
Of the remainder, only small numbers had found their way into education
and training, a few were unwell (six per cent overall), and seven per cent
of the women had ‘retired’ which was an increase from only three per
cent in 1996.
Previous participation in work
During the 18 to 22 months or so between January 1998 and their
interview, less than two thirds (65 per cent) of the sample of workers had
spent all that time in work of 16 hours or more per week, averaging 78
per cent of the time in work.  Among those in work of 16 or more hours
when interviewed 11 per cent had spent some time since January 1998
out of work.  Among the unemployed, claimant and non-claimant alike,
a third (34 per cent) had had no work since January 1998.  It is important
to note, as Table 3.2 shows, that these rates of economic activity were
almost identical in the Scheme A, Scheme B and Control areas.
Table 3.2  Participation in work of 16+ hours per week,
January 1998 to interview, by area
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control
No work since Jan 98 12 11 12
Some work 26 21 23
Always in work 62 68 64
Average proportion of time spent
in work of 16+ hours (%) 77 80 77
Base 541 574 475
Table 3.3 examines six key measures that are commonly associated with
employment - sex, age, marital status, education, health and housing
tenure.  The 1999 sample shared many characteristics in common with
the 1996 sample.  Even among a group of workers without dependent
children, women were still a small majority among the lowest paid (57
per cent).  The absence of parents from the sample also left the age
distribution ‘bi-modal’ - most respondents were either under 25 or over
45 but in 1999 fewer were in the younger age group than in 1996 (35
per cent compared with 45 per cent).  As a result, the 1999 sample had
more who were homeowners (42 per cent), more who had some long-
term illness or disability (28 per cent) and fewer, though still a large
proportion, living with their parents (32 per cent).
3.3.2  Key characteristics of the
sample
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Overall the picture confirmed that the sampling method found a group
of people within range of ETU: poorly educated workers, more than
half of whom had no educational qualifications, high rates of illness and
recurrent unemployment.
The issue of housing tenure, paying rent and eligibility for Housing Benefit
is of considerable importance in estimating the incentives to work provided
by ETU.  Income from ETU counts against workers’ entitlements to
Housing Benefits so there may be workers entitled to Housing Benefit
in these estimates who would not be entitled to it if they were claiming
ETU.
Surveys of low-income families with children find high proportions of
social tenants, which marks them out from better-off families.  Among
the very lowest-paid workers without children, in contrast, far fewer
tenants of any kind are found.  In the 1999 survey, only 18 per cent had
a tenancy in their own right and only 19 per cent had any liability to pay
rent on their own account.  Many low-paid childless workers were older
owner-occupiers who had small outgoings.  Many others were living
with their parents or in some other arrangement, reflecting their youth
and their incomes which were generally too low to support a tenancy.
Thus few qualified for amounts of Housing Benefit that, among the
lowest-paid workers, would clash with their entitlement to ETU.  And
not all of these took up their entitlements.  Among the tenants, only a
third claimed Housing Benefit while a quarter apparently failed to claim
Housing Benefit they were entitled to claim - a take-up rate of 59 per
cent (Table 3.4).  These figures were much the same in the ETU A, B
and C areas except that the take-up rate of Housing Benefit was slightly
higher in the ETU B areas (64 per cent) compared to the A and C areas
(57 per cent) though the proportion receiving benefit was almost the
same.
The figures in Table 3.4 are very similar to those obtained from the 1997
follow-up survey taken when ETU had had a chance to influence
entitlements to Housing Benefit (Finlayson, et al 2000, page 49, Table
3.7).  The overall take-up rate was slightly higher in 1997 at 67 per cent.
The amounts of rent in 1999 that would be assessable for Housing Benefit,
that is after applying all relevant premia and disregards, averaged £44 a
week.  This figure did not differ significantly in the Scheme A and B
areas and the Control areas, nor between those continuing in work
compared with those now out of work.
3.3.3  Housing tenure, rent and
Housing Benefit
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Table 3.3  Key characteristics of workers sample in 1996 and
1999
Column percentages





Under 25 26 22
25 – 34 19 13
35 – 44 10 10
45 – 54 24 31
55+ 21 24
Partner status:
No partner 56 53
Has partner 44 47
Highest educational qualification:
Degree 4 5
A Level 6 6
O Level/GCSE 23 20
CSE Level 14 13
None 53 56




Owns accommodation 16 23
Mortgage 19 19
Living with parents 37 32
Tenant 19 18
Other/missing data 8 8
Base 2315 1582
With respect to work, on the other hand, very few workers still in work
received any Housing Benefit.  Twenty eight per cent of tenants in work
appeared to be entitled to Housing Benefit and 18 per cent of them were
receiving any.  But these were only three per cent of all those working
16 or more hours in the sample.  Two-thirds of these 34 recipients did
not appear to be entitled to it (although this is a very small base size to
work with), so the take-up rate was 36 per cent.  Conversely, a slightly
larger proportion - 22 per cent of working tenants - appeared to be
entitled to some Housing Benefit but were not claiming it.
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Similar figures in the 1997 follow-up survey gave rise to speculation that
continued entitlement to Housing Benefit may be blocking working
tenants’ incentives to claim ETU, which would simply replace their
Housing Benefit.  Among working tenants who had no entitlement to
Housing Benefit, only 17 per cent were receiving any Earnings Top-up.
Among working tenants who were entitled to Housing Benefit (receiving
it or not) almost exactly the same proportions were receiving ETU: 18
per cent.  It is unlikely, therefore, that this part of the evaluation, at least,
will uncover evidence that ETU is being ignored because workers simply
continued to claim Housing Benefit.  If anything is to be shown, it is
merely that there is some tendency to be an eligible non-recipient of
both benefits.
Table 3.4  Eligibility for Housing Benefit by ETU area
Scheme A Scheme B Control areas All
Percentage of whole sample in
rented accommodation and
responsible for housing costs# 21 18 17 19
Base 554 595 433 1582
Among tenants paying rent:
Claiming Housing Benefit+ 33 34 33 33
Eligible for HB but not claiming+ 25 18 25 23
Not eligible for HB+ 41 49 41 44
Eligible rent when greater
than zero (mean per week) £43.76 £42.25 £46.22 £43.81
Base 107 103 69 279
# = Cell percentages
+ = Column percentages
The rules of eligibility for ETU made important distinctions between
workers who were under 25 and those older, and between single people
and couples.  Table 3.5 divides the 1996 and 1999 samples using these
distinctions and further divides them by men and women among single
people and between households whose hours of work qualified them for
ETU or not.  The two profiles are very similar, each showing a small
concentration of sample members into working women over 25 and,
more surprisingly, dual earner couples.  Twice as many dual-earners were
self-employed (16 per cent) compared with the overall rate (eight per
cent) but this does not account for their unexpected presence among the
lowest earners.  More of the men in single-earner couples were self-
employed (27 per cent).
3.3.4  The target groups for ETU
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Table 3.5  Summary of the 1996 and 1999 samples by sex,
age, marital status and employment
Column percentages
Workers sample 1996 Workers sample 1999
Working 16 hrs or more each week:
Single male, under 25 7 6
Single male, 25 or over 8 7
Single female, under 25 9 6
Single female, 25 or over 12 13
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 7 6
Dual earner couple,  45 years or older 13 16
Man works 16+ hours, woman
not in work 5 5
Woman works 16+ hours, man
not in work 9 10
Not working 16 or more hours each week:
Couple, no earner working 16+ hours
or more 8 10
Single male, under 25, 5 6
Single male, 25 or over 7 6
Single female, under 25 3 3
Single female, 25 or over 5 6
Base 2315 1582
On the other hand, it is worth bearing in mind that more than a fifth of
the 1996 and 1999 samples were single people in their early 20s.  This is
a large proportion but still not as large as it should be for a sample designed
to capture potential and actual ETU customers.  Among the parallel
sample of ETU recipients, 40 per cent were under 25.  This shortfall of
the youngest workers in this sample is due to the sampling method,
which allowed a two-year gap between identification and interview.  As
a result, only one per cent of the workers’ sample was under 21 compared
with 24 per cent among the ETU recipients’ sample.  Conversely, 10 per
cent of the workers sample were over 60 compared with only one per
cent of the recipients.
It may still seem surprising that a sample designed to capture the lowest-
paid households without children should have netted so many dual-earner
couples.  They were nearly a third of all the working households (32 per
cent).  As noted above, a higher proportion of them were self-employed
and self-employed people often report low incomes, occasionally none.
In this sample, 20 per cent of working two-earner couples were self
employed compared with 12 per cent of workers overall and four out of
ten of the now-unemployed said they were self-employed in their last
work.  But dual-earner couples were still nearly a quarter of the employees
working 16 or more hours (24 per cent).  This is mainly because we
deliberately allowed into the sample dual-earners both of whom earned
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less than £200 a week.  They were ‘within range’ of ETU in the sense
that if one of them were to lose their job, they would stand a good
chance of qualifying for ETU as a new single-earner couple.
There were no significant differences in the relative distributions of these
ETU target groups among those in work compared with those out of
work.  More importantly, there were no significant differences in these
distributions in the Control Areas compared with the ETU Scheme A or
the Scheme B areas.
The 1999 survey was carried out in the months following the introduction
of the National Minimum Wage in April 1999.  A young single worker
living in a Scheme A area paid the NMW for a typical working week of
36 hours would actually clear the maximum threshold for entitlement to
ETU.  Workers in Scheme B would qualify along with the couples, but
the band of qualifying incomes was still quite small.  For example, no
single person working 30 hours a week or more in Scheme B areas
qualified for ETU above £131 a week.  Under Scheme A, working less
than 30 hours, entitlement ran out at only £87 per week.
Overall, the median rate of pay per hour in 1999 was £3.82, up
substantially from £3.37 in 1997 and £3.15 in 1996.  No direct
conclusions may be drawn from these comparisons, if for no other reason
than the selection band for the inclusion of single people was raised from
£140 to £160 a week.  But it may be interesting that low-paid workers
in these areas following the introduction of the minimum wage were
working substantially fewer hours.  There was a striking reduction in
hours worked by those working 16 or more hours in the 1999 sample,
down to 32 per week from 36 in 1996 and 37 in 1997.  This resulted in
the net weekly incomes of these workers remaining the same.
Table 3.6  Median wages and hours of work in 1996, 1997 and
1999:  employees working 16+ hours
1996 1997 1999
Hourly wage (£) 3.15 3.37 3.82
Usual weekly wage (£) 107.00 115.38 117.27
Usual weekly hours 36 37 32
Base 1431 1053 818
Almost a third (32 per cent) of the 1999 sample worked short hours and
these were distributed evenly across the range from 16 to 25 hours a
week.  Another 32 per cent were grouped in the more familiar 35 to 40
hours range while 12 per cent worked longer hours.
The figure for hourly pay was estimated by dividing respondent’s usual
hours of work into their usual weekly pay.  This is net pay, after all
3.3.5  Hours, wages and incomes
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deductions for tax and National Insurance contributions, though at these
levels of income such deductions were small.  On the other hand, we
had so few respondents aged under 21, the possible effects of the lower
rate of the NMW of £3.00 per hour for the under 21s can be ignored.
Exactly a third of the employees working 16 or more hours in the sample
had a result from this calculation that lay between £3.00 (allowing for
net effects) and £3.60 per hour while 12 per cent were paid less and 53
per cent were paid more.  The lower band below £3.00 per hour net
included four per cent of the sample who were still receiving less than
£2 an hour and eight per cent receiving between £2 and £3.00 an
hour.
Table 3.7 maps out the hours worked, weekly wages and the estimated
rate per hour received for the three main target groups defined by ETU
rules (couples, and single people under 25 or older).  The single people
are then divided between men and women and the couples between one
and two earner couples.  There are really too few single-earner male-led
working couples in the sample because more than three quarters of single-
earner couples are led by a female worker (77 per cent).  This data is then
presented separately for the Scheme A, Scheme B and Control areas.
Men, particularly the under 25s, worked the longer hours for the smaller
rates of pay while women, particularly the older single women and the
(mostly female) single earner couples worked the shorter hours for higher
rates.  This pattern is reproduced very consistently across the three areas.
The only statistically significant differences within these target groups is
that the young single women in the Control areas were working longer
hours than those in either the Scheme A or B areas (36 versus 32).  Also,
when all the working men from the couples are added to the single
working men, those in the Control areas seemed to work longer hours
than those in the Scheme B areas, though not significantly longer than
those in the Scheme A areas (39 versus 35 and 37 hours a week,
respectively).
The span of time between the period of activity between March 1997
and March 1998 when these workers established their low-paid credentials
to be sampled for the 1999 survey, defines the period when the ETU
pilot scheme became established.  It could be argued that, irrespective of
the proportion in the samples Scheme A and Scheme B areas who turned
out to be receiving or who had received ETU, the impact of the new
benefit would be seen in the hours and pay of these continuing low-paid
workers.  The pattern of hours and pay might differ between the Scheme
A, Scheme B and Control areas.  This might be true irrespective of the
introduction of the National Minimum Wage, which occurred equally
in all areas.  If, for example, the effect of ETU was to cause workers to
receive lower wages, or to work shorter hours, some of these effects
might be visible in differences between these three samples.  But there
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are no consistent or systematic differences of these kinds to report.  This
is not in itself conclusive evidence that ETU had not affected the pay and
hours of the continuing body of those working 16 or more hours per
week in the pilot compared with the Control areas; only that there is no
evidence where you might have expected to find some.
Evidence of the impact of ETU over this period that might have been
expected to arise more obviously is that awareness of the benefit would
have grown.  Overall in 1997, 34 per cent of the economically active
respondents had heard of ‘a new social security benefit, introduced last year in
some parts of the country that pays extra money to some people who work and
who have no dependent children living with them’.  By 1999 the proportion
spontaneously aware of ETU - who answered ‘yes’ to the question - had
fallen to 29 per cent.  On the other hand, the proportions who knew
about ‘a benefit..’ and could go on to name it as ETU (or something
reasonably similar) remained about the same at 13 per cent compared to
12 per cent in 1997.  As in 1996, awareness was higher in Scheme B
areas (34 per cent were aware of the benefit and 24 per cent knew it was
called ETU) compared with Scheme A areas (23 per cent and 13 per cent
respectively).  Awareness had fallen most in the Scheme A areas, from 30
to 23 per cent (Table 3.8).
3.4  Awareness of ETU
3.4.1  Levels of awareness
Table 3.7  Hours and wages by ETU ‘target group’ and area
Scheme A Scheme B Control Areas All
Hours Wage Rate Hours Wage Rate Hours Wage Rate Hours Wage Rate
Single men, under 25 [37] [131] [3.64] [38] [127] [3.46] [38] [135] [3.56] 37 131 3.55
25 and over [34] [119] [3.70] [35] [106] [3.31] [47] [132] [3.27] 37 117 3.47
Single women, under 25 [32] [121] [3.83] [32] [118] [3.74] [36] [121] [3.43] 33 121 3.43
25 and over 31 115 3.85 31 110 3.74 [30] [107] [3.87] 30 111 3.82
One-earner couples 29 116 4.28 28 108 3.93 [26] [102] [4.02] 28 109 4.07
Two-earner couples:Resp 35 122 3.79 31 119 4.03 33 126 4.02 33 122 3.94
Partner 33 120 3.94 34 126 4.30 36 129 3.93 34 125 4.06
All 33 120 3.86 31 114 3.78 33 119 3.83 32 117 3.82
Base 35 32 22 89
33 30 16 79
45 21 26 92
66 68 41 175
51 63 34 148
83 91 61 235
83 84 72 239
All 313 305 200 818
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
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It was the two seaside towns, which had the smallest take-up of the
benefit, which also had noticeably the least awareness of ETU compared
with the other areas in their respective Schemes (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8  Awareness of ETU among workers still
economically active, by area
Cell percentages
Aware of Names benefit
introduction of benefit   as ETU Base
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Newcastle 32 21 12 14 125 114
Castleford &
Wakefield 27 28 12 10 163 127
Southend 23 13 7 4 70 55
North Wales 35 23 17 12 106 90
Sunderland 42 38 27 30 130 102
Doncaster 42 33 27 29 169 185
Bournemouth 27 25 9 15 64 75
Perth 36 29 23 25 103 93
Scheme A areas 30 23 12 13 464 386
Scheme B areas 39 34 24 24 466 455
All economically active 34 29 18 20 930 841
How surprising the fall in awareness is found may depend on the view
taken of the power of local networks to continue to spread the news of a
new benefit, on the one hand, compared with the likely effect of the
withdrawal of advertising after the first six months of the ETU pilot, on
the other.  There is some evidence of a rise in the effectiveness of networks
and a fall in the recall of any advertising.  Those who knew about ETU
from local networks, featuring information handed on by workmates,
relatives and friends, rose as a proportion of those who knew anything at
all about ETU from 30 per cent in 1997 to 44 per cent in 1999.  Those
recalling advertisements fell from 35 to 22 per cent and these included
six per cent who thought they had seen advertisements on the television,
of which there have been none.  Those whose source was the DSS grew
from 19 to 29 per cent while small numbers recalled items, not
advertisements, in news broadcasts or other media referring to ETU.
Three respondents wryly recalled being interviewed in one of the earlier
surveys.
The upward movement in employment and wages between 1996 and
1999 lowered the ‘strike rate’ for the sift survey from 17 to 13 per cent of
issued addresses, despite increasing the single person’s wage ceiling from
£140 to £160 a week.  Interviewers found only about a quarter earning
3.4.2  Sources of information
3.5  Eligibility for ETU
71
wages low enough to leave them eligible for interview among people
identified as low-paid workers in 1997-98 even when the remaining
parents in the sample had been identified and eliminated.  Among these
barely two-thirds were still in work that might qualify them for ETU.
This further restricted the numbers of persistently low-paid workers
available for analysis and their wages were often above the small range
qualifying for ETU, especially among single people in the Scheme A
areas.
The uncontrolled variation between those sifted into the 1999 survey
compared with the 1996 survey makes some comparisons difficult because
some changes in economic conditions may have removed in
disproportionate amounts some kinds of workers from eligibility for
interview, or added others such as the recently unemployed.  In this way
the qualifying population of workers-in-work will be different, so
differences in the proportion eligible for the benefit may not be strictly
interpretable as true changes.
This section will look at eligibility in three stages:
• To determine the distribution of qualifying incomes (rather than wages
alone).
• To estimate the corresponding rates of eligibility for ETU.
• To estimate the take-up rate of ETU among eligible workers.
Table 3.9 summarises all the income reported by respondents that counted
against their eligibility for ETU.  This was done for all those working 16
or more hours a week, including the self-employed, and then for
employees alone.  These include earnings from partners (for work of any
hours per week) and some partners’ pensions.
For many this was a simple calculation since all the income they had was
their wages.  Young single men in Scheme A areas, for example, earned
£131 a week and had no other income, on average.  By coincidence,
£131 was also the wage above which the ETU entitlement of young
single people working at least 30 hours a week ceased (the ‘run-out
point’).  Young women had less income, typically £127 a week.  The
couples’ incomes added up to more.  The ‘single earners’ sometimes had
other earnings from work of less than 16 hours or pension entitlements,
typically raising their assessable incomes by an additional £35 a week.
Two earner couples were selected on the basis that neither exceeded
£200 a week but, by another coincidence, had total incomes averaging
exactly £200 a week between them.  Usually this was income solely from
wages.
Removing the self-employed, who were almost all concentrated among
the older men and the couples, made no significant difference to these
average figures.
3.5.1  Assessable incomes
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The same differences between target groups were reproduced in each of
the three areas and overall there were no significant differences at all in
assessable incomes between them.
Table 3.9  ETU Assessable income by ETU ‘target group’ and area (£s per week)
Scheme A Scheme B Control Areas All
All Employees All Employees All Employees All Employees
workers only workers only workers only workers only
Single men, under 25 [131] [131] [124] [125] [119] [121] 125 126
25 and over [113] [117] [112] [112] [98] [109] 109 114
Single women, under 25 [116] [116] [102] [104] [118] [117] 113 113
25 and over 127 130 119 121 [123] [126] 123 126
One-earner couples 151 150 150 155 [122] [121] 144 145
Two-earner couples 207 211 190 197 205 205 200 204
All 151 151 150 148 144 144 147 148
Base 36 36 36 35 29 28 106 99
41 34 43 32 28 20 112 86
47 47 26 25 27 27 100 99
71 68 75 72 49 46 195 186
56 51 76 66 45 37 177 154
96 84 108 89 78 63 282 236
All 347 320 364 319 256 221 967 860
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
The eligibility for ETU of the benefit unit in which each respondent
lived7  was calculated based on their employment status, hours of work,
incomes, savings, partnership/family status and area of residence.  A
partner’s employment might leave a benefit unit eligible for ETU even
while the respondent remained unemployed.  About five per cent of the
working sample qualified on the basis of a partner’s occupation rather
than their own.
Even though every effort was made to collect all relevant information
which might relate to the ETU calculation, calculated eligibility may not
match true eligibility for several reasons (van Oorschot, 1991; Corden,
1983).  There may be differences in the information which respondents
give to benefit officials compared to survey interviewers, for example, in
the periods over which earnings are measured.  Respondents may not
volunteer the same information to officials as they did to interviewers, in
favour of either.  In any comparison between ETU amounts received
and calculated entitlements, some discrepancy would be expected since
ETU payments run on for six months, regardless of change in
circumstances, and so information used to calculate entitlement may be
collected up to six months before the information recorded by the survey.
3.5.2  Rates of eligibility
7 The benefit unit was either the respondent, if single, or the respondent and their
partner if in a couple.
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Nonetheless the calculated ETU entitlements and amounts actually
received (among those in work and receiving benefit) correlated well
(r=0.72, sig>0.0001, see also Figure 2.1).
A close correspondence between amounts of ETU eligibility and amount
received might be no more than should be expected from a well-
conducted survey, especially when small movements in income between
application and interview are allowed for.  But it is a valuable finding
because it means that measures of eligibility for ETU among non-recipients
may be accepted with the same confidence.  This is true of the fact of
eligibility among non-recipients and of the amounts forgone.  It makes
no sense to say that the survey measured eligibility well among those
receiving ETU and poorly among those who did not.  It is however
possible to say that in some cases eligible non-recipients were aware of
other income that they did not want to report and that this is itself the
reason for their not applying for benefit.
The incomes given in Table 3.9 are translated into rates of eligibility for
ETU in Tables 3.10 and 3.11.  Table 3.11 simply divides the ETU-
assessable income into those who would qualify for a maximum award,
those who had incomes between that maximum-award threshold and
the point at which, for them, their entitlement for ETU runs out, and
those above.  These two points, the threshold and run-out points, vary
between Scheme A and Scheme B and between single respondents under
25 or older and for couples.
Table 3.10  ETU entitlements by ‘customer group’ for respondents in ETU areas
ETU entitlement
Proportion eligible (%) Of those entitled:
mean amount (£) Base
1996 1997 1999 1996 1997 1999 1996 1997 1999
Single male <25 working 16+ hours 35 24 32 15.10 13.90 19.05 86 92 72
Single male 25+ working 16+ hours 60 39 56 17.40 16.10 21.70 100 116 84
Single female, <25, working 16+ hours 50 34 40 16.40 20.20 17.26 105 86 73
Single female 25+ working 16+ hours 60 48 48 17.30 19.60 18.28 152 147 146
Dual earner couple <45 years 30 23 41 26.00 31.50 42.37 78 84 64
Dual earner couple, 45+ years 38 24 39 35.70 36.80 43.85 190 193 157
Man works 16+ hours,
woman not in work 64 33 [54] 36.20 29.70 [32.99] 59 69 48
Woman works 16+ hours,
man not in work 51 49 63 38.70 32.40 33.38 104 109 102
All 48 35 45 25.30 24.80 28.80 874 896 746
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
74
Table 3.11  ETU assessable income compared with maximum award thresholds and run-out
points where eligibility expires
Row percentages
Scheme A Scheme B
Between Between
Below threshold Above Below threshold Above
threshold and run-out threshold threshold and run-out threshold
Single Under 25 4 19 77 24 29 47
Single 25 plus 6 35 59 21 40 39
One earner couple 11 46 43 13 51 36





ETU was made more valuable in the Scheme B areas for single people by
raising their maximum award threshold respectively for the under 25s
and older single people from £52.70 and £62.45 to a universal £80.65.
This had the effect of raising the proportion qualifying for a maximum
award from four to 24 per cent among the under 25s and from six to 21
per cent among older single people.  Run-out points were so low in
Scheme A areas that more than three-quarters of young singles exceeded
the qualifying incomes.  Overall, 47 per cent of currently employed or
self-employed workers in Scheme A and B areas together qualified for
ETU, 39 per cent in the Scheme A areas and 54 per cent in Scheme B as
summarised in Table 3.12.  In the Control areas, the same 47 per cent
would have qualified under Scheme B.
Table 3.12  Calculated eligibility for ETU: among 1999
workers
Cell percentages
Scheme A areas Scheme B areas Control areas
Calculated eligibility in 1999
Eligible for ETU 39 54 -
Not eligible but would be
eligible if Scheme B applied 17 - 47
Total eligible if Scheme B
applied 56 54 47
Base 347 364 256
75
This overall figure is a little lower than the estimated eligibility rate among
the 1996 sample: 45 per cent of the working sample in Scheme A and
Scheme B areas would have been eligible for ETU compared with 48
per cent in 1996.  The latter figure fell to 35 per cent among the remaining
workers in 1997.
Under Scheme B, 67 per cent of workers were notionally eligible in
1996 compared with 54 per cent in this 1999 sample.  The rate of eligibility
if Scheme B were universal was almost the same in Scheme A and B
areas: 56 and 54 per cent respectively.  Among remaining workers in
1997, the corresponding figures were 43 and 44 per cent (Finlayson et
al., 2000 pp52).
Rates of eligibility for ETU were highest among single-earner couples
where the partner was out of work altogether (rather than working less
than 16 hours or self-employed) at 61 per cent.  Among working single
people they were lower at 45 per cent and lower still among dual-earner
couples who both worked more than 16 hours a week at 36 per cent.
Overall, men were less likely to be eligible (42 per cent) than were women
(50 per cent).  Among the single workers, those over 24 were more
likely to be eligible (56 per cent among men, 48 per cent among women)
compared with those under 25 (32 per cent among men, 40 per cent
among women).  But these differences are largely driven by the differing
arithmetic of eligibility and incomes.
Overall, those in scope of ETU were entitled to receive £28.80 a week.
Following three years of uprating, this was more or less equivalent to the
£25.30 that the 1996 sample would have been entitled to had ETU then
been available.  It is similar to the £24.80 the remaining eligible workers
would have been able to claim in 1997.
Within each ETU target group, rates of eligibility and the value of
entitlements were similar in 1999 compared with the earlier surveys (Table
3.9) except that single women’s rates of eligibility had dropped from 56
to 45 per cent.  The value of entitlements among dual-earner couples
was much higher at £42 a week compared with £26 in 1996, but these
are small samples.
When the 1996 respondents were re-interviewed in 1997, the proportion
eligible for ETU had sunk from 34 to 27 per cent in the Scheme A areas
and from 67 to 44 per cent in the B areas.  This was due to the greater
likelihood that eligible people would leave eligibility by raising their
incomes, acquiring earning partners or having children.  Fewer of the
ineligible people in 1996 moved in the opposite direction by 1997.
However, very few of the remaining eligible workers in 1997 had managed
to claim the new benefit - less than seven per cent of the working sample
in the Scheme A and B areas together were receiving ETU when
interviewed.  Since 35 per cent remained eligible, this represented a
3.5.3  Amounts of ETU
entitlement
3.6  Claiming ETU
3.6.1  Claiming in 1997
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take-up rate (recipients and new recipients as a proportion of the eligible
population) of 18 per cent. Coincidentally, perhaps, this was exactly the
take-up rate of Disability Working Allowance in its first year (Berthoud
and Rowlingson 1996)8.
Together these changes in eligibility and the low take-up rate suggested
that:
• Eligibility for ETU might be a short-lived condition: Overall, the
proportion of workers eligible for ETU in pilot areas dropped from
48 per cent to 35 per cent in less than a year.  This happened despite
some considerable turnover in who was in employment.  Half of the
workers found eligible in 1996 (47 per cent) were calculated to be
ineligible by 1997 and just under a third (32 per cent) of those entitled
in 1997 were calculated as ineligible in 1996.  Many in work, and
many of those returning to work, saw improvements in earnings that
took them beyond the reach of ETU.
• The eligible population of low-paid workers might be a lot larger than
originally estimated, particularly since the caseload had risen to its
predicted final total of 20,000 in just 18 months.
• Few people had heard of it.  Only 30 per cent of eligible non-recipients
said they had heard of a new benefit for people in work and half these
did not remember what it was called.
The 1999 sample was new - or as new as its design allowed - whereas the
1997 sample was a follow-up survey.  It was reasonable to expect the
newer sample to allow a closer correspondence between eligibility and
receipt of benefit, the benefit itself having had two more years to bed
down.  On the other hand, the evidence seen above that awareness of
ETU had fallen might point in the other direction.
Overall, the take-up of ETU rose but remained low.  Among the current
workers and self-employed people, the proportion of workers actually
receiving benefit rose from seven per cent in 1996 to 13 per cent in
1999.  This was despite the higher inclusion wages for single workers.
ETU was a little more popular in Scheme B areas where 18 per cent of
current low-paid workers received it compared with only seven per cent
in Scheme A areas.  Nor had the previous three years built up a customer
base of earlier recipients of ETU.  Among those continuing in work,
only five per cent recalled ever receiving ETU while a further two per
cent had applied and been rejected.  Thus, eight out of ten low-paid
workers still in work of 16 or more hours when interviewed had never
claimed ETU (87 per cent under Scheme A, 72 per cent under Scheme
B).
3.6.2  Claiming in 1999
8 Although this compares with 57 per cent for Family Credit in the period April 1988
to December 1989 (DSS, 1993) and ‘about half’ for Family Income Supplement in its
second year (DSS, 1978).
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Nor is there a stock of former customers among those who were without
work of 16 or more hours when interviewed.  Fewer of them had ever
received ETU: five per cent in Scheme A areas and 13 per cent in Scheme
B.
The proportion receiving ETU when interviewed was the same among
men and women.  Among single people the proportion differed little,
other than in ways associated with differences in assessable income which
have previously been described.  This led to a concentration of recipients
among older single women; 30 per cent of those working were receiving
ETU and they made up nearly half (46 per cent) of all the recipients
found in the workers survey.  In contrast, receipt among couples was
rare.  Only four per cent of working couples were receiving ETU and
five per cent had received it in the past compared with 19 per cent of
single workers receiving ETU and six per cent in the past.
Correspondingly receipt was also rare among homeowners, almost all of
whom were couples.
We can now bring together the estimates of the rate of eligibility for
ETU with the rates of take-up to estimate the take-up rate among eligible
workers.  The take-up rate was calculated as the proportion of ETU
recipients (plus those who appeared eligible and who had recently
submitted a claim which was being processed) among the total who
were eligible for the benefit at the time of interview.  This means that
current recipients of ETU who were no longer eligible - typically those
whose incomes rose since they claimed ETU - were taken out of the
calculation.  This divided the sample into four groups: eligible and
ineligible recipients, eligible non-recipients and ineligible non-recipients.
Table 3.13 shows the distribution of these four groups in Scheme A and
Scheme B areas for those still in work of 16 or more hours.  Table 3.14
shows the take-up rates among all eligible workers and among employees.
Table 3.13  Eligibility for ETU and receipt by Scheme
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B
A. Eligible recipients 5 16
B. Ineligible recipients 1 2
C. Eligible non-recipients 34 38
D. Ineligible non-recipients 60 44
Base - all in full-time work, inc.s/emp. 361 385
Although more were receiving benefit in 1999 than in 1997, more were
eligible for benefit too, so the take-up rate rose less.  It rose from 18 per
cent in 1997 to 23 per cent of eligible workers in 1999.
3.6.3  The take-up rate of ETU
78
Table 3.14  Take-up rate by Scheme
Cell percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Schemes A and B
All Employees All Employees All Employees
eligible only eligible only eligible only
Take up rate 14 16 30 31 23 24
Base 140 114 207 172 347 286
Note: Take up rate = eligible recipients / eligible recipients + eligible non-recipients
Among the parallel sample of unemployed people interviewed both in
1998 and 1999, only 44 respondents were in work and eligible for ETU
by the time of their 1999 interview: 23 of them were receiving ETU.
As in 1997, the take-up rate was higher in Scheme B areas compared
with Scheme A: 30 per cent compared with 14 per cent.  In 1997, the
corresponding figures were 23 per cent and 11 per cent.  So under Scheme
B at least, the take-up rate was beginning to reach the kind of levels that
it was thought Family Income Supplement (the forerunner of Family
Credit introduced in 1971) reached in its first few years.
On the other hand, a benefit intended to supplement the wages of the
very lowest-paid workers that fails to reach seven out of ten of those
entitled to receive it in its more generous form, cannot be said to be
doing its job. It might still be doing a very special job of encouraging
into work a lot of people, especially young people who were unemployed
and who then rapidly increased their earnings under ETU to take them
beyond eligibility.  This would depress take-up rates in cross-section
surveys because a significant proportion of recipients would quickly
become ineligible.  But the proportion of ineligible workers among the
recipients is quite small - 15 per cent among this sample and 11 per cent
among the larger parallel sample of current recipients who were still in
work.  If they were included in the estimate on the grounds that they
were eligible only a few weeks ago (or at least the DSS found them so)
then take up rates would rise to 19 per cent and 45 per cent respectively
in Scheme A and Scheme B areas.  But this in turn legitimately leads to
speculation about how many of the ineligible non-recipients might also
have been eligible a few weeks ago.
Though suffering the loss of some of the sample to time-lag and a low
response rate, the sampling strategy located adequate numbers of
persistently low-paid workers living in the low-pay areas designated by
the ETU pilot.  Spells of unemployment were common among them
and a quarter would not have qualified for ETU because neither they
nor a partner were working 16 or more hours a week.
3.7  Summary
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The lowest-paid workers without children were either young, single
and living with their parents or were older couples who had either bought
their homes or still had a small mortgage.  Less than a fifth of the sample
paid rent and only a third of these received Housing Benefit.  Overall,
only three per cent of those working 16 or more hours per week continued
to get Housing Benefit in work.
There were more women than men among these lowest-paid workers,
but still more than four out of ten workers were men.
The economic and social profile of workers did not differ significantly
between Scheme A, Scheme B and Control Areas.
Median pay rates had risen from £3.15 an hour to £3.82 among the
workers-in-work since 1996 but hours of work had fallen sharply from
36 to 32 hours a week.  One in six workers appeared to be below the
National Minimum Wage.  Net weekly wages were typically between
£100 and £140 a week.
Awareness of ETU was low and falling.  Even in places where ETU was
more popular, two thirds were unaware of in-work benefits for people
without children and few could name ETU.
If ETU B were available in Scheme A, B and Control areas, about half
the sample would have qualified for benefit in each area, underscoring
the all-important similarity between them.  The proportion of eligible
workers claiming ETU rose from the 18 per cent found in the 1997
follow-up sample, but remained low at 14 per cent in Scheme A and 30
per cent in Scheme B: 23 per cent overall.
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There is a literature on the take-up of income tested benefits (Corden,
1983,1987, 1995; Corden and Craig, 1991; Marsh and McKay, 1993;
McKay and Marsh 1995; van Oorschot, 1991) and research has implicated
a wide range of factors that discourage people from claiming social security
benefits.  Some of these, such as the fear of being mistakenly accused of
fraud that apparently discourages many elderly people from claiming
additional Income Support, are not relevant to the problems encountered
in persuading younger people to claim in-work benefits.  The most
important of the factors which were found to be relevant to Family
Credit (FC), the in-work benefit for families with children equivalent to
ETU, are explained below as they relate to FC.
• Family structure: lone parents are consistently more likely to claim
Family Credit compared to couples.
• Need: families may not claim before they feel they can no longer
afford essential goods and services if they rely on their wages alone.
• Low entitlements: families entitled to only small awards can overlook
or ignore them.  They may especially be unaware of the rules securing
an award unchanged for six months, which would make a claim for
small weekly amounts much more worthwhile.
• Other psychological factors such as past disappointment at being
turned down for benefit and fear of stigma, though this is the rarest
reason.  The internal dynamics of low-income couples has also been
implicated.  Women, who are required to be the recipient in couples,
are said to be unwilling to expose their partners as poor providers.
• Time: some families delay claiming long enough to show up in cross
section surveys as eligible non-recipients, but eventually they do claim,
usually successfully.  Other families moved swiftly out of eligibility by
earning more, becoming two-earner families or sometimes by losing
their jobs altogether.  Again, ignorance of the six month rule, which is
the same in ETU as it is in Family Credit, was an important factor.
• Awareness: Family Credit is well known, but as already shown, ETU
had a visibility problem among non-recipients.
The take-up rate of Family Credit was far higher than that apparently
achieved by ETU: 72 per cent compared with 14 per cent and 30 per
cent in the Scheme A and Scheme B areas.  And the child premiums in
Family Credit put qualifying incomes a whole pound an hour higher
than those earned by ETU recipients.  So we should not necessarily
expect that factors that discouraged a minority of eligible families from
claiming Family Credit will be the same as those discouraging the majority
of eligible workers from claiming their ETU.
ELIGIBILITY AND CLAIMING ETU: WHY DID SO MANY LOW-
PAID WORKERS FAIL TO TAKE UP THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO
ETU?




In 1997 structural factors were the most important in discouraging take-
up of ETU among those surviving from the 1996 sample of low-paid
workers and still eligible for the new benefit.  A multivariate model of
workers’ failure to claim ETU pointed clearly to the failure of dual earner
couples to claim their entitlement.  Among single earner couples however,
those with a female worker were also less likely to claim and those with
a male worker more likely.  Eligible single workers were more likely to
claim than were couples, especially the younger workers and the women.
Lower entitlement reduced the failure to claim only slightly.  Other
things held constant, being a driver and being self-employed also lowered
workers’ propensity to claim their entitlements to ETU.
This research on the 1997 sample was hampered by small numbers because
both entitlement and take-up were low.  Although the overall sample
size was smaller still in this 1999 survey, entitlement was similar and
take-up was larger.  It therefore provided a 1999 sample of 347 people
who were entitled to receive ETU at the point of interview, 23 per cent
of whom had a claim in payment or (in just three cases) were waiting to
hear about a claim they had made.  The next section examines the
differences among these 347 workers between ETU recipients (who
continued to be eligible for ETU) and eligible non-recipients.
In 1999 structural factors were again the most important and will be
described first because they frame all the other explanations and so have
to be controlled for.
Single people and couples
The most significant finding, which the evidence so far will have suggested,
was that the take-up rate among single workers was higher than among
couples.  In fact it was nearly four times higher at 37 per cent compared
with only 10 per cent among couples.
The failure of couples to claim is a strange finding if, as we shall see, the
role of awareness is important.  You would think two heads better than
one in waking up to the opportunity to increase weekly incomes by a
significant fraction.  And it was a significant fraction too since eligible
couples were forgoing far more cash than the singles were.  On the other
hand, two heads are not as good as one if both have to be convinced of
their entitlement before one of them claims.  If very low-paid couples
without children occupy social locations that jointly isolate them from
the sources of information or the examples that prompt claiming in single
people, then it is possible that they might tend to reinforce each other’s
disbelief in their eligibility for a benefit that neither have encountered
before.
The above inconsistencies will leave us struggling somewhat to explain
why take-up was so low among eligible couples since comparisons with
4.2  Recipients and eligible
non-recipients in the workers’
sample
4.2.1  Structural influences
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Family Credit are not going to be that helpful.  One factor was consistent
in that the take-up rate varied among couples between 14 per cent among
single-earner couples and only six per cent among the dual-earner couples.
Very low reported incomes among dual-earner couples are surprising,
and in past research they have been linked to self-employment9.  However,
only 15 per cent of these dual-earner couples were self-employed, similar
to the rate among single-earner couples (11 per cent).  Nevertheless,
they certainly had some extraordinarily low wages, with respondents
reporting usual wages of £94 a week and their partners £60. But their
wage earning was asymmetrical, so they averaged only £102 a week
between them.  Those in the Scheme A areas shared £119 a week and
those in the B areas only £94 - only half the wage above which their
eligibility for ETU would cease (their ‘run-out point’) which was about
£180 per week.
Among the eligible single workers, the take-up rate was the same among
men who were younger or older than the 25+ age-break introduced by
the differing rules of eligibility: exactly 30 per cent.  But among single
women there was a large difference: 21 per cent among the younger
women under 25 but 51 per cent among those older.  The joint effects
of age and sex and marital status on the take-up rate of ETU are shown
in Table 4.1.  It should be noted that the numbers in each of these
groups, except couples aged over 45, are very small and the proportions
should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Table 4.1  Eligible non-recipients by ETU target group
Cell percentages
Men Women Couples
Under 25 25 to 44 Over 44 Under 25 25 to 44 Over 45 Under 45 Over 45
Percent who were eligible
non-recipient of ETU [30] [26] [38] [27] [53] [50] [20] 6
Base 23 31 16 29 32 38 46 132
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
Clearly the group which brought down the overall take-up rate were the
large numbers of older couples who made up 38 per cent of all eligible
families and had a take-up rate of only six per cent.  When these were
removed from the sample the take-up rate among the rest went up from
23 to 34 per cent.  This figure would have been 20 per cent in Scheme
A areas and 43 per cent in Scheme B areas, which begins to look quite
respectable for a new income-tested in-work benefit that had received so
9 Self-employed couples reporting little or no income have often turned out to have
expenditure patterns close to the national average.
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little public promotion.  Again, and unlike the result found in 1997, self-
employment was not implicated. If all the self-employed were removed,
the overall take-up rate rose from 23 to 24 per cent and among everyone
except the older couples it still rose only from 34 to 35 per cent (see also
Table 3.14).
Again, to emphasize, the older ETU-eligible couples had extremely small
wages and incomes, averaging £106 a week for respondents, £35 a week
for their partners and had ETU-assessable incomes averaging only £110
a week between them.  It is hard to believe that they did not have some
other income that they were not telling interviewers of, which they
were topping up with short hours working.  But there was little evidence
for such short hours activity: among all couples over 45 and in
employment, the men worked 35 hours a week and the women 29, and
even among dual earner couples the figures were the same: 36 for men
and 30 for the women, on average.  These hours for husbands and wives
combined averaged 49 hours a week, which means that these eligible
dual-earner couples were working for barely more than £2 an hour
between them.
There was little evidence of other income among the eligible non-
recipients.  There was little from testable sources such as pensions or
income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance among partners, for example.  The
result of this was that they had ETU-assessable incomes that were about
the same as the recipients’: £104 a week compared with £98, on average.
Alternatively, it might be supposed that eligible non-recipients of ETU
were receiving, or had partners who were receiving, non-testable disability
benefits such as Incapacity Benefit or Disability Living Allowance.  Or
they were with partners receiving contribution-based Jobseeker’s
Allowance.  Few among the recipients were receiving such benefits (1.4
per cent) since, if they were, they probably ought to have been claiming
Disability Working Allowance and not Earnings Top-up. DWA would
have been worth far more to them.  Fewer of the recipients were married
to people who were receiving any disability benefits but one in ten of
eligible non-recipients had partners who got non-tested disability benefits,
averaging just over £81.54 a week.  This may have been one source of
discouragement to claim, either because it reduced need to the point
when they were not alert to the need to increase income or because they
feared its loss if they claimed another benefit.  On the other hand, people
adept at claiming one benefit, especially one so complicated as, say,
Disability Living Allowance, ought to be among the first to work out
that ETU was something extra they could get.  Worse, from their point
of view, they would rarely surrender the value of their disability benefit
because it would not count against their ETU.
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Housing tenure and occupations
Research on Family Credit take-up also showed that other structural
factors were important.  Eligible non-recipients of Family Credit had
consistently more favourable social profiles compared with the recipients.
In particular, they were noticeably better educated than the recipients
(or perhaps not as poorly educated) and they were more likely to be
homeowners. In these data, eligible non-recipients of ETU had the same
education levels as the recipients.  They were more likely to be
homeowners, but not by a large margin: 42 compared to 32 per cent.
Among these, however, a much greater proportion of the eligible non-
recipients owned their homes outright: 58 compared to 32 per cent.
It was also noticeable that eligible non-recipient couples were three times
more likely to live in ‘other’ tenure arrangements which in their case
often meant some kind of grace-and-favour arrangement associated with
their work.  However, the proportions of both groups living in such
accommodation were very small - 16 per cent of eligible non-recipients
and five per cent of recipients.
It is possible that eligible non-recipients simply do different jobs, which
somehow isolate them from the streams of information travelling around
the employment networks inhabited by the recipients.




Cleaners, domestics, porters, car cleaners 18 13
Personal services: care workers, hairdressers 16 19
Shop workers 15 15
Cooks, waiters, bar workers 12 10
Clerical, receptionists, data entry work, cashiers 10 16
Assembly, sewing, factory workers 6 8
Distribution, warehouse workers 5 7
Labourers and gardeners 5 4
Drivers 5 2
Other sales 4 3
Construction, plumbers, electricians, floor-layers
(mostly mates and apprentices) 3 0
Other workers 2 4
Base 568 330
Among couples, and even among singles in Scheme A, there were really
too few recipients to allow reliable comparisons - 80 people cannot be
broken down into occupational groups.  To meet this shortfall, all the
members of the parallel sample of ETU recipients who were still in work
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and whose earnings kept them within eligible bounds, were added to the
sample.  Table 4.2 shows a special coding of the jobs undertaken by
recipients and eligible non-recipients.
The lowest-paid workers shared a predictably narrow range of mostly
unskilled jobs.  They were cleaners (the men cleaned cars and factories,
the women cleaned offices, schools, hospitals and homes) or carers, often
in old people’s homes, clerks, cooks, waitresses, bar staff or shop assistants.
There was a small tendency for eligible non-recipients to be more
numerous among the clerical staff and receptionists, but otherwise their
occupational profile was very similar.
One of the most consistent findings in research on Family Credit has
been that unclaimed entitlements were smaller than those claimed. In
PSI’s 1999 Study of Families with Children the take-up rate for Family
Credit was only 43 per cent among those entitled to less than £20 a
week in benefit (the average entitlement among recipients was over £60
a week).  Among those entitled to over £80 a week, the take-up rate
was 88 per cent (Marsh, McKay, Smith and Stephenson, unpublished).
It is not suggested that eligible non-recipients were deliberately calculating
that they would get only a few pounds a week and deciding it was not
worth bothering about.  But they had higher wages and, as follow-up
studies have shown in the past (McKay and Marsh, 1995), often moved
swiftly up the income range over the few weeks and months following
their interview.  They typically had higher trend incomes over time and
so scored lower on various measures of hardship than did the Family
Credit recipients, even though the recipient families had the higher
incomes at the time of asking.
ETU is different.  The take-up rates of ETU shown here are a mirror
image of Family Credit rates and so the majority of people eligible for
ETU were non-recipients. And we have already noted that:
• the one substantial group who had the largest entitlements (because
the rules make them the largest) had the lowest rates of take-up: the
older and the dual-earner couples; and
• recipients and eligible non-recipients of ETU had the same assessable
incomes and so were likely to have similar entitlements.
4.2.2  Levels of entitlement
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Table 4.3  Levels of entitlement to ETU among recipients and eligible non-recipients
(£s mean)
Scheme A Scheme B
Single under 25 Single 25+ Couple Single under 25 Single 25+ Couple
Eligible recipient 20.34 24.20 36.02 19.67 23.67 44.14
Eligible non-recipient [12.35] [16.90] 30.94 [21.60] [20.21] 44.45
Base 50 140 55 147 186 67
18 32 71 21 35 90
Base: workers-in-work eligible for ETU plus weighted sample of continuing and eligible ETU recipients (Unweighted n=895)
Figures in brackets are calculated on a base of less than 50
Table 4.3 provides the average weekly entitlement to ETU of eligible
recipients and non-recipients, separately for single people under and over
25 and for couples, in Scheme A and Scheme B areas.  This division of
the sample controls for the differences in entitlements created by the
rules.
Under Scheme A eligible non-recipients, as expected, were entitled to
consistently smaller awards of ETU than were the continuing recipients.
But the differences were not large, ranging from about £8 a week among
single people under Scheme A and only about £3 among couples. Under
Scheme B there were no consistent differences.  Again, however, these
results should be treated with caution owing to the small size of several
of the bases.
The measure of hardship used in Chapter 2 with regard to ETU recipients
(Section 2.3.6) was also applied to the workers sample (see Appendix A
for an explanation of the measure).  Happily for the design of the study,
the distribution of hardship scores did not differ between Scheme A,
Scheme B and Control areas.  This however conceals a difference evident
when the sample is divided by couples and single people (Table 4.4). In
Scheme B and the Control areas, single people were almost twice as
likely as couples to experience what we have called severe hardship.  In
Scheme A areas single people were slightly better off and couples slightly
worse off, leaving singles and couples in those areas recording similar
levels of hardship10.
4.2.3  Need
10 The reader will note the considerable differences between Table 4.4 and Table 2.19.
These tables are not comparable.  Table 4.4 describes hardship among low-paid workers
of whom less than half were eligible for ETU (many of whom may never have been
eligible) and the vast majority of whom had never claimed ETU.  Table 2.19, in
contrast, describes hardship among a very different group of whom: all had received
ETU in the very recent past, more than two-thirds remained eligible and the majority
continued to receive ETU.  As it would appear that claiming ETU is linked to
(perceived) need, one should not be surprised to find that a sample containing current
and recent recipients shows a greater degree of hardship than a sample containing very
few current and recent recipients.
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Hardship was distributed fairly evenly around differing social groups in
the sample but there were one or two interesting exceptions.  People
listed as ‘tenants’ but who were really in some non-paying arrangement
often for temporary accommodation, other than their parents’ homes,
had very high hardship scores.  Half of them were in severe hardship,
which is probably why they were not in a position to pay anyone any
rent.  By contrast, homeowners and older couples (who were often
homeowners too) were rarely in hardship.  This, of course, located
hardship in sectors of the sample having the higher take-up rates of ETU,
particularly among the tenants, and freedom from hardship in sectors
with the lowest take-up rates, that is, among older couples and
homeowners.  Table 4.5 examines the distribution of hardship among
recipients and non-recipients of ETU.
Table 4.4  Hardship by ETU area, by partners
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control areas
Singles Couples All Singles Couples All Singles Couples All
No hardship 43 43 43 37 50 43 34 45 39
Little hardship 26 26 26 25 25 25 25 22 24
Some hardship 15 15 15 16 13 14 19 21 20
Severe hardship 16 15 16 22 13 18 22 12 17
Base 312 242 554 297 297 595 225 208 443
Table 4.5  Hardship by eligibility and claiming ETU
Column percentages
ETU Eligible non- Higher Out of
recipients recipients income work All
No hardship 24 43 47 39 41
Little hardship 20 25 26 23 24
Some hardship 23 16 14 16 16
Severe hardship 33 16 12 22 19
Scale items: (Cell percentages)
Had unmet needs 49 41 36 40 39
Worried about money 60 36 39 47 41
Managed poorly 29 16 14 21 16
Had trouble with debts 27 12 11 13 13
Had utility etc. debt 21 8 9 9 9
Had personal debt 7 3 3 5 4
Mortgage arrears
among payers 8 1 4 3 3
Rent arrears
among tenants 37 13 11 20 17
Base 98 267 739 467 1582
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Workers receiving ETU were worse off than everyone else.  They were
twice as likely to record severe hardship compared with the eligible non-
recipients even though they had total incomes at least 20 per cent higher
than the eligible non-recipients had.  More than half (56 per cent) of
ETU recipients passed the third point of the scale (some hardship) and a
third of them passed point three (severe hardship).  The corresponding
figures among eligible non-recipients were 32 and 16 per cent.  The
same was found in every survey in PSI’s Programme of Research into
Low Income Families and in the 1999 Study of Families with Children.
The difference in this ETU data is that the ETU recipients were worse
off even than those who were now out of work, on average were11.
Table 4.5 also shows separately the components of the hardship scale.
The widest difference lay in anxiety about money, which appears to
have been prompted in many cases by higher levels of current debt and
by a record of chronic debt.  Anxiety, rather than stoically going without
goods, would also be associated with an alertness to claim benefit.
Thus it is possible to say that claiming ETU was likely to have been
prompted by need and was inhibited by the relative absence of need.
Eligible non-recipients had much lower incomes than those who exceeded
their ETU threshold, but said they experienced only similar levels of
hardship compared to the better off respondents.  Strangely, this was true
of the least well off too: the out-of-work respondents.  But our ETU
recipients were receiving benefits and had higher incomes than the eligible
non-recipients and the out-of-work people.  So it must be said either
that receiving ETU does not much relieve the hardship that helped prompt
its claim, or that the initial levels of hardship prior to the claim were even
deeper.
We established earlier that levels of awareness of ETU were low and
falling. If you take a strict view of the relationship between awareness
and claiming, then it is quite surprising that as many claimed as did.
Even some recipients could not remember its name when challenged to
do so in an interview.  However, you should need only a vague notion
that extra cash might be available in order to prompt an enquiry that is
then rewarded with the right information about what to do.
11 Again, the reader will note the considerable differences between Table 4.5 and Table
2.18 and again should be aware that the tables are not comparable.  Table 4.5 divides
its sample into ‘ETU recipients’ and three groups of non-recipients, while Table 2.18
divides its sample into two groups of eligible respondents and two groups of ineligible
respondents.  But more importantly, the respondents referred to in Table 2.18 are a
very specific group – all of the minority not currently receiving ETU had been recipients
in the very recent past.  In contrast, the vast majority of respondents in Table 4.5 had
never claimed ETU and many had never been eligible. As it would appear that claiming
ETU is linked to (perceived) need, one should not be surprised to find that a sample
containing current and recent recipients shows a greater degree of hardship than a
sample containing very few current and recent recipients.
4.2.4  The role of awareness
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Less than a quarter (23 per cent) of eligible non-recipients of ETU said
that they had heard of ‘….a new benefit introduced in some parts of the country
that pays extra money to some people who work and have no dependent children
living with them’.  It is possible to wonder whether respondents all heard
the negative in the question ‘…no dependent children…’ but generally
people tend to have heard of Family Credit.  Cases making this error
should have said ‘yes’ and then gone on to give the wrong identification.
But only 15 per cent of eligible non-recipients went on to give a name to
the benefit they recalled and they all called it Earnings Top-up or
something codeably similar, not Family Credit.
Among eligible non-recipients, the distribution of recognition of ETU,
or its lack, followed the same broad pattern as the recipient population.
That is to say, among target groups where both take-up and the take-up
rate were high, so awareness of ETU was higher among eligible non-
recipients.  Where it was lowest, so the eligible non-recipients were least
likely to be aware.  Only 15 per cent of the dual-earner couples, for
example, were even vaguely aware of ETU but 28 per cent of the single
eligible non-recipient workers knew about it.
These variations apart, the overall low level of awareness would make it
quite hard to criticize anyone who said that the main reason that ETU
had a low take-up rate among eligible workers was simply that too few of
them had ever heard about it.
Such a view would be strengthened by evidence that the majority of
those who had heard about it also had experience of it.  Eleven per cent
of the eligible non-recipients had previously received ETU.  So had
eight per cent of the much larger group of higher income workers and
nine per cent of those out of work.  Just three per cent of eligible non-
recipients had thought about applying and six per cent had sent in an
application and had been turned down, usually because they earned too
much.
Combining these figures, 13 per cent of eligible non-recipients had had
some experience of ETU, and so had eight per cent of the higher income
respondents and nine per cent of those now out of work.
This meant that 80 per cent of the whole sample of workers (87 per cent
under Scheme A and 73 per cent under Scheme B) had no experience of
ETU and 85 per cent of these (73 per cent of the whole sample) had no
knowledge of it.  On the other hand, some of the people who had
experience of it failed to recognise that ETU was being referred to in the
question:
‘A new social security benefit, introduced last year in some parts of the
country that pays extra money to some people who work and who have no
dependent children living with them.  Have you heard of the introduction of
this benefit?’
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Table 4.6 summarises this position.
Table 4.6  Experience and knowledge of ETU
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B All  in ETU areas
Experience and recognition 9 21 15
Experience but no recognition 4 6 5
No experience, some recognition 13 11 12
No experience, no recognition 74 62 68
Base 434 500 934
In the 1980s Anne Corden found sufficient people among eligible non-
recipients of FC who had applied and been turned down, to suggest that
those she called ‘disappointed applicants’ were an important part of the
explanation of why they did not claim.  This is not the case among those
who failed to claim ETU.  Too few had heard of it, let alone ever applied.
The 1997 survey took the significant bi-variate factors that were associated
with being an eligible non-recipient of ETU and entered each into a
regression model.  Since being an eligible non-recipient or not is a binary
variable, the appropriate technique was logistic regression. Table 4.7 shows
the model that best fitted the data in 1997 (Finlayson et al 2000, pp57).
The 1997 model was dominated by the social structural factors. Readiness
to claim was higher among the young and single and the married male
workers (who were also the younger couples), lower among the (older)
female married workers, lowest among the dual-earner couples, the self-
employed and workers with driving licences, and those entitled to small
amounts of ETU.  This result aligned quite well with experience of
Family Credit whose eligible non-recipients were typically home-owning
couples, self-employed, and entitled to smaller amounts.
4.3  Modelling take-up rates
4.3.1  The 1997 model
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Table 4.7  Logistic regression prediction of who did not claim
their entitlement to ETU in 1997
Coefficient Probability not in receipt of ETU
ETU ‘customer’ group 1997
Single male, under 25, working 16+ hrs -0.8541 77%
Single female, under 25, working 16+ -1.1364 72%
Single female, 25 or over, working 16+ -1.0863 73%
Dual earner couple, under 45 years 8.7906 100%
Dual earner couple, 45 years or older 2.8455 99%
Man works 16+ hours,
woman not in work -1.4821 64%
Woman works 16+ hours,
man not in work 2.4106 99%
Driver in 1996 0.8851 95%
ETU entitlement in 1997 (per pound) -0.0695 80%#
Self-employed 2.5427 99%
Constant 2.0564
Probability of reference individual not being in receipt of ETU 89%
Notes: the ‘reference individual’12  was a single man aged 25 or over, an employee who was not a driver,
and who had an ETU entitlement of £10 per week
# = Effect of increasing entitlement by £10
But following the Family Credit experience, there were some notable
absentees among the variables that made up the best model for a failure
to claim ETU.  Housing tenure, for example, is important in the Family
Credit setting.  Among families entitled to Family Credit, the social tenants
were far more likely to claim, other things being equal.  And of course
the one variable that is likely to explain a large proportion of non-take-
up among eligible workers - their awareness of ETU - has to be left out
of any equation since it has to be assumed that the recipients were aware
of it.  This is true even if some of them failed the recognition test we set
them.
Analysis of the 1999 data began with a reconstruction of the 1997 model.
The result was similar, though simpler.  Entering the same variables as in
1997 again divided the single workers from the couples, naming the
older single women as most likely to claim, other things being equal, and
older dual-earners and women in sole-earner couples as least likely to
claim.  But this time neither low levels of entitlement nor self-employment
were significant independent influences on the failure to claim.  The
only significant 1997 non-structural variable to retain significance in the
same equation in 1999 was the possession of a driving licence, which
again inhibited claiming.
4.3.2  The 1999 model
12 The ‘reference individual’ is a theoretical individual with known characteristics and a
known probability of being an eligible non-recipient.  It allows us to see the effect on
that probability of changing each characteristic independent of other factors.
93
Again, the problem with the 1999 data was that the workers-in-work
survey alone provided too few ETU recipients (just 80 out of 347 eligible
workers) for this kind of multivariate analysis.  It was possible, on the
other hand, to take from the survey of ETU recipients all those still in
work and still eligible for ETU and add them to the recipients in the
workers sample, first applying the re-weighting system used for the
recipients survey.  Both samples may be treated as independent random
samples of ETU recipients and combined.  This provided a sample of
644 recipients and 267 eligible non-recipients.
The next step was to add to the 1997 model all the 1999 variables that
were associated, if only in a small way, with claiming and not claiming
ETU.  As well as age, sex and marital/partnership status, these included:
• housing tenure;
• self-employment;
• the possession of a driving licence;
• amounts of entitlement to ETU;
• whether or not the worker was working 30 or more hours a week
(which drew an additional £11.05 a week);
• hardship;
• qualifications (academic and vocational);
• temporary work;
• homeworking;
• prior experience of claiming Family Credit;
• and which of the eight ETU pilot areas respondents lived in.
Age and amounts of ETU entitlement were entered as continuous
variables. Hardship was dichotomised at the second point on the scale.
The remaining were all categorical variables each of whose values were
transformed into binary variables and entered separately, omitting one.
These missing categories, for example living with parents, having no
academic qualifications, living in Perth, and so on made up the reference
category.  The method used was to subtract the least significant variable
at each iteration.
The result of the 1999 model is given in Table 4.8.  With the advantage
of the larger sample, the outcome provided a comprehensive description
of what encouraged or discouraged eligible workers in claiming their
ETU.
Marital/partnership status
Social structural variables remained important.  Having a partner more
than doubled the probability of being an eligible non-recipient.
Independently of simply being in a couple, being a member of a dual-
earner couple had the same effect, hence the observed difference that all
4.3.3  The outcome of the 1999
model
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eligible couples were four times more likely to be eligible non-recipients
than all eligible singles were.  In addition, being older added to the
probability that eligible workers failed to claim their ETU, independently
of the fact that single eligible workers were on average younger than
those with partners.
Table 4.8  Logistic regression on being an eligible non-
recipient of ETU
Coefficient Predicted probability
Household receives disability benefit 1.53 75% **
Couple 1.25 69% ***
Dual earner 1.23 69% ***
‘Other’ housing tenure 1.00 64% **
Homeowner (no mortgage) 0.64 55% *
Has driving licence 0.41 49% *
Age (per year) 0.02 39.8% ***
Eligible amount (per £) -0.02 38.7% **
Working 16-29 hours a week -0.43 30% *
In hardship (> scale point two, 0-7 scale) -0.77 23% ***
Doncaster -0.61 26% *
Sunderland -0.96 20% ***
Renter receiving HB -0.87 21% **




Base = Workers-in-work eligible for ETU plus weighted sample of continuing and eligible ETU recipients
(Unweighted n=895)
Significance levels: *<0.05>0.01 **<0.01>0.001 ***<0.001
Note:  The ‘reference individual’13  was a younger-than-average woman living in Perth. She worked 30 or
more hours a week in a permanent job outside the home, had no qualifications, lived with her parents,
experienced little or no hardship, was eligible for a larger than average amount of ETU, had no past
experience of Family Credit, nor of disability benefits and had no driving licence.
Housing tenure
Holding constant this very large gulf in claiming behaviour between
singles and couples, housing tenure remained important.  People who
owned their own homes (rather than still paying a mortgage) and people
in ‘other’ tenure arrangements being much less likely to claim.  The
latter included people, often couples again who lived in an institutional
setting and worked as wardens or other care workers, or appeared to be
some kind of domestic servant.  In contrast, renters who received Housing
Benefit were much less likely to be eligible non-recipients of ETU.  This
is a particularly interesting finding. Receipt of ETU among the minority
of workers who were both eligible for ETU and paying rent reduced
13 The ‘reference individual’ is a theoretical individual with known characteristics and a
known probability of being an eligible non-recipient.  It allows us to see the effect on
that probability of changing each characteristic independent of other factors.
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their entitlement to Housing Benefit and so reduced their incentive to
claim it.  It probably reflects a tendency either to claim both benefits, and
to continue to claim both benefits even if they might no longer be entitled
to Housing Benefit having claimed their ETU, or to be an eligible non-
recipient of both benefits.  Claiming benefits, like a lot of other things
learned by experience, is a transferable skill, and skill transfer turns out to
be a key theme in explaining take-up and non-take-up.
Entitlement to benefit: ETU and other benefits
Confirming this point regarding skill transfer, prior experience of claiming
Family Credit was the strongest individual prompt to claim ETU.  In the
combined sample, a fifth of recipients (22 per cent) had prior experience
of Family Credit, some of them as children in recipient households,
compared with one in nine (11 per cent) eligible non-recipients.  Among
those selected solely in the workers-in-work sample, those with prior
experience of Family Credit had a take-up rate for ETU of 36 per cent
compared with 21 per cent among those with none.  Among couples
those with prior experience of Family Credit had a similar profile compared
with those with none, but among singles they were concentrated among
older single women, four out of ten had claimed Family Credit in the
past, suggesting the presence of former lone parents.  They would have
had a great deal of skill transfer to bring to ETU.
But the skill transfer hypothesis cannot be generalised to people’s
experience of all other social security benefits.  It was shown earlier that
the relatively small number of households receiving disability benefits
were almost all eligible non-recipients of ETU.  Despite being wholly a
characteristic of couples, receipt of disability benefits too was a strongly
independent influence that discouraged otherwise eligible couples from
claiming their ETU.  It is possible that they did not realise they could be
entitled to more benefit without losing what they already had.
The amount of entitlement to ETU also remained important. Smaller
amounts of entitlement for ETU discouraged eligible workers from
claiming, in line with repeated findings with other benefits, especially
Family Credit. Though the differences shown earlier (Table 4.3) were
small and largely confined to Scheme A areas, their significant effect on
take-up remained independent of other factors, especially so since it is so
pre-determined by the values of other variables that are also in the equation.
Some of these cross-cut the familiar finding of low entitlements begetting
low take-up. Couples have much higher entitlements but a far lower take-
up-rate, for example. Conversely, people working more than 30 hours a
week get a bonus of £11.05 a week added to their entitlements, but it
was those working between 16 and 29 hours a week that had the higher
take-up rates. This last – working shorter hours – was also an independent
element in the same equation.  This indicated that there were some
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people in the sample attracted to ETU as a means of working shorter
hours, which may be typical of women who had other caring
responsibilities at home, for example.
Hardship
That hardship remained as an independently significant factor in the
equation was of special interest.  If nothing else, it was evidence that
ETU was reaching people who needed it.  Or at least it was reaching
people who were aware they needed it, and who worried about not
being able to pay their debts.  But again it raised the puzzle that having
got their ETU they ought to have been in less difficulty.  They ought at
least to have been on a par with both the eligible non-recipients and the
out of work respondents.  But their living standards remained significantly
lower, indicating a long hangover of financial stress pre-dating their entry
to ETU.  Among the eligible workers, their relative poverty remained a
significant difference even after all other factors were held constant.  It
was equally true in Scheme A and Scheme B areas, for example.
Area
On this last point, it is also impressive that the two urban-industrial Scheme
B areas still boasted a higher take-up rate among eligible workers than
eligible workers elsewhere after all other factors were taken into
consideration.  Living either in Doncaster or Sunderland halved the
probability of being an eligible non-recipient.
This is not because different kinds of workers lived under the respective
Schemes.  Nor it is due to the arithmetic of eligibility, not directly so at
any rate.  In fact an argument can be made that the arithmetic might have
favoured a higher take-up rate among eligible workers under Scheme A
because, among the single workers at least, they had smaller incomes
than did Scheme B’s eligible workers (£79 a week compared with £87
a week).  Given that need was implicated in being more alert to claiming
ETU it followed that Scheme A workers should have been keener to
claim their chance to top-up their very small incomes, even with the
modest Scheme A allowances.
Instead it highlights a second key theme in explaining take-up and non-
take-up:  recipient density and awareness.  In the absence of advertising
after the first six months of the pilot, leaving it to official and informal
networks to inform workers of ETU, recipient density was crucial.
Scheme B areas were half the size of Scheme A areas so that entitlement
to ETU at the higher wages under Scheme B would still produce similar
caseloads in each area.  Even so, Scheme B still attracted more customers,
in total, and this difference was established right from the start. Forty per
cent more Scheme B recipients than Scheme A recipients (14,000
compared to 10,000) were occupying half the geographical and population
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space occupied by Scheme A recipients.  More than that, the majority of
the Scheme B recipients were squeezed into Sunderland and Doncaster
which, being urban concentrations, were geographically far smaller than
the Bournemouth and Perth B-areas.  Doncaster in particular consists of
a large number of small towns and (ex-) pit villages joined together.
Once the caseload was established, a worker’s chances in Doncaster and
Sunderland of knowing someone else who was claiming ETU, or meeting
someone who knew about it from someone they knew was claiming,
were probably at least three times better than among those living elsewhere.
It was shown earlier that personal contact became a relatively more
important source for those aware of ETU.  After nearly three years, this
connection between recipients per acre, as it were, and awareness of the
benefit, probably caused the higher-rate Scheme B to be more effective
in penetrating its potential customer base in its industrial heartland.
Furthermore, in social terms, the same arguments can be made for low-
paid older couples, dual earners, homeowners, people with disabled
partners and so on.  These characteristics are all badges of isolation from
the streams of information that are live and current among younger single
people and tenants.
In geographical and social settings where eligible workers were rare, these
official and informal networks could not possibly work as they do for
other benefits like Family Credit and Housing Benefit.
The small proportion of couples among the ETU caseload was due to
non-take-up among eligible working couples, not to a lower rate of
eligibility. Only 10 per cent of eligible couples claimed their ETU,
compared with 37 per cent of single people.
Multivariate analysis indicated that, other things being equal:
Eligible workers who took up their entitlement to ETU were young, single
workers, many of them living in Sunderland and Doncaster.  They worked
shorter hours and so had lower earnings, higher entitlements and felt
hard up.  Often they had experience of claiming other income-tested
benefits.
Eligible workers who failed to take up their entitlement to ETU were
couples, especially dual-earner couples, and older people who either
owned their own homes or had some living arrangement other than
homeowner or tenant.  Additionally one of them might be receiving a
disability benefit.  They lived in a Scheme A area or in Bournemouth in
Scheme B.  They had no experience of claiming other income-tested
benefits, had slightly higher earnings and so were entitled to slightly lower
amounts of ETU and they were used to managing on a low income.
4.4  Summary
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Lack of publicity was crucial, leaving it to official and informal networks
to inform workers of ETU and few eligible non-claimants were aware of
the benefit.  Geographical and social isolation were important factors in
inhibiting claims.  In geographical terms, eligibility in Scheme A was too
sparsely scattered to support adequate networks of informal information
that would prompt others to claim.  In social terms, lowest-paid older
couples, dual earners, homeowners, people with disabled partners and so
on were all groups isolated from streams of information that would prompt
claiming a new in-work benefit, even in Scheme B areas.
Skill transfer was also important.  It is highly significant that claiming
ETU was both need-driven and associated independently with prior
experience of claiming income-tested benefits, especially in claiming
Housing Benefit and Family Credit.
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The aim of this section is to examine what effect, if any, ETU has had on
job retention.  The analysis is based on the original 1996 sample of low-
paid workers, members of which were re-interviewed in 1997.  A booster
sample of ETU recipients was also interviewed at this stage.  Respondents
to all these samples were followed up with either a postal questionnaire
or a telephone interview in 1998.
Between them, these samples permit an assessment of changing
employment status over a three-year period, beginning before the
introduction of ETU in the pilot areas.  Most revealing is the analysis
based on postal respondents who were interviewed in 1997 since their
questionnaire contained sufficient information to construct a month-by-
month work history for the period of interest.  For this reason, these
respondents will be the focus in the following analysis.
The analysis of response rates is complicated due to the number of surveys
carried out on low-paid workers and ETU recipients. A full discussion is
provided in Appendix B.  Overall, examination of the profile of
respondents to the 1998 follow-up surveys reveals quite a close match to
that of the 1997 re-interviewees, although there are some significant
differences.  These differences do not necessarily invalidate subsequent
analysis, which aims to compare the pilot ETU areas with the comparison
areas, so long as the bias is common to both.  In fact, for most
characteristics, there was no significant difference between the pilot and
comparison groups.  Unemployed claimants in the pilot areas provided
an important exception, however; they were more likely than those in
the comparison areas to participate in the 1998 follow-up surveys.
The extent to which this will prejudice later analysis is not clear for two
main reasons.  First, the focus of this section is on job retention and, as
such, will consider only those individuals who were in paid employment
in 1996.  By this reasoning, those unemployed in 1996 do not feature
and hence their differential response across pilot and comparison areas is
not an issue.  Second, being unemployed in 1996 is a temporal
characteristic.  The tendency for lower response rates among this group
does not signify that the unemployed are less likely to respond, only that
those who were unemployed in 1996 are less likely to respond.  Hence it
is difficult to predict the effect of this non-response on other analyses.
However, there is a scenario in which the effects of this non-response
will have to be considered.  If one is willing to assume that being
unemployed in 1996 is an indicator of the likelihood of being unemployed
at the time of the 1998 survey, the lower response rate can be interpreted
as a higher propensity for non-response amongst the unemployed.  This
JOB RETENTION AMONG ETU WORKERS5
5.2  Response rates
5.1  Introduction
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will have a bearing on any analysis that seeks to investigate the effect of
ETU on job retention since those outside the pilot area who become
unemployed will fall out of the sample due to non-response.  This will
result in the comparison area sample becoming disproportionately
composed of those who have remained in work.  In this scenario, results
on the effect of ETU on job retention will have to be regarded as a lower
bound.
Having weighted in the booster sample (see Appendix B), some
descriptives of the resulting pooled sample of 1998 respondents are set
out below.  Table 5.1 sets out the employment status.  Clearly, the majority
of the sample are in paid work or self-employed.  This is possibly partly
a consequence of the tendency, suggested earlier, for those in work to
respond to the surveys.
Table 5.1  Employment status of the 1998 sample
Valid Percent
Working, in a paid job or self employed 83.2
Unemployed and looking for work 3.8
In full-time education 0.5
On govt training or employment scheme (inc NEW DEAL) 0.5
Out of work because of sickness or disability 4.6
Looking after the family or home 1.4
Retired 6.1
Base 2031
Note that this classification does not distinguish between work of less
than 16 hours and 16 hours or more per week.  However, further
inspection revealed the average number of hours worked to be 34, with
seven per cent of those working being employed for fewer than 16 hours.
Average take-home pay was £71 per week.
The aim in the remainder of this section is to understand which
characteristics are linked to job retention.  A particular focus is on the
role of ETU.  In order to do this; month-by-month work histories were
constructed for all members of the 1998 sample.  Unfortunately, since
this information was not available for those who were interviewed by
telephone in 1998, these respondents have been dropped from subsequent
analysis.  Furthermore, it was not possible to construct monthly histories
for other variables.  In view of this, respondent characteristics and
circumstances as they existed at the time of the 1997 interview are assumed
to remain constant over the duration of the work histories.
ETU was introduced in the pilot areas in October 1996.  The analysis
that follows takes this as its starting point.  Since the focus is on job
retention, only those who were in work at this point are included in the
sample.  Furthermore, non-respondents to the postal survey were
5.3  Characteristics of the 1998
sample
5.4  Modelling job retention
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excluded.  The analysis that follows examines how long respondents
remained in employment and investigates what characteristics and
circumstances influenced this.
Eventually, a sample comprising 1065 respondents (1019 unweighted)
who were working in October 1996 and who had work histories that
were satisfactory for analysis was identified.  By the end of the observation
period (September 1998) 280 (297 unweighted) had exited from
employment.  Figure 5.1 shows the cumulative movements out of work
over this two-year period.  This type of graph is often referred to as a
‘survival curve’ because it represents what proportion survive in the initial
state (here, full-time employment) as time progresses.  It is a purely
descriptive presentation of the movement out of work and does not
incorporate any statistical adjustment for other factors which may exert
an influence.
Figure 5.1  Movements out of work by whether in ETU pilot
area
Two lines are shown in Figure 5.1: one relating to those who were in
the pilot areas and one relating to those in the comparison areas.  From
this simplistic depiction it appears that those in the pilot areas move out
of employment more quickly than those in the comparison areas.
However, there are other characteristics of the respondents that are
important in influencing job retention and the differences shown in the
graph cannot be interpreted as the effect of ETU.  Indeed, the natural
inference to draw from Figure 5.1 is counter-intuitive since it suggests
that being in the pilot area is likely to speed movement into non-
employment.  In order to examine what role if any is played by ETU in
determining job retention; one must control for other sources of variation
between the samples.  This is done through multivariate analysis.
5.4.1  Descriptive findings
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There is another point worth noting from Figure 5.1.  While the
movements out of work are fairly small in most months, there is a marked
step at month 13.  This corresponds to the period where data were taken
from the postal questionnaire rather than the face-to-face interview.  There
are at least two possible reasons for an abrupt change at this time.  First,
while the face-to-face interviews distinguished between work of less than
16 and 16 or more hours per week, no such distinction was drawn in the
postal questionnaire.  In the absence of other effects, one would expect
this to cause a jump in the empirical survival function since, beyond this
point, those working only fewer than 16 hours would be included with
those working 16 hours or more.  In actuality, the proportion of people
who work fewer than 16 hours is sufficiently small to allow us to ignore
this effect.  Second, and more important, the step may reflect a bias in
the response to the postal questionnaire, with those more likely to stay in
work not responding to the survey.  Although this contradicts the earlier
finding that those in work are more likely to respond than those out of
work, this was based on characteristics as they existed in 1997.
The preceding discussion has provided a description of the movements
out of work for those who were observed to be working 16 or more
hours per week in October 1996.  As noted, a more revealing insight is
possible by carrying out a multivariate analysis of these movements.  By
so doing, full account can be taken of simultaneous influences on job
exit and hence a more focused analysis of the effects of the variables of
interest may be achieved.  In particular, we are interested in those variables
relating to ETU.  In this section, the estimation results are presented and
discussed.  The details of the model are left to Appendix C.
The variables in the analysis were included to capture the effects of a
broad range of personal, demographic and labour market characteristics
as they existed at the time of the 1997 interview.  These included three
variables relating to ETU, gender, age, tenure type, self-assessed health,
long-term illness, partnership status and employment status of partner
where relevant, educational qualifications, professional and vocational
qualifications, whether the respondent can drive, whether the respondent
felt their employer regarded their job as permanent or temporary,
occupational classification, industrial classification and usual weekly
earnings in 1997.  A monthly variable was also included to allow for the
possibility of the rate of exit changing over time.  Lastly, in view of
concerns about a possible bias of results arising from the postal
questionnaire, a variable was included to indicate whether observations
for a given individual in a given month were taken from the face-to-face
interview or the postal questionnaire.
5.4.2  Statistical analysis of
influence on job exit
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ETU variables
The main result from the analysis was that ETU appeared to be unrelated
to job exit and therefore, by association, to job retention.  Three variables
were included with the aim of investigating this effect: one variable
indicating whether the respondent lived in one of the areas in which
ETU was being piloted under the Scheme A provision, an analogous
variable for Scheme B and a variable indicating whether the respondent
was receiving ETU in 1997.  The first two of these variables were
included to capture any differences between the pilot areas and the
comparison areas that were unrelated to ETU receipt.  The third variable
captured the effect of receiving ETU at the time of the 1997 interview
on subsequent job retention.  For all three of these variables the effect
was insignificant.  The inference from this is that the receipt of ETU
has no discernible effect on job retention for the members of our sample.
As an aside, it is possible that the introduction of ETU so affected the
state of the local labour market that the circumstances for all workers in
the area changed regardless of whether they claimed ETU.  This might
be the case where, for example, there is evidence of substitution effects
with non-recipients becoming less competitive vis-à-vis those in receipt
of ETU and hence more likely to exit employment.  These wider effects
are not separately identifiable from the effects of other differences in the
characteristics between the three types of area.  However, the estimation
results suggest that these wider effects are not significant.
Age
It is also interesting to consider the influence of other characteristics.
First, we note the effect of age.  The age structure of the sample is
unusual in that it is bipolar.  This is a consequence of the eligibility
criteria for ETU which exclude those with children.  The effect of age
on job retention is non-linear.  Older respondents are less likely to exit
employment, although this effect tails off reaching a minimum at age
44.  Respondents older than this become more likely exit employment.
This can be shown by means of a modelled survival curve.  This is
simply the statistical analogue to the empirical survival curve in Figure
5.1.  In other words, the curves in Figure 5.2 depict the month-by-
month probability of exiting employment controlling for factors which
affect this exit rate.  The charts are based on an ‘average’ individual,
where the average characteristics are the sample means.  Thus the curves
are best interpreted as relating to job exit at the aggregate level, since
their interpretation at the level of the individual may be confusing given
the inclusion of categorical variables such as gender.  Influences arising
from the sample design rather than attributable to personal characteristics
have been excluded.  In particular, the variable indicating whether
employment history information was taken from the postal questionnaire
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has been excluded.  This has the effect of removing the sharp drop in
month 14 which featured in Figure 5.1.  By selectively altering the value
of the variables of interest, we can map out the survival curves for particular
characteristics.
Figure 5.2 presents the survival curves for respondents of different ages.
As noted, the youngest respondents (those aged 20) are more likely to
move away from employment than their older counterparts.  This is
depicted in the diagram by a steeper survival curve indicating a more
rapid change in status with time.  For those aged 30, the gradient of the
survival curve is less steep.  This is also true for those aged 44.  This age
was chosen since it corresponds to the age at which the likelihood of job
retention is at a maximum.  The negative effect of age on job retention
beyond this age is illustrated in Figure 5.2 by the line relating to those
aged 55.  For these respondents, the risk of job exit increased.
Figure 5.2  Survival function by age
Given the unusual age distribution of the sample, it is revealing to explore
whether other influences on job exit vary with age.  This was examined
by dividing the sample into those under the age of 40 and those aged 40
and upwards.  The dividing point of 40 was chosen since an informal
examination of the age distribution revealed this as a natural break point.
The model results (presented in Appendix C) point to a number of
significant differences between the two sub-samples, justifying their
separate treatment.  Of particular interest is the finding that for those
over the age of 40, being in one of the Scheme B pilot areas significantly
reduces the chance of leaving employment.  However, actual receipt of
ETU in 1997 has no effect.  Two possibilities deserve comment.  First,
the labour market for those aged over 40 may be stronger in the Scheme
B areas than in the other areas.  This may be as a result of the introduction
of ETU under Scheme B or it may not: this cannot be discerned from
the data.  Second, it may be the case that, although the effect of claiming
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ETU at the time of the 1997 interview has no significant effect, those
aged over 40 in Scheme B areas have an increased tendency to claim in
later months.
Personal characteristics
There are some significant effects among the non-ETU-related variables.
Also interesting are some effects that are not significant.  For example,
the results suggest there is no difference between males and females.
Similarly, health appears to have little influence with self-assessed health
being statistically insignificant.  Having a long-term illness is also
insignificant.  Intriguingly, though, inspection of the results by age reveal
that this insignificance is the result of the conflation of two significant
but opposite effects.  For those under the age of 40, having a long-term
illness appears to speed exit from employment while for those aged over
40 the reverse is true.  Considering housing tenure, those who rent but
pay no rent are more likely to exit from employment than those with
alternative housing arrangements.  Partnership status has no effect on job
retention and nor does the partner’s employment status where relevant.
Education and skills
A number of variables were included to capture education and skills.  In
terms of educational qualifications, the only significant influence was
found to be associated with having a degree.  This increased the probability
of exiting employment.  This tendency for those with higher qualifications
to exit from employment was mirrored in the vocational qualifications,
with possession of a professional qualification or, particularly, a HNC/
HND qualification being associated with moves out of employment.
Having an apprenticeship qualification has a similar effect.  One possible
explanation for this may be that these respondents exited their low-paid
jobs in order to recommence the education or training which resulted in
their qualifications.
Employment
Not surprisingly, those who, in 1997, felt their job not to be permanent
were more likely to have left employment.  These influences are very
large and very significant.  Among occupations, salespeople were
significantly more likely than other type of workers to have left work,
while managers and professionals were less likely.  Type of business also
played a role; those working in business and financial services in 1997
were less likely to have stayed in work.  Finally, usual weekly earnings in
1997 were an important influence on job retention: those with higher
wages were more likely to stay in work.
This chapter has examined the issue of job retention among ETU workers
using information from the 1998 follow-up surveys.  Approximately one
quarter of those working in October 1996 exited from employment at
some point during the two-year period of observation.
5.5  Summary
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Statistical modelling showed ETU to have no effect on job retention,
although there was some evidence of a positive effect among older workers
in the Scheme B areas.
Other characteristics were found to be associated with job retention:
• The effect of age is such that individuals in their mid-forties are the
most likely to remain in work; individuals younger or older than this
tend to leave employment more quickly.
• There appears to be no difference in job retention between men and
women
• Those who are nominally tenants but are not required to pay rent
move out of employment more quickly.
• Those with higher academic or vocational qualifications were more
likely to leave employment.
• Salespeople were more likely than other type of workers to have left
work, while managers and professionals were less likely.
• Those working in business and financial services in 1997 were less
likely to have stayed in work.
• Those with higher wages were more likely to stay in work.
Finally, the possibility that the results have been distorted as a result of
response bias cannot be ignored.
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This chapter uses data from Department of Social Security (DSS) records
to test the effects of the introduction of ETU.  These data came from
two sources:
• records of awards of ETU from November 1996 to January 2000,
when the pilot scheme had accepted no new applications for three
months14; and
• records of awards of Family Credit from October 1995, a year before
the introduction of ETU, to September 1999.15
The ETU records are compared in terms of pilot scheme type (A and B)
and recipient type.  For FC data, comparisons are made:
• between pilot Scheme A and pilot Scheme B;
• between the pilot schemes and four matched ‘control’ areas (C); and
• between the evaluation areas (A, B and C) and a five per cent sample
of areas outside the evaluation.
The introduction of Earnings Top-up alongside Family Credit and
Disability Working Allowance (DWA) completed the provision of wage
supplementation to people working for low weekly wages in the
experimental areas.  The child and disability premiums associated with
FC and DWA extended eligibility much further up the lower part of the
wage distribution than ETU reached.  That is, FC and DWA remained
available at higher wages than was the case for ETU.  However, there
were many claiming the existing benefits, in particular lone mothers,
who earned wages similar to those earned by ETU recipients.  ETU was
intended to increase the numbers of low-paid jobs available, and to reduce
the stock of claimant unemployed as more people became willing to
accept jobs at very low wages using ETU as a supplement.  However,
the possibility remained that universal wage supplementation would have
effects predicted for it by classical economic theory.




14 ETU records provide information for all claims in payment in each month, so each
recipient remains in the data for at least six months.  Data about their wages and hours
refers to information collected at the time when their current claim was first made.
15 FC records provide information for either all fast-track claims beginning in each month,
so each recipient appears only once (‘flow’), or for all other claims current in each
month, so that each recipient remains in the data for the duration of their claim
(‘stock’).
6.1.1  The issues
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A wage effect
Increasing the numbers of people willing to work for very low wages
could weaken the wage bargaining position of everyone at the bottom
end of the wage distribution, including those already subsidised by Family
Credit.  Employers would not need to know much about ETU to buy
labour more cheaply but would merely respond to more favourable labour
market conditions, from their point of view.  Low wages would become
lower or remain steady and, in effect, a large slice of the subsidy would
travel through the workforce and end up with the employers.
A substitution effect
Should few new jobs be created by the introduction of ETU, newly-
subsidised childless workers might move into jobs occupied by low-paid
workers with children claiming FC, typically lone mothers.
In practice, there are reasons why we might not expect to find such
effects as a result of the ETU pilot scheme.  Firstly, around seven in ten
ETU recipients were already in work when they applied for the benefit
(Section 1.4.4) and ETU had very little influence over whether workers
accepted a particular job (Section 2.5).  Where ETU recipients were
already in work, employers would have less scope to reduce wages than
they would if they were fixing the wage of a new job.
Secondly, both the number of claims and the proportion of eligible
workers who claimed (that is, take-up and the rate of take-up) were
relatively low.  The take-up rate among employed workers was estimated
to be 24 per cent in 1999 (Section 3.6.3).  Table 6.1 shows FC and ETU
caseloads at August/September 1999, excluding the self-employed.  It is
questionable whether the presence of 18,000 ETU recipients could have
any substantively significant effect on the employment of more than 68,000
FC recipients in the pilot areas.  This is especially in doubt in Scheme A
areas where FC recipients outnumbered ETU recipients by a ratio of 6:1
(ETU take-up rate was estimated at 16 per cent).  It is unlikely that the
wage bargaining and employment position of low-paid workers in general
would have been weakened by the introduction of ETU given this take-
up and take-up rate.
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Table 6.1  ETU (all awards) and Family Credit (stock and
flow) caseloads16 (excluding the self-employed) by ETU area
ETU FC
(Sept. 99) (Aug. 99)
Scheme A 7 388 45 574
Scheme B 10 996 22 920
Total 18 384 68 494
Sources: Family Credit administrative statistics and DSS ETU Statistical Enquiry
Thirdly, though FC recipients also occupied the low-paid end of the
labour market, they worked for wages which were, on average, higher
than the wages of those claiming ETU.  Furthermore, they were different
populations in many respects resulting from their key difference: ETU
recipients did not have dependent children while FC recipients did.  It
follows that if ETU had a wage effect in the labour market occupied by
low-paid workers without children, it would not necessarily also have
significant effects, in terms of either wage or substitution effects, on the
slightly different labour market occupied by low-paid workers with
children.  Indeed, if it did this would indicate a considerable problem.
It is possible to sum up the central question of the investigation by asking
‘How many new jobs were created (or existing jobs preserved) at the
expense of how large a wage effect?’.  Here we look for evidence in
wage and caseload trends.  First we look at the ETU wages themselves.
Then we look at the wages of the Family Credit recipients who were
also on low weekly pay, comparing the ETU areas with the control and
outside areas.  Finally we look for the possibility of substitution effects by
tracking the FC caseload in the pilot and control areas.
If employers in the pilot areas held steady or reduced their wage offers as
a result of the introduction of ETU, the low-paid work done by ETU
and FC recipients would have become relatively lower paid in the pilot
areas over the months following its introduction.  Thus, if the data showed
a depression in wages or failure to rise in the pilot areas, while wages in
the control and areas outside the evaluation continued to rise with inflation,
an ETU wage effect could be indicated.
The ETU administrative data is limited in its usefulness because we have
no ‘control’ group against which to compare ETU recipients.  Caution
must therefore be used in its interpretation.
16 ETU and FC awards are classified by DSS along different lines - ETU awards are
divided into new, renewal and subsequent awards, while FC awards are divided into
flow and stock awards.
6.2  Wage effects
6.2.1  ETU recipients
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Figures 6.1-6.4 show the average weekly and hourly earnings of ETU
recipients between November 1996 and January 2000.  Figures 6.1 and
6.2 examine them by pilot scheme area (A and B), while Figures 6.3 and
6.4 show averages by recipient type, that is couples, single people aged
25 and over, and younger single people.  Figures are based on all awards
(new, renewal and subsequent) and exclude the self-employed whose
income would not directly be affected by any reaction of employers to
the introduction of ETU.  Hourly wage rates were not included in the
administrative data and have been calculated using average weekly wage
and hours.
In the pilot areas as a whole, there was a very slight downward trend in
the average gross weekly earnings of ETU recipients between December
1996, when it was £88, and the autumn of 1997 (Figure 6.1).  Thereafter,
average weekly earnings remained fairly static at £85 per week, until the
introduction of the National Minimum Wage in April 1999.  From this
point weekly earnings began a gradual increase to a plateau in the winter
of 1999 at £90.
Figure 6.1  Gross mean weekly wage of employed ETU
recipients by ETU area
By pilot scheme area
Recipients in Scheme B areas earned significantly more per week on
average than recipients in Scheme A areas, due to the differing qualifying
rules of the two versions of the benefit, and this gap increased over the
period of the ETU pilot scheme, from £7 in November 1996 to £21 in
January 2000 (Figure 6.1).  Similarly, the wage trends in the two schemes
differed.  In Scheme B, average weekly earnings remained stable at around
£92, across the period to April 1999 and following the introduction of
the Minimum Wage steadily increased to £99 per week.  In contrast, the
average weekly earnings in Scheme A experienced a downward trend
from November 1996, when they were £83, until early 1998 and
thereafter they remained stable at around £75 until the introduction of
the Minimum Wage.  After this they rose slightly to a plateau of £78.
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Average gross hourly earnings in the pilot areas fell very slightly from
November 1996 until the summer of 1997, after which they remained
static at around £2.88 per hour (Figure 6.2), beginning to climb gently
in the winter of 1998.  After April 1999 when the National Minimum
Wage was introduced, hourly wages began to climb steeply, levelling
out at around £3.43 by the end of 1999.
However, as with weekly wages, there were differences between the
two schemes with those in Scheme B areas earning more per hour on
average (Figure 6.2).  Again, this gap grew over the period from parity in
December 1996 to 31p in May 1998, around which level it fluctuated
for a year until it narrowed slightly after the introduction of the Minimum
Wage.  In Scheme B areas, there was a very slight upward trend in average
hourly earnings during the period November 1996 to April 1999, an
increase of 18p per hour overall.  Thereafter, the rate of increase was
sharper and by November 1999 the average had reached £3.52 after
which it levelled off.  Conversely, in Scheme A areas there was a downward
trend to mid 1998, when it was £2.69, and thereafter hourly earnings
began to rise steadily until April 1999.  They subsequently rose sharply
reaching £3.24 in November of that year, a level around which they
remained.
Figure 6.2  Gross mean hourly wage of employed ETU
recipients by ETU area
By recipient type
Relative earnings levels of the three client groups (couples, single people
aged under 25, and single people aged 25 or more) also reflected the
ETU rules.  Couples earned considerably more per week than single
people (Figure 6.3).  Their average wages saw a very small decline from
£110 at the beginning of the evaluation to around £107 through 1998
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and finally climbed back to £111 in late 1999.  Single people aged 25
and over, though earning substantially less, saw a very similar wage pattern,
average earnings falling from £86 to £84 and remaining at that level
until Spring 1999 and then rising gradually back to £87.  Single people
under 25 earned less still, however they did not see the very small decline
in wages experienced by the other groups.  By the spring of 1999, their
weekly wages had risen slightly from £77 to £80, and thereafter they
rose sharply to £87 in January 2000, matching those of older single
people due to the introduction of the National Minimum Wage.
Couples also had the highest mean hourly wage (Figure 6.4).  Initially
steady at just under £3.50, between spring 1998 and spring 1999 it rose
to £3.62.  Following the introduction of the National Minimum Wage,
it then rose sharply to reach £3.92 in January 2000.  The trend among
single people aged 25 and over was similar.  Relatively steady until August
1998 it began a gentle rise to £3.22 prior to the introduction of the
Minimum Wage, after which it rose sharply to reach £3.65 in November
1999, reducing the gap between older singles and couples.  Younger
single people earned considerably less per hour than either of these two
groups.  Their wage rate was steady at around £2.50, but after the
introduction of the Minimum Wage it rose steeply, reaching £3.00 by
January 2000.
Figure 6.3  Gross mean weekly wage of employed ETU
recipients by recipient type
Explaining the trends
At face value, these trends appear to indicate a lack of wage growth in
Scheme B areas and an actual decline in Scheme A, either of which
might be associated with the wage subsidy provided by ETU.
However, the initial decline in Scheme A wages was most likely due to
compositional changes in the ETU workforce in those areas.  More single
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under-25s were drawn into the scheme as the first few months went by
at the expense of those in couples, and this would have brought average
wages down.  In January 1997 Scheme A recipients were composed of
25 per cent couples, 27 per cent single under 25s and 48 per cent single
over 25s, but by November 1997 these proportions had changed to 19
per cent, 32 per cent and 50 per cent.  A similar shift took place in
Scheme B, but to a much lesser extent.  This compositional effect is
confirmed by the absence of such steep declines when the data is separated
by recipient type.
Figure 6.4  Gross mean hourly wage of employed ETU
recipients by recipient type
Furthermore, due to the low earnings thresholds, a rise in wages could
have pushed many recipients out of eligibility for ETU, leaving a caseload
containing the lower-paid workers.  Hence the average wages of eligible
recipients would be unlikely to rise substantially over time as the earnings
thresholds were up-rated at about two per cent per annum, below the
rate of wage inflation.  Renewal rates fell across the evaluation period,
indicating that existing recipients’ wages were rising over time and pushing
them out of eligibility.  It is true that recipients’ mean hourly wages did
show a rise as a result of the National Minimum Wage, but at that point
the caseload and average hours declined as those working longer hours
became ineligible.  However, couples’ average wages failed to rise in just
the same way as those of other recipient groups, despite their higher
maximum payments and, in Scheme A, higher earnings threshold, which
made them less susceptible to such an effect.  This indicates that static
wage trends may also have been due to factors other than low earnings
thresholds.
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Thus, this administrative data offers no conclusive evidence that employers
responded to ETU by holding down the wages of ETU recipients, but
equally the series provides no firm evidence to rule it out.
Figure 6.5  Mean hours per week worked by employed ETU
recipients by ETU area
Hours
Another fear associated with wage supplementation was that workers
would simply reduce their hours in favour of more benefit.  Figures 6.5
and 6.6 show recipients’ average working hours per week.
In the pilot areas overall, employed recipients’ average weekly working
hours initially fluctuated between 29 and 30.  After April 1999 they
decreased, and remained at 26 after November 1999.  Thus there is little
evidence here that average weekly hours were affected by the availability
of ETU, rather the effect on the hours of ETU recipients was seen with
the introduction of the National Minimum Wage.  After NMW, workers
on longer hours increasingly ceased to qualify for ETU, especially in
Scheme A areas.
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Figure 6.6  Mean hours per week worked by employed ETU
recipients by recipient type
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the average earnings of Family Credit (FC)
recipients in the areas where ETU was introduced (A and B) and the
control area of the evaluation (C), compared with a five per cent sample
of FC recipients living outside these areas.  The self-employed are included
in this analysis due to the nature of the administrative data.  Their incomes
would not directly be affected by any response to ETU among employers,
however they would not be immune from the effects of downward
pressures on the wages of low-paid employees.
Figure 6.7  Mean weekly wage of Family Credit recipients by
ETU area
6.2.2  Family Credit recipients17
17 Data are based on a flow sample of recipients whose new ‘fast-track’ claims for FC
began in each month from October 1995 to August 1999.
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Weekly and hourly earnings
The evaluation areas were chosen for their high proportions of
unemployed people and greater numbers of vacancies in low-wage
occupations.  This is reflected in the relatively low levels of weekly and
hourly pay of FC recipients in these areas compared with those outside
the evaluation.  The differential ranged from £3 to £7 per week across
the period from October 1995 to August 1999.  This provides useful
confirmation that ETU was introduced in areas where it was likely to be
needed most.
In all areas, the weekly and hourly earnings of FC recipients followed an
upward trend during the year prior to the introduction of ETU and this
continued over the period to August 1999.  However, there was a large
increase in the spring of 1999 in the ETU scheme and control areas (A,
B and C) bringing wage rates there more closely into line with areas
outside the evaluation, though these also saw a steeper increase at this
time.
Figure 6.8  Mean hourly wage Family Credit recipients by
ETU area
These figures do not point to a depression or reduction in the rate of
growth in wage offers in areas A and B as a result of the introduction of
ETU.  Instead the data merely suggest that weekly and hourly earnings
in all areas increased more sharply following the introduction of the
National Minimum Wage, but slightly more so in areas with more low-
paid employment.
Lone mothers in receipt of Family Credit
The weekly wages of employed lone mothers claiming FC were on average
lower than those of other employees receiving FC and were therefore
closer to those of low-paid workers eligible for ETU (Section 6.1.1).
Thus if any FC recipients would be affected by the introduction of ETU,
it might well be the lone mothers.
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Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the average earnings of lone mothers in receipt
of FC in the ETU scheme and control areas (A, B and C) compared with
a five per cent sample of lone mothers on FC outside these areas.
Figure 6.9  Mean weekly wage of employed lone mother
Family Credit recipients by ETU area
In all areas, the average earnings per week and per hour of lone mothers
receiving FC followed an upward trend during the period October 1995
to August 1999.  The rate of growth in weekly earnings appears to have
increased around the end of 1998 and growth continued at this new rate
for the remainder of this period, while the rate of growth in hourly
wages increased sharply after March 1999.  These increases were actually
more pronounced within the ETU areas (A, B and C) than outside
them.
Therefore, Figures 6.9 and 6.10 do not point to a reduction in weekly or
hourly earnings of lone mothers receiving FC in any of the areas during
this time.  Neither does it suggest that the rate of growth in weekly or
hourly earnings decreased in any of these areas.  Thus a group thought
particularly vulnerable to a wage effect from ETU continued instead to
participate in the general rise in wages experienced by lone parents and
by other FC recipients outside the ETU areas.  The data again suggests
that the introduction of the National Minimum Wage caused wages to
increase, and that in areas of particularly low wages it had a greater impact
than elsewhere.
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Figure 6.10  Mean hourly wage of employed lone mother
Family Credit recipients by ETU area
Sunderland
Sunderland turned out to be a key area of success for ETU, and both
take-up (the number of claims) and the rate of take-up (the proportion of
eligible workers who claimed) were high.  In September 1999 it had 27
per cent of all awards (5,737) shared among about eight per cent of the
ETU-exposed population.  Thus, if ETU were to have an effect, it would
be particularly visible in this region.  We looked at Sunderland recipients
overall, and a further check looked specifically at the lone mothers claiming
FC in Sunderland.  Extending the earlier argument, these formed
potentially the most vulnerable group in the one place where ETU
captured a significant fraction of the lowest-paid workers without children.
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show the average earnings of FC recipients in
Sunderland, separately for all recipients and lone mothers.  The self-
employed are included in the analysis of FC recipients as a whole due to
the nature of the administrative data, but have been excluded from the
analysis of lone mothers.
119
Figure 6.11  Mean weekly wage of Family Credit recipients in
Sunderland
The average weekly earnings of FC recipients followed a gradual increase
over the period October 1995 to March 1999.  In April 1999 there was
a sudden jump from £106 to £113 due, in all probability, to the
introduction of the Minimum Wage.  Thereafter earnings fluctuated
around this higher level.  The average weekly earnings of employed lone
mothers also followed a gradual increase over the period until April 1999
when their average weekly earnings leapt from £97.80 to £103.40, at
which higher level they remained for the rest of this period.
Similarly, the average hourly earnings of all FC recipients in Sunderland
and lone mothers as a separate group followed an upward trend across
the period October 1995 to August 1999, which was particularly steep
from spring 1999 onwards.
Thus, Figures 6.11 and 6.12 do not point to a reduction in wage offers
during the ETU evaluation among FC recipients in Sunderland as a whole
or lone mothers as a group.  Nor do they suggest that the rate of growth
in hourly earnings decreased.
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Figure 6.12  Mean hourly wage of FC recipients in Sunderland
Had employers in the pilot areas targeted their recruitment on people
eligible for ETU at the expense of existing non-eligible low-paid
employees, the FC caseload would have decreased in the pilot areas (A
and B) as the ETU caseload rose.  The exit rates from the labour market
of FC recipients would have increased beyond the rates prior to the
introduction of ETU and their entry rates would have decreased compared
with the control areas (C) and areas outside the evaluation (D).
Figure 6.13 shows the FC caseload in the ETU pilot areas.  The self-
employed, who would have been unaffected by any substitution effect,
are excluded.
Figure 6.13  Family Credit caseload (excluding the self-
employed) by ETU area
6.3  Substitution effect
6.3.1  Overall Family Credit
caseload18
18 Data are based on a stock sample of recipients, that is awards are not new, or are new
but without ‘fast-track’ status.
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In all areas, the FC caseload followed an upward trend during the period
March 1996 to August 1997, 10 months after the introduction of ETU
in the pilot areas.  The caseload dropped back slightly until March 1998
after which it rose slightly again and then remained fairly constant.  There
was no overall reduction in the numbers on FC in the pilot areas, and the
caseload in the control areas and outside the ETU areas mirrored that in
areas A and B.  This indicates that there was no ETU substitution effect
that impacted significantly on FC recipients who shared the low-paid
end of the labour market with ETU recipients.
Figure 6.14  Lone mothers Family Credit caseload (excluding
the self-employed) by ETU area
The weekly wages of employed lone mothers claiming FC were on average
lower than those of other employed FC recipients and were therefore
closer to those of low-paid workers eligible for ETU.  Thus if any FC
recipients would be affected by the introduction of ETU, it might well
be the lone mothers.  Figure 6.14 shows the FC lone mothers caseload in
the ETU pilot areas compared with the control areas and with the five
per cent sample of the rest of Britain.  Again, the self-employed, who
would have been unaffected by any substitution effect, are excluded.
In all areas, the FC lone mothers caseload followed a slight upward trend
during the period March 1996 to August 1997.  Following this it levelled
out until early 1998 after which it began to climb again until late that
year when it levelled out once more.  There was no overall reduction in
the numbers on FC in the pilot areas, and the caseload in each area
continued to grow at its previous rate in the year following the
introduction of ETU.  This indicates that there was no ETU substitution
effect that impacted significantly on lone mothers in receipt of FC.
6.3.2  Lone mothers’ caseload
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Administrative data on the wages of ETU recipients themselves offered
no conclusive evidence that employers responded to ETU by holding
down the wages of ETU recipients.  However the failure of ETU
recipients’ wages to rise across the evaluation period to April 1999,
particularly among couples, suggests that it should not be ruled out as a
possibility.
ETU could have depressed the wages of ETU recipients without
significantly affecting the wages of FC recipients, and in the Family Credit
wage data, similar trends occurred both before and after the introduction
of ETU and in pilot areas, control areas and areas outside the evaluation
alike.  That is, they showed no significant effect on the wages earned by
FC recipients in the same workforces as those chosen for the ETU pilot,
compared with the control areas and with the rest of Britain.  Wage data
for employed lone mothers on FC, who typically earned lower weekly
wages than other employees on FC and might therefore be the most
vulnerable to an ETU wage effect, gave no indication of a downward
pressure on their wages caused by the introduction of ETU.  This was
true generally and also specifically within Sunderland where ETU had
penetrated a significantly larger proportion of the low-paid workers
without children than it had elsewhere.
With regard to an ETU substitution effect, by which ETU eligible workers
may have replaced FC eligible workers at lower wages, there was no
evidence from the data of this occurring among FC recipients in the pilot
areas.  This was true for both FC recipients as a whole and specifically for
employed lone mothers receiving FC whose weekly wages were on
average lower than those of other employees receiving FC and were
therefore closer to those of ETU recipients.
The lack of evidence in the ETU and FC administrative data for wage
and substitution effects as a result of the introduction of ETU in the pilot
areas should not come as a surprise for three reasons.  Firstly, around
seven in ten ETU recipients were already in work when they applied for
the benefit, giving employers less scope to reduce wages than they would
if they were fixing the wage of a new job.  Secondly, the number of
claims and the proportion of eligible workers who claimed (that is, take-
up and the rate of take-up) were relatively low.  This made it unlikely
that the wage bargaining and employment position of low-paid workers
in general would have been weakened by the introduction of ETU.
Thirdly, though FC recipients occupied the low-paid end of the labour
market along with ETU recipients, they worked for wages which were,
on average, higher than the wages of those claiming ETU.  Furthermore,
having dependent children unlike ETU recipients, they were a different
population in many respects.  That is, they occupied a slightly different
position in the labour market.
6.4  Summary
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Evidence taken solely from administrative data would have concluded
that ETU was on balance a success.  Take-up grew rapidly and exceeded
its projected caseload early in its second year.  Attention would have
been drawn to the large numbers of single people, particularly young
single people who were in work and claiming ETU.  Their very low
wages were raised by Scheme A from £60 to £82 a week and by Scheme
B from £92 to £114, on average.  Little surprise would have been
expressed at the relative absence of couples from the caseload.  Although
more generously treated by the rules, they would have been expected to
earn more.
ETU would have appeared most successful in the areas where it would
have been expected to thrive - in the industrial areas of the North East.
Elsewhere, the steep wage gradient leading from London left too many
in Southend and Bournemouth out of scope of the narrow qualifying
range of ETU while in rural areas like Perth information networks were
probably too stretched to cope with the absence of nationally-based
television and radio promotion.
Disappointment might have been expressed that the proportion of
recipients arriving straight from Jobseeker’s Allowance had failed to
maintain its initial growth, falling back again to only 18 per cent.  But
this might have been attributed to the falls in the overall stock of
unemployed people during the three-year period of the ETU pilot.
Fears that employers would respond to ETU by lowering or holding
down the wages of workers in the low-paid end of the labour market
would have been allayed considerably by the Family Credit wage data.
These showed no significant effect on the wages earned by FC recipients
in the same workforces as those chosen for the ETU pilot, compared
with the control areas and with the rest of Britain.  Nor did administrative
data on the wages of ETU recipients themselves offer conclusive evidence
that employers had responded to ETU in this way, although the failure
of ETU recipients’ wages to rise across the evaluation period to April
1999, particularly among couples, would have sustained concern over
this issue.  However it is hard to imagine any ‘wage effect’ that would
seriously have diminished the substantial gains in income made by ETU
recipients.
Concerns about a substitution effect, by which ETU eligible workers
may have replaced FC eligible workers at lower wages, would also have
been dismissed by the lack of evidence from the administrative data of
this occurring among FC recipients in the pilot areas.
CONCLUSIONS7
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On balance, then, a developed form of ETU, no doubt following the
same lines as the development of Family Credit into Working Families’
Tax Credit, would have recommended itself as an effective extension of
wage supplementation to people without children.  The introduction of
the National Minimum Wage in April 1999 has presented a challenge to
design.  Higher qualifying thresholds and a reduced taper might bring
larger numbers into scope than first intended by the ETU experiment,
for example.  But few would doubt that ETU had provided a sound
template for policy.  The question asked in the remainder of the report is
whether there is evidence from the surveys of ETU recipients or from
the surveys of workers-in-work, that would add or subtract from this
conclusion.
The surveys of ETU recipients in 1997 and in 1999 indicated that the
new benefit was taken up by the people you would expect to find in the
lowest-paid occupations.  Those interviewed corresponded to the profile
of recipients known from administrative statistics; they were, after all,
respectively a one-in-seven and a one-in-twelve sample.  They worked
predominantly in low-skilled jobs, often in protective and personal
services.  Women were in the majority but only marginally so.  Therefore
the problems addressed by policy towards these lowest-paid workers were
not gender-specific.  Indeed they were more concerned with the small
accumulation of human capital among recipients – most had only basic
academic qualifications or none, and one in ten had literacy and/or
numeracy problems.  Half had no driving licence, one in six had health
problems, and all lived in areas where work could be hard to find for
people like them.  It was clear that ETU was topping up the wages of
those people shown, in many other studies, to have a lot of trouble
getting and keeping paid work.
Though determined by the arithmetic of eligibility for ETU, those
claiming the benefit did earn very small wages, typically less £100 a
week.  Some of those working the longest hours averaged less than £3.00
an hour.  Despite this, the great majority of low-paid workers maintained
a strong attachment to their job and to work in general.
There was more evidence in the survey of recipients that ETU was
reaching people who needed it.  For example, hardship was fairly common
among recipients, especially among couples, in terms of the frequency of
problem debts, anxiety about money and having basic unmet needs.  This
finding matched well with the majority view of recipients that they would
find it difficult to manage without getting ETU even if they stayed in
work.
The surveys of recipients also confirmed that eligibility for ETU could
be short-lived.  Some recipients’ incomes had moved beyond eligibility
and a quarter had left ETU altogether before interviewers tracked them
down.  This kind of instability is not surprising among people claiming a
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complicated in-work benefit, especially since so many of its recipients
were young and single.  In terms of the effectiveness of the benefit, it
might be more worrying if large numbers of young people had claimed
ETU in 1996 and the same people were all still claiming it in 1999.  It
was intended to bring people into low-paid work as a transitional phase,
assisting their movement into better paid jobs.  Certainly those who had
left eligibility and stayed in work were earning significantly more.
At this point, then, the view that on balance ETU was doing what it was
designed to do would have largely been supported by the two field surveys
of recipients.  It was going to workers in marginalised low-skilled jobs
who had the same social profile common to people who have had so
much trouble staying in paid work in Britain over the past 20 years.
Because the majority of recipients were not tenants, the delivery of the
benefit was unobstructed by any real competition from Housing Benefit,
or by the complexities of claiming.
The first doubts about the real efficacy of ETU were voiced by the
recipients themselves.  The great majority of employees had started their
job after ETU had been introduced.  Half of them had been aware of
ETU at the time of their recruitment and only 17 per cent of all recipients
had any idea of what they might be allowed to claim.  Little of this was
discussed with the new employer and almost none had the impression
that ETU had somehow created the opportunity they had been able to
take.  It is fair to suggest that most recipients would have been working
in their jobs without ETU.
Though difficult in execution, the sampling strategy located persistently
low-paid workers living in the low-pay areas designated by the ETU
pilot.  Spells of unemployment were common among them and at
interview a quarter would not have qualified for ETU because no one in
the household was working 16 or more hours a week.
The lowest-paid workers without children were a plausible customer
base for ETU and reflected many of the profile characteristics shown by
the recipients’ sample.  They were young, single and living with their
parents or they were older couples who had either bought their homes
or still had a small mortgage.  Again, the path of ETU was unobstructed
by Housing Benefit since less than a fifth of the sample paid rent and only
a third of these received Housing Benefit. Overall, only three per cent of
full-time workers continued to get Housing Benefit in work.  Like the
recipients, a small majority were women.
Awareness of ETU in the Scheme A and B areas was low and falling.
Even in places where ETU was more popular, two thirds were unaware
of in-work benefits for people without children and few could name
ETU.
7.2.3  Did ETU meet its
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If ETU B had been available in Scheme A, B and Control areas, about
half the sample would have qualified for benefit in each area.  The
proportion of eligible workers claiming ETU rose from the 18 per cent
found in the 1997 follow-up sample, but remained low at 14 per cent in
Scheme A and 30 per cent in Scheme B: 23 per cent overall.  This, after
three years, was a disappointment.  But there were some important
qualifications.
The survey discovered that the relative absence of couples from the ETU
caseload was due to non-take-up among eligible working couples, not to
a lower rate of eligibility.  Eligible couples were about as numerous as
the eligible single workers were.  But only 10 per cent of eligible couples
claimed their ETU compared with 37 per cent of single people.  In
Scheme B single people had a take-up rate of 43 per cent, which was
much more in line with expectations, especially since the new benefit
had had so little public promotion.
In addition to this wide difference in take-up rates between single workers
and couples, the survey was able to go on to provide a detailed and
persuasive explanation of why some eligible workers took up their benefit
and others did not.
The following factors were found to encourage and discourage claims
for ETU, operating independently of one another.
• Eligible workers who failed to take up their entitlement were
couples, especially dual-earner couples, and older people who either
owned their own homes or lived in some other arrangement rather
than as homebuyers or tenants.  Additionally one of them might be
receiving a disability benefit.  They lived in a Scheme A area or in
Bournemouth. They had no experience of claiming other income-
tested benefits, had slightly higher earnings and so were entitled to
slightly lower amounts of ETU and, anyway, they were used to
managing adequately on a low income.
• Eligible workers who did take up their entitlement were young
single workers, many of them living in Sunderland and Doncaster.
They worked shorter hours and so had lower earnings, higher
entitlements and felt hard up.  Often they had experience of claiming
other income-tested benefits such as Housing Benefit and Family Credit
or came from families who did.
This added up to an explanation of non-take-up that has some clear
implications for policy and there were two clear themes in this explanation.
Recipient density
Crucially, publicity was sparse.  In the first six months it was limited to
non-electronic media and then it vanished altogether, leaving it to official
and informal networks to inform workers of ETU.  In geographical and
7.4  Explaining take-up rates
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social settings where eligible workers were rare, these networks could
not possibly work as they do for other benefits like Family Credit and
Housing Benefit.
In geographical terms, in some areas such as Scheme A and the rural
Scheme B areas, information streams and cues-to-enquire-and-claim such
as meeting recipients or their relatives and friends or hearing about ETU
in conversation were just too scattered.  In Sunderland and Doncaster,
workers’ chances of meeting ETU recipients or hearing references to
ETU were two-to-three times higher than elsewhere.  Besides the
arithmetic, the evidence from the qualitative studies is that, knowing
they were on to a promising thing, officials in Sunderland and Doncaster
pushed ETU far more actively than elsewhere (Vincent et al, 2000).
In social terms, the same arguments can be made for low-paid older
couples, dual earners, homeowners, people with disabled partners and so
on.  These characteristics are all badges of isolation from the streams of
information that are live and current among younger single people and
tenants.  Since older couples are clearly good managers, it should not be
difficult to persuade them to pick up a subsidy once they are convinced
by a credible high-profile advertising campaign they really are among
those intended to benefit from ETU or a successor.  The problem for
policy is that they are people who are quite settled in work and need no
additional encouragement to continue what they have been doing for
years.
Skill transfer
It is highly significant that claiming ETU was both need-driven and
associated independently with prior experience of claiming income-tested
benefits.  Those picking up their entitlements, as well as being young,
single and connected to information sources, were the lowest-paid of
eligible workers and sensitised to news of a subsidy by the experience of
hardship.
Though persuasive, we have a better explanation of non-claiming than
we have of claiming.  Those answering the discouraged description –
older dual earning couples and so on – were almost all non-recipients.
Those encouraged – young, single, hard-up, experienced applicants –
still fell short of a take-up rate of, say, 50 per cent, which might have
been ruled a satisfactory level under the circumstances of the pilot scheme.
But they did not fall far short, and we do know who the non-recipients
were.  A lot of them could be eliminated right away simply by disregarding
Scheme A, which would anyway be buried beneath full compliance with
the National Minimum Wage.  A new ‘B-plus’ version of ETU would




• allowed for the introduction of the National Minimum Wage with
adjusted thresholds;
• adopted a shallower taper like Working Families’ Tax Credit, that is
one which was withdrawn at a lower rate against income above the
earnings threshold;
• was backed by national television and radio advertising which would
penetrate the relative isolation of poorly paid older couples who have
their own homes, or work in residential settings.
B-plus would almost certainly look forward to a take-up rate of between
50 and 60 per cent after a year or so.  The evidence for this conclusion is
that young single people in Scheme B were not that far short of 50 per
cent take-up without the advertising.  The view taken of the remaining
non-take-up might also be influenced by the evidence that within its
limitations ETU, like Family Credit, still managed to get to the lowest-
paid workers who appeared to need it most.
We are left with a puzzle: if ETU had such a low take-up rate, how did
24,000 people manage to receive it at the peak of its popularity? Particularly
since econometric estimates had promised a peak caseload of about 20,000.
It is uncertain what take-up rate was assumed in this estimate but it is
likely to have been higher than 23 per cent.  There are really only three
explanations:
• there were more eligible workers in the eight pilot areas than expected,
the National Minimum Wage notwithstanding; or
• this survey’s estimate of the take-up rate is too low; or
• some combination of these two factors.
If the take-up rates in this survey are accurate, then divided into the
known caseloads of 10,000 and 14,000 respectively, they suggest the
eligible population of low-wage workers without children in the Scheme
A areas was 74,000 and in Scheme B areas it was 47,000.  These estimates
correspond to known caseloads of Family Credit recipients of 44,000
and 22,000 respectively, which, at a take-up rate of 72 per cent, would
translate into eligible populations of 61,000 and 31,000 respectively.
These Family Credit caseload figures confirm that the low-paid working
population of Scheme A was twice that of Scheme B.  They also show (as
proportions of the national caseload of 785,000) that the low-paid
population with children in the pilot areas was 8.4 per cent of the low-
paid population with children nationally.  If these ratios were the same
for the lower-paid population without children, this suggests a national
eligible population for ETU of 1.41 million compared with the Family
Credit eligible population of 1.09 million.  This would leave seven per
cent of the working population eligible for ETU compared with five per
cent for Family Credit. Thus, about one in eight British workers would
7.6  How do we reconcile low
take-up rates with high take-
up?
7.6.1  Size of eligible population
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qualify for wage supplementation.  And this is before any changes in the
form of tax credits.  Since Scheme A is clearly a non-starter, an estimate
based solely on the survey evidence for Scheme B would project a national
Scheme B eligible population of 1.67 million.  A B-plus version to match
Working Families’ Tax Credit would have a larger eligible population
than this.  Again though it should be stressed that the mobility of half the
target population and the remoteness of the other half, is likely to keep
take-up rates below that achieved for Family Credit.  Caseloads will,
therefore, be smaller.
How accurate this short-cut method of grossing-up may be will wait
further adjustment for assumptions about the relative size of the low-
paid population with children compared with the lower-paid population
without children.  Family Credit recipients earn around a whole pound
an hour more than ETU recipients did, for example.
Last, how accurate are the take-up rates estimated in this survey?  It is still
quite difficult to accept that so many older couples were living on incomes
that really were as low as the survey measured, though many of them had
only small outgoings.  However, there is no real reason to believe that
they responded very differently to the questionnaire compared to the
recipients, for whom we have a strong verification of their eligibility and
its amount.
However, other small adjustments could be made that would favour a
higher ‘true’ take-up rate.  The exclusion from the workers sample of
two key low-paid group – people earning below the National Insurance
Contribution threshold of £62 a week and young people aged 18 to 20
- may have depressed take-up rates.  Adjustments in favour of a higher
estimate would reduce projected caseloads considerably.  If, for example,
the ‘true’ take-up rate was 40 per cent in Scheme B, the projected national
eligible population for Scheme B would be reduced to 1.25 million.
A strong argument in favour of extending wage supplementation to people
without children was the evidence from Family Credit research which
showed that it helped families, especially two-parent families, survive
difficult times, such as sudden overtime reductions, without leaving their
jobs and falling onto Income Support or JSA.
The design of the pilot scheme was a good test of this function, but there
was no evidence that workers left their jobs at a slower rate in the Scheme
A or B areas compared with the control areas.  There was no direct
evidence of people claiming ETU and so hanging on to their jobs longer.
Nor was there indirect evidence of job retention being better overall in
the presence of ETU in the Scheme A or B areas compared with the
control areas.  Nor was there any retrospective evidence in the 1999
surveys that workers in the Scheme A or B areas had had better or more
secure work histories either directly as a result of receiving ETU or by
7.6.2  Accuracy of take-up rates
7.7  Job retention
130
working in a more secure employment market that was now underwritten
by wage subsidy.
The report on the first phase of the evaluation surveys of ETU recipients
and workers concluded that:
‘There is little in the data to oppose the view that most of the first year of
expenditure on ETU in the pilot areas has gone to people who would
anyway have done the jobs they did, or who took the jobs they would have
taken, working the hours they would have worked for the wages they would
have otherwise accepted.’
(Finlayson et al, 2000)
On the basis of the second round of surveys of ETU recipients and
workers-in-work, there is no reason to change this conclusion.  We can
add that no evidence was found to encourage the view that people kept
the jobs they had more easily because of support from ETU.
7.8  Conclusion
Department of Social Security
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The Earnings Top-up (ETU) Pilot Scheme was designed to make low-
paid employment more financially attractive.  The scheme operated in
eight localities within Great Britain between October 1996 and October
1999.  Payment of a weekly wage supplement was made on a sliding
scale to single persons and to married couples without children, who
worked 16 hours a week or more and who earned below a threshold
amount.  Various rates of subsidy and thresholds applied to different
groups and in different types of areas in which the scheme was piloted.
Full details of the operation of the scheme can be found in Finlayson et al
(2000)
One of the objectives of the scheme is to increase the employment
opportunities at the low end of the skill distribution.  However,
substitution and displacement mechanisms19 can operate within the wider
labour market to reduce or even negate any employment-producing
potential the scheme may have.  The aim of this research is to determine,
via the analysis of detailed work history information from a sample of
participants and non-participants, whether there is evidence of such effects.
Chapter 9 focuses upon the issue of substitution and displacement arising
from the scheme.  Via graphical methods and through a multivariate
statistical analysis of the duration of employment and non-employment
spells, work history survey data are analysed for evidence of potential
effects of the scheme on non-participants.  The second part of the paper
examines for potential longer-term impacts of the scheme.  By taking
advantage of the fact that the scheme has now ended, it is possible to
examine the labour market behaviour of those who were participants,
but are no longer, as the scheme winds down.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Chapter 9 describes the survey data
used in this study, details the populations defined for sampling purposes,
and examines the extent of attrition between the various follow-up surveys.
Chapter 10 presents a graphical analysis of the employment histories of
respondents to the various surveys, for the period January 1991 to July
1997.  Chapter 11 presents results from an analysis of the duration of
spells of employment and non-employment for persons who were
19 Substitution effects arise if ETU-recipient workers are employed at the expense of
non ETU-recipients.  Displacement effects are similar but work via competitive forces
through the markets for goods and services.  These effects, if present, operate to
reduce employment opportunities for non ETU-recipient workers below what they
would have been in the absence of the scheme.
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participants in the scheme compared with those who were not.  Chapter
12 considers the potential longer term impacts of the scheme and presents
further information from administrative sources about the evolving
employment status of ETU participants as the scheme winds up.  Chapter
13 summarises and concludes the study.
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The data for this study derive primarily from three related sample surveys
of ETU recipients and non-recipients.  Prior to the introduction of
Earnings Top-up in eight pilot areas in October 1996, a sample of low-
paid workers was selected in these and four additional control areas and
interviewed in the summer of 1996.  This group was interviewed again
in the summer of 1997.  The sample was identified from 1994-95 National
Insurance Records database as being in low-paid employment20.
A second sample, termed the sample of unemployed persons, was also
interviewed in 1996 and 1997.  This sample was drawn from the records
of those who had experienced lengthy spells of claimant unemployment
(6-15 months) in 1995 and 1996.
The third sample, interviewed in 1997, consisted of Earnings Top-up
recipients in the pilot areas, this sample being drawn from ETU
administrative records.
A postal follow-up survey of the ETU recipients and low-paid workers sample
members who were interviewed (or re-interviewed) in 1997 was carried
out in December 1998.  Figure 9.1 shows the relationship between the
various surveys and details the numbers responding at each stage of data
collection.
While further surveys of ETU recipients and low-paid workers were conducted
in 1999 (See Marsh et al., 2001), these samples were newly drawn and
could not provide updates to the month-by-month information of labour
market status required for this study.  The analysis presented in Chapters
10 and 11 is limited, therefore, to an examination of the potential for
substitution and displacement effects within the first ten months of the
scheme.  While this study is early in the three-year life of the scheme, it
should be noted that participation in the scheme grew rapidly in this
early period.  By August 1997 the number of participants had surpassed
two thirds of what would become the peak in the Spring of 1999.
THE SURVEY DATA9
20 For full details of sample selection methods, achieved sample sizes, survey response
rates and a review of the basic characteristics of the respondents to these surveys, see
Finlayson et al. (2000).
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Notes: ‘Low-paid workers’ identified from 1994-1995 National Insurance records database.
‘Unemployed people’ identified from National Unemployment Benefit records database.
‘ETU recipients’ identified from administrative records of ETU pilot scheme.
A small number (38) of the sample of unemployed people responded to the postal follow-up survey.  These are not considered further in this study.
Sample attrition rates are fairly high.  For the low-paid workers sample,
72 per cent of the 1996 sample responded in 1997.  For the sample of
unemployed persons, the rate of attrition is higher still, leading to a fall in
sample size to 66 per cent.  For the postal follow-up, only 55 per cent of
the 1997 low-paid workers sample responded.  For ETU recipients this
rate was 41 per cent.
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Information on the previous economic activity of respondents to the
1996 survey was collected via a series of questions structured as follows:
I would like to ask you some questions about paid work.  May I just
check, which of these best describes your current situation (READ
OUT)
Employee, 16 hours a week or more
Employee, less than 16 hours a week
Self-employed
On a Government training scheme
Unemployed and claiming benefit
Unemployed and not claiming benefit
In full-time education
Temporarily sick/disabled (less than 6 months)
Temporarily sick/disabled (6 months or more)
Looking after the home/children
Retired
Other (specify)
When did you start your current spell of.....? (MONTH YEAR)
What were you doing immediately before that?
(CODE FOR EACH CHANGE OF ACTIVITY BACK TO
JANUARY 1991, OR TO AGE 16 IF SOONER)
These questions generated a set of economic activity codes and start
dates (including a start date for the activity held in January 1991).  For
the ‘low-paid workers’ and the ‘unemployed’ sample respondents who
were re-interviewed, these data were updated from the date of the first
interview to the date of the 1997 survey.  For the new interviewees in
1997 (the ‘ETU recipients’ sample), work history data were collected for
the entire period 1991 to 1997.  The postal follow-up survey requested
respondents to characterise their economic activity in each month from
October 1997 to September 1998 using a collapsed version of the
economic activity categories shown above.  Interviews for the 1997 surveys
were mainly held in the period July to September 1997.  As a result,
information about economic activity status in September and October
1997 is not available for some respondents to the postal follow-up survey.
The survey data files were merged and reconstructed into ‘calendar files’
(one record per month per respondent) for all months over which activities
were recorded21.  These records were then restricted to the period January
1991 to September 1997.
21 The 1996 and 1997 surveys requested the dates of recent events in detail.  Examination
of these data showed that most respondents gave simply a month and a year when
asked for the date.
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Data on events that are recalled by respondents are subject to a progressive
type of degradation, associated with memory loss, time ‘compression’
and possible censoring of information on particular types of events by
respondents.  Recent studies (Elias, 1997; Paull, 1998; Dex and
McCulloch, 1998) have revealed the nature and extent of these errors.
Of particular relevance to the present study are the findings in Elias (1997),
indicating that information on spells of unemployment becomes unreliable
if recalled more than two years after the event.  The possible effect of this
on the interpretation of results is addressed later in this part.
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A useful way of summarising the individual month-by-month work
histories is to show the average situation in each month from January
1991 to September 1997 for survey respondents.22  Given the different
procedures used to select potential respondents to the surveys, information
is shown separately for each of the three survey groups (low-paid workers,
unemployed persons and ETU recipients).
Two different versions of the scheme were piloted.  These are termed
Scheme A and Scheme B.  Each scheme was operated in four of the pilot
areas.  Scheme B had a higher maximum credit for married couples without
children than Scheme A.  It also had a significantly higher earnings
threshold for single claimants.  The employment histories of each survey
group are contrasted by scheme type (A or B) and also with the respondents
in the four areas in which the scheme did not operate (Group C areas)
Figures 10.1 to 10.3 show the history of employment (employee and
self-employed status) reported by respondents to the sample of low-paid
workers.  Figure 10.1 shows that in ‘Group C’ areas (areas in which the
ETU pilot scheme was not running and which were selected for
comparison purposes) the historical employment rates of respondents are
about 5-7 percentage points higher than in the Scheme A or Scheme B23
areas.  When examining these employment rates by gender (Figures 10.2
and 10.3) it is apparent that this higher employment rate is due to the
higher historical rate of employment reported by women in the Group
C areas and that the diverging experiences of employment commenced
almost two years before the onset of ETU.
Figure 10.4 shows similar information from the employment histories of
the sample of unemployed persons.  The effect of sample selection is seen
as a sharp dip in the rate of employment of this group in late 1995 and
1996 (months 55-70).  There is surprisingly little variation in the
employment histories of the sample of unemployed respondents between
the different types of area.  Investigation of gender differences (Figures
10.5 and 10.6) shows that female ‘Scheme B’ respondents generally have
a weaker history of employment than for respondents in Scheme A or
the comparison areas.
THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORIES OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS10
22 Months are numbered such that ‘1’=January 1991 and ‘80’ =August 1997.  ETU was
introduced in the pilot areas in month 70.
23 Differences observed are mainly attributable to the varying length of employment as
opposed to non-employment spells.
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Figure 10.7 shows the employment histories of ETU participants.  Here
it can be seen that sample selection effects operate to raise employment
rates towards the end of the period.  This is because ETU participants
are, by definition, in employment.  The fact that employment rates peak
at just over 90 per cent, rather than reaching 100 per cent, reflects the
time interval between creation of the administrative record and the
interview, in which period some respondents had become unemployed
or had otherwise left paid employment.  Scheme B respondents show a
lower rate of employment in the three years prior to their participation
in the ETU pilot, a finding that holds for both men and women (Figures
10.8 and 10.9).
While the analysis presented in Figures 10.1 to 10.9 is essentially
descriptive, some interesting observations emerge.  First, there appears
to be a strong contrast in the early work histories of ETU recipients
compared with the sample of low-paid workers (few of whom participated
in the ETU scheme).  From December 1990 to January 1994 the
employment rate of the ETU participants is 20-30 percentage points
lower than that shown for the corresponding period in the employment
history of the low-paid workers sample.  This may reflect the fact that
the ETU participants’ sample consists of a higher proportion of young
people who were still in the education sector in this earlier period.  This
possibility is investigated further in Chapter 12.  Comparison with the
sample of unemployed persons is problematic, due to the high ‘selection
effect’ which distorts the employment histories.24  Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that the ‘early’ employment histories (i.e. about six
years prior to the introduction of the scheme) of both the sample of
unemployed persons and the ETU recipients are, on average, more similar
than those of the sample of low-paid workers.
In summary, it appears that there are significant labour market effects
contributing to the employment/unemployment profiles shown in Figures
9.1 to 10.8.  Clearly, some analytical technique which can ‘control’ for
varying labour market influences is required.  The following section
describes how this was achieved.
24 Sample selection effects will bias the employment histories of all three samples relative
to a simple random sample of the population of persons of working age drawn in each
locality.  However, both the ETU recipients sample and the low-paid workers sample are
selected conditional upon being observed in employment at the time the sample is
drawn.  The opposite is true for the sample of unemployed persons.
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Figure 10.1  History of employment (sample of low-paid
workers) by area type
Figure 10.2  History of employment (sample of low-paid
workers) by area type, males
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Figure 10.3  History of employment (sample of low-paid
workers) by area type, females
Figure 10.4  History of employment (sample of unemployed
persons) by area type
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Figure 10.5  History of employment (sample of unemployed
persons) by area type, males
Figure 10.6  History of employment (sample of unemployed
persons) by area type, females
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Figure 10.7  History of employment (sample of ETU
recipients) by area type
Figure 10.8  History of employment (sample of ETU
recipients) by area type, males
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Figure 10.9  History of employment (sample of ETU
recipients) by area type, females
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The preceding graphs indicate that there is a significant degree of variation
through time in the work histories of survey respondents over the 6½-
year period for which they gave work history details.  A sharp contrast in
the earlier experience of employment is evident according to the sample
selection procedures adopted in each survey.  In this section an attempt is
made to identify systematic factors which relate to the probability that a
spell of employment (and, conversely a spell of non-employment) will
end in any particular month during the period from the start of the scheme
in October 1996 to the date of the second survey in 1997.  To test for
differences due to participation in the scheme all work history data
(‘person-months’) are pooled then split into participants and non-
participants25.
In modelling the dynamics of employment and non-employment over
this 6½ year period, a number of factors need to be taken into account.
These are:
• differing labour market conditions between the areas;
• differences in the prior experiences of employment and unemployment
for survey respondents and the effect of these on subsequent movement
into and out of employment;
• differences which may be attributed to the operation of rules governing
eligibility for and the amount of ETU paid (Scheme A versus Scheme
B, presence of a partner, savings etc);
• differences attributable to variations in the ‘employability’ of respondents
(eg age, ethnicity, health, education, qualifications, skills, attitudes to
work).
Two statistical models are developed.  The first of these estimates the
probability that an employed respondent ends a spell of employment in
any particular month of his/her work history.  The other is a corresponding
model of the probability of a spell of non-employment ending.
Earnings Top-up is paid to qualifying persons who gain employment of
16 hours per week or more.  A potential effect of ETU could be that it
encourages people to seek and accept employment of 16 hours per week
and over, with a corresponding reduction in the supply of workers seeking
STATISTICAL MODELLING OF THE DURATION OF SPELLS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND NON-EMPLOYMENT
25 The terms ‘non-participant’ and ‘participant’ are virtually synonymous with ‘low-
paid worker/unemployed persons’ on the one hand and ‘ETU recipient’ on the other.
Only five per cent of respondents in Scheme A and Scheme B areas of the surveys of
low-paid workers and unemployed persons participated in the scheme.  The analysis
presented in this section focuses strictly upon those who were either non-recipients of
ETU or recipients, regardless of the sample from which they were drawn.
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and gaining employment at less than 16 hours per week.  In addressing
this issue, employment is defined only when it is for 16 hours per week
or more.  ‘Non-employment’ therefore includes the small proportion of
workers who are working less than 16 hours per week.
If the introduction of ETU led to changes in labour market behaviour,
these are likely to manifest themselves in a number of ways.  First, it
could make work a more financially attractive proposition than not
working.  This may appear initially as an increase in the probability of a
spell of non-employment ending in the pilot areas in the period after
October 1996.  Secondly, it could make employment in low-paid jobs a
more ‘secure’ option, helping to reduce the ‘recycling’ between ‘low-
pay’ and ‘no-pay’ which characterises the work histories of those who
are employed in low-paid jobs.  If this occurs, it will be revealed as a
decrease in the probability of a spell of employment ending.  Both effects
would be apparent in the pilot areas after October 1996 but not in the
control areas.
Substitution and displacement effects may operate to moderate these
desirable outcomes.  Movement of individuals into ETU-supported jobs
may be offset by an increase in the probability of an employment spell
ending for those who are not in ETU-supported employment, or may
decrease the probability of a spell of non-employment ending for those
not eligible to receive ETU.  Alternatively, or additionally, ‘wage effects’
may operate such that employers reduce wage levels on the assumption
that sufficient labour will still be supplied at lower wage rates given the
financial support received by individuals eligible for and subsequently
claiming ETU.  An important distinction, therefore, is between recipients
and non-recipients of ETU.
Each model considers every month in an individual’s work history as a
separate observation, relating the prior work history up to that point in
time to the status in that month.  In addition, personal characteristics
(most of which have to be treated as fixed over time but varying for each
respondent) and labour market conditions (varying through time but
common for all respondents within a particular labour market) are
included.
The full set of covariates is:
• age (linear spline);
• gender;
• cumulative employment tenure recorded in work history;







• cumulative duration and spells of unemployment;
• local area unemployment rates;
• family/household structure variables;
• literacy and/or numeracy problems;
• self assessed skills.
A dummy variable was constructed to represent the operation of the
ETU schemes.  This variable has the value zero for each month up to
October 1996, then is set as a linear trend for each month from October
1996 to July 1997.  With these variables the following hypotheses are
tested:
For non recipients and in the period following the introduction of
ETU, the probability of a spell of non-employment ending falls and
the probability of a spell of employment ending rises in Scheme A
and Scheme B areas, with no change in the comparison areas.
For recipients and in the period following the introduction of ETU,
the probability of a spell of non-employment ending rises and the
probability of a spell of employment ending falls.
Testing of these hypotheses relies then upon maintaining the distinction
between recipients and non-recipients of ETU and examining for relevant
changes after October 1996 in the probability of employment or non-
employment spells ending in the ETU areas.  Table 11.1 shows variation
in the rate at which employment and non-employment spells end for
recipients and non-recipients.
Table 11.1  Frequency of spells of employment or non-employment ending, by type of spell
and by type of respondent (October 1996 - July 1997)
Non-recipients ETU recipients
Employment Non-employment Employment Non-employment
spells spells spells spells
No. of spells ending in period (%) 303 (1.8) 529 (3.3) 316 (2.0) 935 (16.6)
No. of person-months observed 16,711 15,943 15,642 5,625
As was evidenced in the graphical depiction of the employment histories
of ETU recipients shown in Figure 10.7, the number of non-employment
spells ending is proportionately lower than the spells of employment
which end, indicative of the general increase in employment among this
group of respondents.  The sharp rise in employment indicated in Figure
10.7 is evidenced by the large number of non-employment spells ending
for this sample; 16.6 per cent of all months of non-employment have a
spell ending as opposed to 2.0 per cent of all months of employment
marked by the end of a spell.
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Appendix D, Table D.1 shows the estimated coefficients of the two logistic
regression models that explore the correlates of these spells ending for
the sample of ‘non-recipients’.  The termination of an employment spell
appears positively correlated with being male, young (under 21 years)
and being disabled.  Negative effects (a lower probability of an employment
spell ending) are noted for high attendance in final year of schooling,
having a vocational qualification, assessing oneself as being ‘good at
working with people’ and being an owner-occupier.  The potential impact
of ETU is modelled via a variable that represents a time trend from
October 1996 in the pilot areas, but is set to zero in the comparison
areas.  This variable is designed to pick up the effects of the gradual
introduction of ETU from October 1996 onwards.  No significant effect
can be detected.
For non-employment spells among this same group of respondents, the
results effectively mirror the analysis shown for employment spells.  Again,
no statistically significant pilot/control differential appears to exist for the
probability of a spell of non-employment ending.
For the ETU recipients, Appendix D, Table D.2 shows the estimated
coefficients from a similar analysis.  Here, the distinction between pilot
and control areas is not relevant.  Instead, the Scheme ‘A’ trend variable
differentiates Scheme A from Scheme B areas via the use of a time trend
dummy from October 1996 for the Scheme A areas.  No significant
difference can be detected in the incidence of either employment or
non-employment spells ending is these two groups of areas.  Fewer of
the other variables are significant, although the scale and direction of
effects indicated by the estimated coefficients are generally similar to
those shown in the analysis for the re-interviewed sample.
In summary, therefore, this detailed investigation of the work histories
of two groups of survey respondents for the period October 1996 to July
1997 does not reveal any significant variation between the ETU pilot
and control areas in the movements into or out of employment.  Any
secondary effects of ETU (substitution and displacement effects), which
may have operated to worsen the employment situation for non-
participants at the expense of participants, are non-evident.  Testing for
‘within scheme effects’, contrasting the employment dynamics for ETU
participants in Scheme A with ETU participants in Scheme B, again fails
to reveal any significant difference in movement into or out of
employment which could be attributed to the different credits and
thresholds associated with Schemes A and B.
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The preceding section made use of the survey data to examine for evidence
of the effects of ETU in terms of differences in the employment
participation of recipients and non-recipients.  This section investigates
the potential longer-term impact of the scheme on recipients, particularly
whether or not the scheme increases the extent to which people with a
history of intermittent employment settle into more stable work patterns.
It is, as yet, too early to provide a definitive view on the above issue.  To
do so requires that a longer period of time should have elapsed since the
scheme was introduced to determine these impacts.  Instead two related
approaches are used.  First, a comparison is made between the early work
histories of the sample of ETU participants, the sample of low-paid
employees and the sample of unemployed persons.  It was clear from the
graphical analysis presented in section three that there are some
fundamental differences in their early work histories.  This section explores
possible reasons for these differences.  Secondly, use is made of the fact
that the ETU scheme has now ended.  No new claims were admitted
after October 1st 1999.  As existing claims come to an end it is possible to
observe the subsequent benefit status of persons who previously received
ETU.
An interesting finding to emerge from examination of the employment
histories of respondents to the various surveys relates to the prior history
of employment reported by the ETU recipients.  Figure 12.1 combines
the information by type of area as shown in Figures 10.1, 10.4 and 10.7
to summarise the average employment experienced each month for the
three groups of survey respondents.  This graph demonstrates that the
average experience of employment in the period four to six years before
the 1997 surveys is closer for the ETU recipients and the unemployed persons
than it is for the sample of unemployed persons, with both of the former
groups showing employment rates of 45-55 per cent in this period.  In
contrast, members of the sample of low-paid workers were, on average,
working 75-85 per cent of the time in these same months.
THE LONGER TERM IMPACTS OF ETU12
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Figure 12.1  History of employment by sample type (all
respondents)
There are a number of factors which could explain these differences,
possibly the most important of which is the variation in the age structure
of the samples.  Table 12.1 shows the age structure of each sample by
gender.  The ETU recipients are a younger sample of respondents than
either the sample of unemployed persons or the sample of low-paid
workers.  Almost two thirds (64 per cent) of the men in the sample of
ETU recipients and over half of the women (54 per cent) are aged under
35 years.  This difference could account for a significant part of the
‘employment gap’ between ETU recipients/unemployed persons on the
one hand and low-paid workers on the other in terms of their prior
experience of employment.  The youngest age group in each sample
(16-24 year olds) is significantly more likely to have been in full-time
post compulsory education (or in full-time compulsory education for
those aged 22 years or less) at some time in the 6½ year period prior to
their participation in these surveys.  Excluding all 16-24 year olds from
the analysis makes a crude adjustment for this effect.  The result is shown
in Figure 12.2.  As is evident, the effect of removing all young persons
from these samples is to raise the average employment reported in each
earlier month for the three groups of respondents.  Nonetheless, a similar
difference remains between the average employment experienced by the
unemployed and ETU recipients samples and that reported by the sample
of low-paid workers.
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Table 12.1  Age structure of samples by sex
Sex of respondent
Sample Male Female Total
Unemployed persons
16 -24 yrs 32.7 30.0 31.9
25 - 34 yrs 18.0 12.8 16.4
35 - 44 yrs 10.9 13.0 11.5
45 - 54 yrs 21.1 25.3 22.3
55 yrs and over 17.3 19.0 17.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Low-paid workers
16 -24 yrs 29.2 21.9 25.1
25 - 34 yrs 22.2 13.5 17.3
35 - 44 yrs 8.4 9.9 9.2
45 - 54 yrs 17.7 30.8 25.0
55 yrs and over 22.5 23.9 23.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
ETU recipients
16 -24 yrs 40.4 38.9 39.6
25 - 34 yrs 23.7 15.1 19.1
35 - 44 yrs 13.7 17.6 15.8
45 - 54 yrs 15.7 22.0 19.1
55 yrs and over 6.5 6.3 6.4
Total 100 100 100
Note: Age groups are defined with respect to age at the time of the 1997 surveys.
Another possible explanation, related to the different age structure of
these samples, is that the sample of low-paid workers consists
predominantly of married (or cohabiting) couples whereas the samples of
unemployed persons and ETU recipients are predominantly single.  Given
that many low-skilled single persons have a lesser degree of attachment
to the labour market, this could yield the observed difference in their
earlier employment histories.  To test this hypothesis, the respondents
shown in Figure 12.1 were divided into two groups, single persons and
married (or cohabiting) persons.  The employment histories of these two
groups are contrasted in Figures 12.3 and 12.4.  Again, the effect of age
is clear.  Single respondents, being generally younger, are more likely to
be in full-time education in the earlier years.  Interestingly, for married
respondents the 20 percentage point gap remains between the early
employment participation rates of ETU-recipients and the sample of
unemployed persons on the one hand and the sample of low-paid workers
on the other.
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Figure 12.2  History of employment by sample (all
respondents aged 25 and over)
Figure 12.3  The evolution of employment by sample type,
for single respondents
155
Figure 12.4  The evolution of employment by sample type,
for married respondents
A further explanation for the difference between the employment
participation in the early work histories of the sample of low-paid workers
versus the others is that it could arise if the low-paid workers are a fairly
heterogeneous group, consisting of a number of reasonably well-paid
workers with very steady jobs and a number of very low-paid workers
with intermittent employment histories.  The profiles of employment
participation rates shown for this sample in the preceding figures could
represent an average of such employment histories, with average
participation raised by a significant number of respondents with high
participation rate profiles.
To test this hypothesis the sample is restricted to all persons for whom
gross hourly earnings could be computed from responses to the 1997
surveys.  Figure 12.5 shows the employment rate profiles for the three
groups of respondents who reported earnings.  These differ somewhat
from Figure 12.1, mainly in the profile of employment participation
over the period 1996/97.  This is due to the fact that respondents who
reported hourly earnings had fairly recently held a job (or held one at the
time of the interview).  The median of hourly earnings was then computed
for all respondents reporting earnings at the time of the 1997 survey.
This was £3.44 per hour, compared with average hourly earnings for
manual workers of £6.18 per hour in April 1996.  The sample of low-
paid workers was then divided into those who were in ‘very low-paid
employment’ (below sample median hourly earnings) and ‘low-paid
employment’ (above sample median hourly earnings).  The employment
participation profiles for the ‘very low-paid’ is contrasted with the ‘low-
paid’ in Figure 12.6.
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It is apparent from these profiles that division of the sample of low-paid
workers between those who reported ‘very low-paid’ hourly earnings at
the time of the 1997 survey and those who are above the sample median
hourly earnings does not assist in understanding the difference in
employment participation in the earlier period.  In other words, there is
no clear evidence that the sample of low-paid workers consists of a group
of employees who can be characterised in terms of their hourly pay.
Figure 12.5  History of employment by sample type (all
respondents reporting hourly earnings at time of interview)
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Finally, Figure 12.7 examines whether or not the difference in previous
employment participation rates between the low-paid workers sample
and the ETU recipients/unemployed workers samples reflects a difference
in the reported rate of claiming benefits for unemployment.  To achieve
this, use is made of the fact that respondents stated whether or not they
were receiving unemployment benefits for each period in which they
stated they were unemployed.  The profile of reported benefit claims is
shown in Figure 12.7.
From this analysis it appears, therefore, that the difference between the
early work histories of ETU-recipients and the sample of low-paid workers
arises because the ETU-recipients are more similar to the sample of
unemployed workers - a group of respondents who have all had a very
significant spell of unemployment in their work histories in recent years.
Figure 12.7  History of receipt of unemployment-related
benefits
If, as appears, ETU has operated in such a way that it has attracted into
employment persons who have had an intermittent record of employment
in the past, the critical issue is whether or not the patterns of employment
participation they displayed before taking part in the scheme reappear as
they leave ETU.  As was stated earlier, this issue cannot be fully addressed
at this stage, because insufficient time has yet to elapse following the
winding down of the scheme in the eight pilot areas.  It is evident from
Figure 12.1 that the rate of employment participation of ETU recipients
was rising for approximately two years prior to their participation in the
scheme.  It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that in the absence of any
lasting ‘ETU-effect’ which increases subsequent attachment to the labour
market, it may take up to two years after the scheme ends for the
employment participation rate to stabilise at a rate which no longer reflects
the sample selection effect.




This section makes use of two sources of information used to update the
employment profiles of participants and non-participants.  The first of
these makes use of information from survey respondents who were
recontacted via the postal follow-up survey conducted in 1998.  Figure
12.8 shows, for postal survey respondents only, the profile of their
employment in each month from October 1997 to September 1998.
Additionally, this figure includes the information these respondents
provided in the earlier surveys, portraying their employment over the
period January 1991 to July 1997.  As expected, the aggregate rate of
employment for the ETU-recipients interviewed in 1997 (and responding
to the 1999 postal follow-up) falls from its peak of 93 per cent in August
1997 to 75 per cent as recipients lose their jobs or leave employment for
other reasons.  The rate of decline appears to have slowed considerably
after December 1997, suggesting that the rate of employment among this
group may remain significantly higher in the future than the rate of
participation they displayed some two years before they joined ETU.
Figure 12.8  The employment histories of respondents to the
postal follow-up survey
A second, and later, source of information about the post-ETU status of
recipients is derived from analysis of the Department of Social Security
cross-benefits database, derived from a five per cent longitudinal sample
of all benefit records.  This analysis was conducted by selecting all persons
in the database who were in receipt of ETU in August 199726, then
examining the benefits they received at three monthly intervals through
to August 1999.  Benefits which are unemployment-related (Jobseeker’s
Allowance and Income Support) indicate the extent of joblessness among
this group of persons who received ETU in August 1997.
26 August 1997 is selected to derive a ‘cohort’ of participants who can be likened to
respondents to the survey of ETU participants, identified because of their participation
in the scheme in summer 1997.
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In August 1997 it is estimated that there were 18.8 thousand claims for
ETU still active.  By August 1999 only 4.9 thousand of these claims were
still active.  Of the 13.9 thousand claims which had ended, 2.4 thousand
(13 per cent) had transferred to unemployment-related benefits.  Figure
12.9 shows the evolution of unemployment-related benefits among this
group over the period November 1997 to August 1999.  This is compared
with the recalled history of employment and unemployment for postal
survey respondents who were employed and in receipt of ETU in August
1997.  While the estimated percentage of respondents in receipt of
unemployment-related benefits appears higher than the reported rate of
unemployment from postal survey respondents, the important point to
note is that there is no evidence of a continuing upward growth in the
proportion of ETU-recipients who become unemployed as time elapses
following their participation in the scheme.  Looking back to Figure
12.7, it can be seen that almost one quarter of ETU-recipients stated that
they were unemployed prior to their participation in ETU.  There is, as
yet, no evidence that this situation will reappear following the ending of
the scheme.
Figure 12.9  Employment, unemployment and




This study makes use of evidence collected by survey methods to evaluate
the wider labour market and longer term effects of the Earnings Top-up
Pilot Scheme, an in-work benefit paid to certain categories of low-paid
workers and available in eight localities from October 1996 to October
1999.  The evaluation methodology involves the collection of information
from participants and non-participants in the eight pilot scheme areas
and from non-participants in ‘comparison areas’ – localities in which the
scheme was not available.  A statistical comparison between these various
groups allows certain conclusions to be drawn about the wider labour
market effects of the scheme.
The term ‘wider labour market effects’ is used to refer to the impact of
the scheme on non-participants.  A consequence of measures that are
designed to promote the employment of one group is that these might
reduce employment for persons who are not eligible for them.
Comparison of the movements into and out of employment for ETU-
recipients and non-recipients as the scheme built up following its
inauguration in October 1996 did not reveal any such effects which are
statistically significant and which might be attributed to its operation.
The longer-term impacts of the scheme are assessed by examining the
early work histories of those who participated in the scheme, comparing
them with those who did not participate.  Additionally, this part of the
study takes advantage of the fact that the ETU Pilot Scheme has now
ended, facilitating observation of the subsequent movement out of work
for those who were participants.  This investigation revealed that ETU-
recipients had a weaker degree of attachment to the labour market than
a sample of low-paid employees.  Their employment profiles in the years
prior to their participation appear similar to persons who had experienced
a spell of long-term unemployment in the year preceding the start of
ETU.  Importantly, they display no sign of returning to their earlier
levels of joblessness as the scheme now unwinds.
There are, however, a significant number of caveats that must be attached
to these conclusions.  First, the so-called ‘comparison areas’ may be
fundamentally different from the scheme areas, invalidating their use for
statistical comparison.  Second, the survey samples used suffer from
significant attrition over the period of the study, particularly for the postal
follow up survey in 1998.  Third, the problem of sample selection is
endemic to this study.  The original methodology for evaluation of the
ETU Pilot Scheme envisaged that samples of low-paid workers and
unemployed persons (i.e. potential ETU claimants) would be selected in
1996, then followed at intervals throughout the period that the scheme
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS13
162
operated.  Due to the extremely low take-up rate among these two groups,
this methodology was modified to include a sample of scheme participants
and to vary the frequency and method of follow-up employed.
Despite these difficulties, the analysis presented here reveals a number of
interesting findings.  First, there is little evidence from these survey data
to support the notion that the scheme operated to the detriment of non-
participants.  Among a sample of persons who were low-paid workers in
1994-95, there is no evidence that the scheme operated to reduce their
later experiences of employment.  While it does appear to be the case
that a higher rate of employment is observed among previously low-paid
workers in the comparison areas than in the scheme areas, the fact that
this higher rate existed for two years prior to the scheme suggests that it
is a structural effect and does not relate to the operation of ETU.  Secondly,
there is no evidence to suggest that previously unemployed persons had
more difficulty regaining employment in the scheme areas than in the
comparison areas.  Multivariate analysis of the duration of spells of
employment and non-employment by scheme participants and non-
participants also fails to find evidence of any effects on the duration of
such spells that can be associated with operation of the scheme.  However,
it is important to point out that even at its peak the scheme only covered
between one and two per cent of the employed population in the areas
in which it was piloted.  It is unsurprising therefore that no statistically
significant effects of its operation among non-recipients can be detected
by survey methods.
In terms of the longer-term impacts, the conclusions presented here must
remain tentative, simply because insufficient time has elapsed for longer-
term impacts to become apparent.  From an analysis of the early work
histories of the three groups of survey respondents (two selected because
of their participation in a spell of employment and one selected because
of participation in a spell of unemployment) it is apparent that the early
work histories of ETU participants bear more resemblance to the early
employment experience of persons who have had a fairly lengthy spell of
unemployment than to persons who were in low-paid employment in
1994-95.  At the beginning of the decade, and discounting the effects of
participation in full-time education on employment rates, the average
employment rate of both ETU recipients and those persons who
experienced a significant spell of unemployment in 1994-95 was
approximately 60 per cent.  For those in low-paid employment in 1994-
95, the rate was about 25 percentage points higher.  Some convergence
in these rates is apparent in the period October 1997 to November 1998,
but those who experienced a significant spell of employment in 1994-95
do not regain their earlier employment rates, whereas ETU recipients
continue to display higher rates of employment than in their earlier work
histories, possibly by between five and ten percentage points.  Analysis of
the benefits received by ETU-recipients as the scheme winds down does
not reveal any evidence as yet of a return to the high rates of
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unemployment that marked the work histories of ETU-recipients prior
to their participation.  This suggests that ETU did well to locate its target
group (persons with a history of poor attachment to the labour market)




For the purposes of this report, a person is defined as having a problem
debt when:
• they have not kept up to date with payments for their electricity bill,
gas bill, other fuel bills, Council Tax, insurance policies, telephone
bill, TV/video rental or HP, other HP payments, or water charges
(each counts as one problem debt); or
• they cannot manage the repayments on their credit, charge or store
cards, that is they cannot meet the minimum monthly amount they
have to repay; or
• they have rent or mortgage arrears; or
• they have not be able to keep up with repayments for a bank overdraft,
a fixed term loan from a bank or building society (excluding mortgages),
a loan from a finance company, a loan from a money lender or ‘tally
man’, a loan from a friend or relative, or a loan or advance on wages
from their employer.
Family Credit research showed eligible non-recipients to be ‘better off’
than recipients using a complex index of relative material hardship, on
which they scored lower.  The index assigned points to families who
could not afford things that most other families could afford, who lived
in poor housing circumstances, suffered a lot of financial anxiety, and fell
into unmanageable debt.  ‘Severe hardship’ was defined by exceeding a
pre-set points total.
Measuring hardship among this sample of childless workers was more
difficult.  For example, few young workers maintain households in the
way that families with dependent children have to.  Ideas of household-
based hardship, of families ‘going without’ and getting into household
debt, are far more difficult to pin down for a young person living with
parents or sharing a flat with friends.
A hardship measure was therefore constructed from seven basic measures.
One point was scored for each of the following:
• The respondent said ‘yes’ to the question: ‘Is there anything you really
need to buy at the moment but which you just cannot find the money
for?’.
• The respondent had fallen behind with at least one regular bill such as
utilities, Council Tax, Water Charges, telephone, TV rental.
• The respondent had fallen behind on the repayments schedule for a
loan or overdraft.
PROBLEM DEBT AND HARDSHIP MEASURESAPPENDIX A
A1  Problem debt
A2  Hardship measures
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• The respondent said they worried about money ‘quite often’ or ‘almost
all of the time’.
• The respondent said that they ‘don’t manage very well’, ‘have some
financial difficulties’ or are ‘in deep financial trouble’.
• The respondent said that over the past two years they have had debts
that they have found hard to repay and that this situation occurred
‘often’ or ‘almost all the time’.
• The respondent had fallen behind with rent or mortgage payments.
Not surprisingly, the tendency to score on one of these items of financial
stress was correlated with the tendency to score on others, so they could
be usefully combined into a single index:
Score 0 – no hardship
Score 1 – little hardship
Score 2 – some hardship
Score 3 or more – severe hardship.
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The analysis of response rates is complicated due to the number of surveys
carried out on low-paid workers and ETU recipients.  Whereas in the
analysis of the 1997 sample, it was sufficient to simply quote the 70 per
cent response rate, there are a number of measures of interest in 1998.
Overall, the postal and telephone interviews received a combined response
rate of 51 per cent of the 1996 sample and 61 per cent of the 1997
follow-on sample.  Postal respondents outnumbered telephone
interviewees by four to one.  The response rate to the booster sample
was only 53 per cent.  For the 1997 sample as a whole (i.e. re-interviewed
1996 sample plus booster sample), there was a 56 per cent response rate.
Attempts were also made to contact those individuals sampled in 1996
who were not interviewed in 1997.  The response rate for this group was
predictably low at 27 per cent.
Given these relatively low response rates it would be unsurprising to find
evidence of response bias resulting from differences in attrition across
particular characteristics.  This is examined through inspection of the
changing representation of characteristics as they existed in 1996 (or 1997
in the case of the booster sample members).  Since the 1998 questionnaires
include only very limited demographic information, a comparison of
changes in characteristics is not possible.  Moreover, this is not the aim of
this section of the analysis.
Table B.1 shows how response to the 1998 follow-up surveys is linked
to 1996 characteristics.  On the whole, the samples appear reasonably
well-matched, since the differences never amount to more than a few
percentage points.  However, in some cases these differences are statistically
significant, despite being only small.  Significance is depicted by asterisks.
Thus, a number of characteristics can be seen to be associated with
increased likelihood of response to the follow-up surveys.  Being female,
older, partnered and owning accommodation all predispose the individual
to responding to the follow-up surveys.  Conversely, those renting in
1996 and those whose highest educational qualification is at CSE level
are less likely to respond.  In terms of the response bias associated with
employment characteristics, the most important differences are among
those who are employed for 16 or more hours per week in 1996 and
those who are unemployed and claiming benefits.  The former are more
likely to respond, the latter less likely.
Hence, there is some cause for concern that the follow-up sample may
not be representative of the 1996 sample (strictly, the sub-sample of 1996
respondents who took part in the 1997 survey).  This does not necessarily
invalidate subsequent analysis which aims to compare the pilot ETU
RESPONSE RATES AND WEIGHTING IN CHAPTER 5APPENDIX B
B1  Response rates
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areas with the comparison areas so long as the bias is common to both.
To investigate this, differences between the pilot and comparison areas
were examined among the 1997 re-interviewees and the 1998 respondents.
This revealed that for most characteristics, there was no significant
difference between the pilot and comparison groups.  However, there
was one important difference in that unemployed claimants in the pilot
areas were more likely than those in the comparison areas to participate
in the 1998 follow-up surveys.  The extent to which this will prejudice
later analysis is not clear for two main reasons.  First, the focus of this
section is on job retention and, as such, will consider only those individuals
who were in paid employment in 1996.  By this reasoning, those
unemployed in 1996 do not feature and hence their differential response
across pilot and comparison areas is not an issue.  Second, being
unemployed in 1996 is a temporal characteristic.  The tendency for lower
response rates among this group does not signify that the unemployed
are less likely to respond, only that those who were unemployed in 1996
are less likely to respond.  Hence it is difficult to predict the effect of this
non-response on other analyses.  However, there is a scenario in which
the effects of this non-response will have to be considered.  If one is
willing to assume that being unemployed in 1996 is an indicator of the
likelihood of being unemployed at the time of the 1998 survey, the
lower response rate can be interpreted as a higher propensity for non-
response amongst the unemployed.  This will have a bearing on any
analysis that seeks to investigate the effect of ETU on job retention since
those outside the pilot area who become unemployed will fall out of the
sample due to non-response.  This will result in the comparison area
sample becoming disproportionately composed of those who have
remained in work.  In this scenario, results on the effect of ETU on job
retention will have to be regarded as a lower bound.
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Table B.1  Response bias in the 1998 follow-up surveys to the
1997 re-interviewees
1996/7 1998 Significance
Female 56 59 *
Age in 1996 39.4 41.2 *
Partner 44 48 *
Live with parents 36 36
Long term illness 23 24
Economic status: 16+ hours self-employed 7 7
Economic status: 16+ hours employed 62 65 *
Economic status: <16 hours employed 5 5
Economic status: <16 hours self-employed 2 3
Economic status: government training 0 0
Economic status: unemployed claimant 13 8 *
Economic status: unemployed non-claimant 4 4
Economic status: full-time education 1 1
Economic status: temporarily sick 1 1 *
Economic status: long-term sick 1 2
Economic status: looking after home 1 0
Economic status: retired 3 3 *
Economic status: other 0 0
Qualifications: degree 4 5
Qualifications: a-level 6 6
Qualifications: o-level 23 23
Qualifications: cse-level 14 13 *
Qualifications: none 53 54
Housing owned 29 34 *
Housing mortgaged 37 38
Housing social rented 25 21 *
Housing privately rented 6 4 *
Base 2315 1174
Note: for legibility, no decimal places are given for the percentages in this table so very small differences
are not always apparent, despite being significant in some cases.
As noted earlier, the response rate to the booster sample of ETU recipients
was lower than that for the 1997 re-interviewees.  This is unsurprising
since one might imagine that those individuals who responded to the
1997 survey were more likely than those who did not to respond in
1998.  Overall, the 1998 response rate to the booster sample was similar
to the proportion of the original 1996 sample who responded.
Table B.2 below follows a similar format to Table B.1.  It examines the
changing composition of the sample defined in terms of those
characteristics as they existed in 1997.  A similar pattern exists to that in
Table B.1.  In particular, those in employment of 16 or more hours per
week in 1997 are more likely to respond to the 1998 survey, while those
who were unemployed and claiming benefits are less likely to respond.
However, there are notable differences for some of the characteristics.
Those in the booster sample tend to be younger and are less likely to be
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partnered.  Clearly, they are also more likely to be employed for 16 or
more hours per week.
Table B.2  Response bias in the 1998 follow-up surveys to the
1997 booster sample
1997 1998 Significance
Female 54 58 *
Age in 1996 34.3 35.9 *
Partner 21 22
Economic status: 16+ hours self-employed 6 5 *
Economic status: 16+ hours employed 79 82 *
Economic status: <16 hours employed 2 2
Economic status: <16 hours self-employed 0 0
Economic status: government training 0 0
Economic status: unemployed claimant 10 7 *
Economic status: unemployed non-claimant 2 2
Economic status: full-time education 0 0
Economic status: temporarily sick 1 1
Economic status: long-term sick 0 0
Economic status: looking after home 0 0 *
Economic status: retired 0 0
Economic status: other 0 0
Qualifications: degree 4 5 *
Qualifications: A-level 8 8
Qualifications: O-level 24 26
Qualifications: CSE-level 16 15 *
Qualifications: none 48 47
Housing owned 17 22 *
Housing mortgaged 29 32 *
Housing social rented 38 34 *
Housing privately rented 13 10 *
Base 1990 1049
Note: for legibility, no decimal places are given for the percentages in this table so very small differences
are not always apparent, despite being significant in some cases.
The differences between the two samples are due to their different target
populations.  In order to pool the two samples, weighting is needed to
bring the resulting sample into line with what is expected, in terms of
key characteristics.  Since the defining feature of the booster sample is
that its members received ETU, the most appropriate weighting would
be to maintain the profile of ETU receipt evident in the non-booster
sample.  Doing so would also adjust the profile of those characteristics
associated with ETU receipt.  Examination of those members in the
non-booster sample who receive ETU suggests that their profile is quite
similar to that of the booster sample presented in Table B.2.  However,
this is only indicative given the small number of individuals.
B2  Weighting
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Four variants of the model are given.  Column (1) gives the results for
the fully parameterised model.  That is to say, all the variables of interest
are included regardless of their level of significance.  This is refined by
excluding insignificant variables to provide a more parsimonious
specification.  The model results for this specification are given in column
(4).  This is the preferred specification, and the one on which the
commentary is based.  However, as mentioned, some analysis was carried
out on subsets of the sample; namely those aged under 40 and those aged
40 and above.  The results for these models are presented in columns (2)
and (3) respectively.
Table C.1  Duration model results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample Aged <40 aged 40+ full sample
Scheme A area 0.022 0.376 -0.593 0.053
(0.10) (1.04) (1.67) (0.25)
Scheme B area 0.007 0.522 -0.870 0.022
(0.03) (1.39) (2.38)* (0.10)
Receive Earnings Top-up in 97 0.073 -0.336 -0.043 0.169
(0.21) (0.68) (0.07) (0.51)
Female 0.262 0.837 -0.427 0.321
(1.19) (2.78)** (1.07) (1.63)
Age -0.106 -0.262 -0.275 -0.102
(1.87) (0.81) (0.59) (2.14)*
Age squared 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
(1.79) (0.61) (0.64) (1.95)
Owner occupier -0.114 3.215
(0.29) (1.57)
Lives with parents, no rent -0.369 -0.647 4.973
(1.00) (1.56) (2.25)*
Rents 0.042 0.079 3.753
(0.11) (0.16) (1.83)
Rents but pays no rent 2.040 3.574 2.072
(3.42)** (4.26)** (4.01)**
Owns with mortgage 0.091 -0.042 3.553
(0.24) (0.07) (1.74)
Self-assessed health: fairly good 0.187 0.926 -0.172
(0.92) (2.66)** (0.52)
Self-assessed health: not good -0.028 -1.312 0.968
(0.07) (1.60) (1.62)
Respondent has
long-term illness 0.313 0.886 -0.780 0.361
(1.41) (2.66)** (2.01)* (1.79)
Continued
ESTIMATION RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 5APPENDIX C
C1  The estimation results
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Table C.1  Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample Aged <40 aged 40+ full sample
Partnered 0.008 -0.303 0.083
(0.02) (0.47) (0.11)
Separated/divorced/widowed -0.052 1.595 -0.299
(0.13) (1.99)* (0.37)
Partner’s employment
status 1997 0.018 -0.067 0.040
(0.61) (0.70) (1.06)
Education: degree 0.701 1.374 1.998 0.612
(1.72) (2.36)* (2.15)* (1.79)
Education: A-level 0.165 0.746 -1.858
(0.42) (1.42) (1.18)
Education: O-level 0.119 0.173 0.633
(0.43) (0.40) (1.28)
Education: CSE-level 0.211 0.467 -0.253
(0.69) (1.12) (0.30)
Qualification: professional 0.494 0.242 0.808 0.578
(1.50) (0.44) (1.39) (1.93)
Qualification: apprentice 1.098 0.288 1.689 1.080
(2.89)** (0.33) (3.34)** (3.03)**
Qualification: RSA -0.055 0.017 -0.245
(0.21) (0.05) (0.47)
Qualification: City & Guilds -0.035 -0.402 0.826
(0.15) (1.27) (1.88)
Qualification: ONC/OND -0.877 -1.277 -1.252 -0.830
(1.43) (1.19) (1.27) (1.41)
Qualification: HNC/HND 1.333 -0.257 2.489 1.371
(2.84)** (0.34) (3.04)** (3.14)**
Qualification: TEC/BTEC 0.212 0.274
(0.57) (0.64)
Qualification: other 0.510 0.863 -1.653
(1.19) (1.57) (1.29)
Respondent has driving licence 0.279 0.132 0.402 0.275
(1.44) (0.46) (1.27) (1.51)
Job lasting less than 12 months 1.930 2.518 3.287 1.895
(7.26)** (6.50)** (5.03)** (7.75)**
Job lasting between
1 and 3 years 1.532 1.470 2.387 1.600
(4.49)** (3.48)** (2.54)* (5.11)**
Occupation: manager/
professional -0.470 -1.772 0.841 -0.592
(1.22) (2.62)** (1.29) (1.87)
Occupation: clerical -0.273 -1.039 0.135 -0.317
(0.81) (2.00)* (0.25) (1.30)




Table C.1  Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample Aged <40 aged 40+ full sample
Occupation: personal
protection 0.170 -0.576 0.416
(0.54) (1.05) (0.80)
Occupation: sales 0.905 0.119 1.453 0.711
(2.72)** (0.23) (2.71)** (3.37)**
Occupation: plant operative -0.137 -0.803 -0.163
(0.35) (1.38) (0.24)
Industry: manufacturing
and utilities 0.615 1.005 0.031 0.404
(2.10)* (2.23)* (0.06) (1.78)
Industry: construction 0.365 0.694 2.382
(0.71) (0.98) (2.24)*
Industry: hotel and catering 0.611 1.933 -0.060 0.395
(1.78) (3.38)** (0.11) (1.38)
Industry: transport 0.083 0.330 0.145
(0.16) (0.45) (0.17)
Industry: business services
and financial 1.140 2.385 -0.208 0.930
(3.02)** (4.02)** (0.31) (2.92)**
Industry: public administration 0.391 1.494 -0.214
(0.91) (2.00)* (0.34)
Industry: education 0.696 1.984 -0.265 0.511
(1.58) (2.38)* (0.39) (1.45)
Industry: health 0.250 0.647 -0.362
(0.74) (1.07) (0.75)
Industry: other services -1.059 0.133 -3.213 -1.301
(1.60) (0.16) (1.61) (2.13)*
Usual weekly earnings in 1997 -0.008 0.000 -0.023 -0.008
(3.14)** (0.01) (4.60)** (3.04)**
Correction for postal bias 1.746 2.304 1.457 1.726
(5.44)** (5.03)** (3.00)** (5.39)**
Month -0.037 -0.077 0.038 -0.038
(1.62) (2.36)* (1.15) (1.70)
Constant -3.825 -2.759 -1.227 -3.552
(3.31)** (0.61) (0.10) (3.88)**
Observations 19444 8733 10452 19487
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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APPENDIX D ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The dynamic impacts of a labour market programme on employment or
unemployment are often measured via a partially static ‘before and after’
framework, choosing two particular points in time (for example, pre-
programme and post-programme) and measuring whether a person is in
the state of employment or unemployment at each point in time.  For a
number of reasons these states are defined to be mutually exclusive and
are represented with a binary (0, 1) variable27.  Information from a
randomly selected group of programme participants and non-participants
can be analysed in a multivariate statistical framework to explore the
covariates of their labour market status via logistic or probit regression
techniques.  Tests for ‘programme’ effects involve a comparison of the
degree of fit of the two models (participants and non-participants) and
detailed study of the size and significance of the coefficients associated
with covariates.
There are a number of difficulties with this approach.  The first, and
most obvious, is that participants and non-participants are not usually
randomly selected for programme participation.  Comparison between
the two does not, therefore, represent a controlled experimental situation.
‘Self-selection’ into programmes may mean that participants are
systematically different from non-participants, a feature that would
invalidate simple comparative analysis.  Various ‘solutions’ to this problem
exist, from statistical correction for participation bias to the introduction
of a scheme in a randomised manner (eg admission to a scheme at random)
or the restriction of a scheme on a geographical basis, allowing for
comparison between scheme and non-scheme areas.  In the present study
we make use of the latter approach via a feature of the design of the ETU
evaluation, which included separate experimental or ‘pilot’ and non-
experimental or ‘control’ areas.
A second problem with ‘pre’ and ‘post’ programme evaluation methods
arises from the fact that the approach described does not make full use of
the available information and ignores some of the fundamental processes
at work in the labour market.  For example, some people, particularly
those with strong attachment to the labour market, may be unaffected by
a programme designed to modify attachment.  If such people are employed
continuously between the points of observation, this raises the question
of whether they should be included in the analysis and, if so, how?  It
may also be the case that the length of the time period between the two
27 Mainly for computational ease, but also because of the difficulty of extending a
multinomial model into a multi-period framework.
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observations, together with what has happened to a person in this period,
could affect the probability of being employed or unemployed at the
time of the second observation.  Failure to take account of the dynamics
of labour market behaviour and differences between changes in labour
market conditions in pilot and control areas can impart serious bias to
‘point-in-time’ statistical models and can have consequences for the
interpretation of results.
Statistical techniques have been developed to overcome these deficiencies
in a number of ways.  These usually involve the estimation of multi-spell
duration models, which utilise all available information on the dynamics
of labour market changes over a period of time.  Such techniques have
been developed to fit duration models to information on the length of
spells of employment and unemployment, simultaneously dealing with
what is termed ‘unobserved heterogeneity bias’28.  However, these models
are sensitive to the mathematical specification of the so-called ‘survivor
function’ - the shape of the curve used to describe the survival rate - or
its complement, the hazard function (the probability of a spell ending in
the next period given that it has lasted for a specific period).
These problems can be addressed in a number of ways.  The technique
adopted in the present study models as a binary recurrent sequence all of the
information on spells of employment or non-employment in each
individual’s work history.  This is described in the example below.
Consider an individual whose employment/non-employment experience
can be recorded as a sequence of zeroes and ones over a length of time
denoted as s periods.
0 = not employed 1 = employed
individual
i
0 0 1 1 .... 1 0 0 0
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 ....... t=s-3 t=s-2 t=s-1 t=s
At time period 2 the individual becomes employed, then remains
employed until time period s-3 (3 units of time from the end of the
observation period).  These zeroes and ones represent a binary recurrent
sequence that describes the history and sequence of non-employment
28 This is the effect of unobserved factors such as ‘motivation to work’ on the movement
of people in and out of jobs and the potential effect of these factors on the estimated
coefficients of duration models.
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and employment for this individual.  Modelling all such observations
simultaneously, including information which describes the cumulative
experience of the individual at each point in time, can overcome the
problems which arise simply by choosing two arbitrary points in time
and helps eliminate the problem of model specification which typically
affects duration analyses.
Table D.1  Modelling the probability of a spell of employment or non-employment ending
(non-recipient of ETU)
Non-recipients
Employment spell end Non-employment spell end
B S.E. B S.E.
Male 0.432* 0.140 0.193 0.107
Age group
16-21 0.331 0.370 0.297 0.283
22-24 0.007 0.380 0.316 0.297
25-34 0.020 0.245 0.190 0.176
35-44 Ref Ref Ref Ref
45-54 -0.278 0.258 -0.126 0.181
55 and over 0.352 0.260 -1.425* 0.233
age not stated -3.278 11.058
Minimum age school-leaver -0.157 0.174 -0.110 0.125
Ever truanted 0.100 0.203 0.127 0.156
Attended all or most classes in final year -0.528* 0.279 0.164 0.225
Highest qualification
GCSE ‘D’ or below Ref Ref Ref Ref
GCSE A-C grades -0.204 0.266 0.201 0.231
‘A’ levels -0.487 0.402 -0.080 0.306
Vocational qual. -0.428* 0.207 0.464* 0.181
Professional quals. -0.447 0.299 0.369 0.235
No quals. reported -0.255 0.222 0.388* 0.194
Reading difficulties 0.523 0.386 -0.019 0.283
Writing difficulties -0.567* 0.296 -0.011 0.223
Numeracy difficulties 0.222 0.365 -0.293 0.260
Partner present -0.004 0.151 0.167 0.120
Self assessed skills
Good at constructing 0.095 0.129 0.095 0.099
Good at teaching 0.116 0.153 -0.062 0.116
Good with people -0.273* 0.133 0.428* 0.105
Ethnicity
White Ref Ref Ref Ref
Black -4.034 8.438 0.396 0.769
Other -3.802 6.987 -0.298 0.469
Continued
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Table D.1  Continued
Non-recipients
Employment spell end Non-employment spell end
B S.E. B S.E.
Housing tenure
Owner occupier -0.269* 0.127 0.349* 0.100
Other Ref Ref Ref Ref
Good health -0.3612* 0.139 0.3024* 0.117
Disabled 0.345* 0.154 -0.685* 0.140
Pilot (trend) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001
September 1996 status
Spells of employment 0.195* 0.086 0.273* 0.067
Spells of non-employment 0.146* 0.071 -0.013 0.050
Cum. months employed -0.033* 0.005 0.001 0.004
Cum. months non-employed -0.007 0.005 -0.004 0.003
Unemployment rate in locality 0.109* 0.037 0.027 0.027
Note: S.E. = Standard error of estimated coefficient.
An asterisk indicates that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Ref. = reference category
Table D.2  Modelling the probability of a spell of employment or non-employment ending
(recipients of ETU)
ETU recipients
Employment spell end Non-employment spell end
B S.E. B S.E.
Male 0.254* 0.126 -0.066 0.079
Age group
16-21 -0.106 0.419 -0.295 0.242
22-24 -0.057 0.409 -0.369 0.244
25-34 0.372 0.206 -0.068 0.123
35-44 Ref Ref Ref Ref
45-54 -0.186 0.219 0.039 0.132
55 and over -0.248 0.306 -0.020 0.182
age not stated -2.841 8.355 0.941 1.239
Minimum age school-leaver 0.003 0.171 -0.030 0.109
Ever truanted 0.305 0.216 0.196 0.139
Attended all or most classes in final year 0.02 0.339 0.208 0.198
Continued
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Table D.2  Continued
ETU recipients
Employment spell end Non-employment spell end
B S.E. B S.E.
Highest qualification
GCSE ‘D’ or below Ref Ref Ref Ref
GCSE A-C grades 0.389 0.281 0.197 0.177
‘A’ levels 0.634 0.385 0.413 0.239
Vocational qual. 0.366 0.249 0.138 0.154
Professional quals. 0.608 0.326 0.217 0.205
No quals. reported 0.445 0.259 0.090 0.158
Reading difficulties -0.077 0.378 -0.089 0.198
Writing difficulties -0.505 0.335 0.299 0.163
Numeracy difficulties 0.179 0.318 -0.341 0.203
Partner present -0.024 0.154 0.065 0.101
Self assessed skills
Good at constructing 0.084 0.130 0.061 0.080
Good at teaching -0.011 0.157 -0.004 0.094
Good with people -0.321* 0.127 0.040 0.082
Ethnicity
White Ref Ref Ref Ref
Black -0.061 1.032 -0.412 0.621
Other 0.690 0.528 -0.275 0.375
Housing tenure
Owner occupier -0.408* 0.129 0.178* 0.080
Other Ref Ref Ref Ref
Good health -0.148 0.142 0.249* 0.090
Disabled 0.269 0.157 0.053 0.101
Scheme A (trend) 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001
September 1996 status
Spells of employment -0.154 0.098 0.062 0.068
Spells of non-employment 0.292* 0.060 -0.023 0.042
Cum. months employed -0.001 0.005 -0.007* 0.004
Cum. months non-employed -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.003
Unemployment rate in locality 0.204* 0.044 -0.147* 0.027
Note: S.E. = Standard error of estimated coefficient.
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